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This thesis treats the impact of the atomic bomb on traditional naval strategy as
that strategy had developed under the influence of Captain Alfred T. Mahan, how-
traditional naval strategy was modified by the development of naval aviation, the
lessons of World War II, and the leadership of James Forrestal. and how the adoption
of atomic weapons into naval strategic planning was integrally tied to naval aviation.
The growth of the Soviet Union as a threat to world peace, and interservice
rivalry over roles and missions are compared as factors that influenced the development
of post-World War II naval strategic thinking. The Navy's reaction to the adoption of
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Navy has always had a very particular manner in its approach
to new and innovative ideas. Some might even call the traditional naval approach
dogmatic and short-sighted. Senior naval officers protested the introduction of steam
propulsion, torpedoes, rifled guns and the screw propeller. They fought against the
establishment of the Office of Naval intelligence, the installation of electric lights and
abolishment of flogging. [Ref. 1: p. 5] Rather than rushing headlong into unexplored
pathways of naval development, the Navy has very methodically evaluated, analyzed,
experimented and discussed every7 new development slowly and painstakingly prior to
trial and acceptance [Ref. 2: p. 77].
Perhaps this approach developed in part from the Navy's historically precarious
position in the U.S. defense community. The President and Congress, supported by the
public at large, have always been quick to cut defense spending for the armed forces in
times of peace. The historical reluctance of democracies to adequately support a
peacetime military defense was particularly acute in the case of the Navy. Throughout
America's history, the Army was actively engaged in opening the western frontier even
in times of peace. The Navy, on the other hand, was generally left without a visible
mission except in times of war. Subsequently, it was a particularly attractive target for
budget reductions. After every conflict, the U.S. leadership was anxious to cut the
Navy's budget, reduce the fleet and rely upon diplomacy to achieve national goals.
[Ref. 3: p. 260].
Secondly, the single unit cost of Navy ships has always been so great and so
difficult to justify that there is little room for error in choosing and building the right
system for the job. The Navy could not build an inexpensive prototype to evaluate
and perhaps discard if it did not meet expectations. Once a new ship is built it must
serve for years regardless of its possible inadequacies. These two factors have no doubt
forced the Navy to be cautious at spending limited resources on unproven systems and
hesitant at pursuing dubious ventures. It has been wiser to preserve and protect what
one has than to draw unwanted scrutiny with risky and speculative ventures.
Subsequently, the Navy has been very conservative in its modernization programs.
A third reason for the slow pace of naval development has undoubtedly been
parochialism. The first two factors served to amplify the intransigent influence of the
third. The struggle of naval aviation to establish itself is a dramatic example. Battleship
sailors, who had struggled to build what existed saw little reason to risk future gains on
unproven ideas. The total extent of this partisan effect is impossible to determine but
was surely significant.
One should be careful, however, not to exaggerate the effect of this conservatism.
Several factors, unique to the Navy, tended to mitigate the effects of such things as
parochialism and intransigence. After the turn of the century, the Navy did find itself
exploring new avenues of development and soon adopted much of what it found to be
valuable. The technological advances of the industrial revolution prodded the Navy
into facing the new developments of the machine age.
One of the factors that mitigated the Navy's conservatism was the shear variety
of naval activity brought on by the integration of the submarine and airplane into
traditional naval forces. The tremendous gulf that separated the specialties-surface,
subsurface, and airborne Navy—could have produced chasms in the service, divided the
officer corp and destroyed naval unity. On the contrary, it strengthened the Navy, and
tended to cultivate a more receptive attitude by the service to new ideas and
developments. Naval officers were assigned to their specific branches of the Navy, but
were not allowed to forget that above all else they were naval officers and only
secondly, fliers, submariners or battleship sailors. As Admiral Moffett testified before
the Committee on Military Affairs in 1926:
. . . we feel that a fiver who operates in conjunction with the fleet and does not
understand what is " takine place on the surface and subsurface vessels is a
nuisance and menace to us]Ref. 4: pp. 129-130].
They were each to aspire to "command at sea" and eventual command over all naval
specialties [Ref. 5: p. 23]. In this regard they clearly contrasted with both Army and
Army Air Corp officers who tended to reject generalization, concentrating instead upon
their individual specialties. This contrasting attitude spared the Navy the division it
produced in the Army-resulting in the eventual break-away of the Air Force.
[Ref. 2: p. 6]
Additionally, the "unified diversity" that characterized the Navy prompted naval
officers to think in terms of unified strategy, in seeing the "big picture" and in rejecting
overly simplified explanations of how to meet the postwar threat. World War II in the
Pacific was recognized as having been won by a balanced fleet of forces-aircraft,
submarines, surface ships and Marines. This balance of forces was perceived to be
necessary in any combat situation and necessarily required the cooperation of all
available specialties. One force was not to be arbitrarily restricted in its operations to
protect the parochial interests of another. This unified approach was apparently
rejected by the Army Air Corp which was inclined toward an entirely different
interpretation of what won the war.
From a historical legacy of conservatism, the Navy emerged from the war with a
much broader outlook toward strategy and modernization. The naval officer corp was
highly educated, technically proficient and confident of the Navy's capability to handle
change and technological innovation. However, there were natural limits to this open-
mindedness.
The sudden shock of the atomic bomb blast over Alamogordo, and then twice
again over Japan forced the Navy to step back and re-evaluate itself. The total
involvement required by the war and the secret development of the atomic bomb
caught the Navy without a framework of understanding from which to accept or reject
the bomb as a naval weapon. The struggle to establish a framework with which to
view the bomb, a nuclear policy on its employment in the maritime environment and
the associated struggle to obtain the assets to employ a nuclear strategy drew the Navy
into a controversy that drained its postwar esteem and threatened to reduce the service
to a level far removed from its former stature.
Central to the post-WWII debate, both within and outside the Navy, over
adopting the nuclear bomb to traditional military roles was the aircraft carrier and
naval aviation itself. Each service desperately tried to integrate nuclear weapons into
its primary mission not only to increase its own effectiveness as a fighting force, which
could have occurred rather painlessly, but also to preserve itself from the severe
postwar budget cuts under the uncompromising direction of Harry Truman. For the
Navy that meant trying to find a nuclear role for the aircraft carrier which had risen to
the pinnacle position as the weapon of choice in U.S. naval strategy.
Captain Alfred T. Mahan, the father of U.S. naval strategy, defined two
propositions on the nature of naval warfare that already fit well with the traditional
naval attitude toward warfare in general. First, Mahan said that sea lines of
communication (SLOC's) were always weak points in an enemy's defenses. The
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projection of naval power should therefore be oriented toward sea control. Secondly,
Mahan taught that the fleet should direct it forces against the enemy's ships and fleet.
By defeat of the enemy fleet the sea lines of communications could be preserved for use
by friendly forces. [Ref. 6: p. 1272] Both of these concepts harmonized with traditional
imperialist naval philosophy in that both were vital to establish "command of the sea"
promoting unhindered trade and colonial expansion [Ref. 7: p. 107].
After some procrastination, the Navy integrated the aircraft carrier into the role
of sea control that would surely have pleased the venerable Captain Mahan. The
Navy finished World War II with twenty-six Essex class, eight Independence class,
seventy-eight escort carriers and three Midway class carriers for a total of 115 carriers
that gave the United States undisputed "sea control" throughout the world's oceans
[Ref. 8: p. 346].
After the successes of the Navy in World War II, one could not talk about naval
strategy without talking about the aircraft carrier. Naval strategy was the aircraft
carrier. However, while some mourned the relative demise of the battleship, the
evolution in naval strategy brought on by the adoption of the aircraft carrier retained a
good deal of traditional naval strategy. Sixteen-inch guns had been replaced by aircraft
which had extended the range of naval power projection from 25 miles to almost any
land point [Ref. 3: p. 261]. In many respects the military objectives of the aircraft
carrier were synonymous with the military objectives of the battleship navy-sea control
and power projection against the enemy fleet. And, despite the potential of strategic
bombing as expounded by the Army Air Corp, the Navy generally rejected it as
anything more than just another capability and not as the single determining strategy
[Ref. 2: p. 77].
Although after twenty-five years the aircraft carrier did come to dominate the
fleet, the transition was not an easy one and the difficulties for early proponents of
naval aviation were significant; no less so were the difficulties of integrating nuclear
weapons into a naval strategy based on the carrier. A good deal of the difficulties were
fabricated by the other services who sought to aggrandize themselves at the Navy's
expense. The Navy interpreted the lessons of World War II as erasing any doubts of
the carrier's value whether in a conventional role or a new nuclear role. The other
services, particularly the Army Air Corp which was desperate for independence, felt the
lessons of the war indicated otherwise. The difference of opinion among the services
over the role of naval aviation and the Air Corp's drive for autonomy provided the
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foundation for the controversy that erupted after the war and engulfed the Navy. In
this less than placid environment the Navy struggled to integrate nuclear weapons into
its traditional maritime strategy.
The purpose of this study is to prove the thesis that the Navy's efforts to
integrate the atomic bomb into naval strategy involved much more than merely
developing a weapons system and deploying it throughout the fleet. Rather it involved
a difficult and frustrating process whereby the Navy attempted to define the role of the
atomic bomb in naval warfare within the context of a greater and often conflicting
national effort to come to grips with the military and political implications of nuclear
weapons for American foreign policy.
12
II. THE EVOLUTION OF PRE-NUCLEAR NAVAL STRATEGY
A. THE BIRTH OF NAVAL AVIATION
U.S. naval aviation must credit some of its humble beginnings to a civilian,
Eugene Ely, who piloted a Glen Curtiss biplane down a sloping wooden ramp built
upon an American light cruiser, the USS Birmingham, which was sitting at anchor olT
Hampton Roads near Norfolk, Virginia. It would take another two years and the
British navy to make the first take off from a ship underway which occurred in July of
1912 [Ref. 8: p. 29]. However, from Ely's first flight from a naval ship, naval aviation
attracted supporters who struggled through significant opposition to finally establish a
niche for the fledsling communitv in the Naw.
What U.S. naval strategy existed prior to the introduction of aircraft into the
fleet can be credited almost entirely to Captain Alfred Mahan. Underlying the
influence of Mahan's doctrine on naval strategy was the traditional U.S. inclination
toward isolationism mixed with nineteenth century imperialism. The battleship navy
had sailed around the world only to tie up in port to wait for future hostilities
[Ref. 9: p. 65]. After war was declared and following Mahan's strategy, upon
identifying the enemy, the fleet would sail out to battle on the high seas where one big
decisive battle would determine the victor, or surround his ports and defeat him
through blockading actions.
Against this well engrained strategy, naval aviation had an uphill struggle for
recognition. Army aviation had become very vocal and made tremendous demands
upon its parent service. Subsequently, it had extremely rough going, encountered
tremendous obstacles and yet, through the personal sacrifice of aviation proponents,
made notable progress toward its ultimate goal-autonomy. Naval aviation was a good
deal more passive and for reasons already stated did not seek autonomy. Nevertheless,
despite slower progress, naval aviation did eventually achieve preeminence.
In contrast to the Army which allowed its air force to fly over enemy territory on
its "own" pursuits, the Navy demanded from the beginning that naval aviation support
the fleet. Subsequently, the Navy concentrated on the use of seaplanes as
reconnaissance platforms to seek out the enemy. The development of the aircraft
carrier was not vigorously pursued but left to the British who seemed somewhat more
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interested. When the British entered World War I in 1914, the U.S. Navy owned only
twelve aircraft, all of them seaplanes or flying boats. However, by the end of the war,
the Navy owned 2,107 aircraft of all varieties as well as 15 airships. The Navy's
primary aviation-related responsibility in the War was that o^ conducting anti-U-boat
patrols achieving the first successful sinking on 25 March 1918 [Ref. 8: p. 117].
During the war the Navy restricted its bombing activities to naval targets and
enemy airship fields that threatened the fleet. However, there were plans to include the
Navy in the strategic bombing of Germany had the war continued. [Ref. S: p. US]
After the war, slow progress toward establishing a truly effective aviation arm in
the Navy continued. The USS Langley was commissioned and with the support oi'
senior naval officers who had seen both the U.S. and Royal navies at work in the war,
naval aviation was accorded more respectability.
B. THE STRUGGLE OF NAVAL AVIATION TO SURVIVE
Although some progress had been made toward expanding its role, naval aviation
nevertheless still found itself struggling to survive. Ironically, it was not within the
Navy but outside that the struggle took place. And. it was during this struggle to
preserve naval aviation from enemies outside the Navy that the foundations of a much
greater struggle yet to come were laid. The controversy over roles, missions, and
strategy that would engulf the Navy 25 years later as it came to grips with nuclear
weapons began with this struggle. One particular incident can possibly be identified as
the beginning.
After World War I, as after the Revolutionary War, the Navy was once again
threatened with dis-establishment. While debate raged over whether the United States
even needed a navy, the Navy joined the Army to mount an offensive. The
surrendered German battleship Ostfriesland and submarine, U-l 17, were positioned at
anchor in Chesapeake Bay and sunk by aerial bombings in July 1921. The German
destroyer G-I02 and cruiser Frankfurt followed them to the bottom a few days later
under the bombing of seventy-four Army and Navy aircraft.
The Navy participated in the tests for their scientific and military value. The
Navy's goals were to demonstrate the effectiveness of aerial bombing against ships as
well as the effectiveness of compartmentation for ship survival from aerial
bombardment [Ref. S: p. 124]. The Navy, having a broader outlook than the Army Air
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Service, had no intention of denigrating the value of surface ships, but merely wanted
to demonstrate the potential value of naval aviation. Surface ships could be protected
with compartmentation and were still integral to a balanced naval force. The primary
goal of the Navy after all was to demonstrate the necessity of the surface navy as well
as naval aviation to the nation's defense.
In contrast to the objectives of the Navy, the Army Air Service wanted the tests
to demonstrate the superiority of air power over seapower [Ref. 7: p. 96]. By
demonstrating the ability of aircraft to sink a battleship, however contrived the
circumstance," the Air Service hoped to provide legitimacy for their campaign to
separate themselves from the Army and set up a separate service. They saw the tests
as one more example of the supremacy of air power and its revolutionary capabilities.
Adherents to this philosophy were led by the arch-proponent of air power, General
"Billy" Mitchell.
The Army-Navy cooperation in the bombing demonstration was actually quite
ironic considering what the Army really hoped to achieve from the tests. The Navy
cooperated in the tests with the understanding that they were to promote the mutual
support of aviation within both services. The Navy, while fully knowledgeable of
Mitchell's efforts to divorce the air service from the Army, considered it an internal
affair for the War Department and the Army, and of no significant concern for the
Navy or naval aviation, both of whom were satisfied with their relationship. The air
service, however, attacked the Navy and its aviation branch more than it did its own
service in an attempt to provide justification for its case. [Ref. 3: p. 42]
Mitchell chose to attack the Navy for two reasons. First, he believed that by
demonstrating the effectiveness of an aircraft in a bombing attack against a battleship
he could strengthen the case of aviation in general and further his goal of establishing a
separate service. The foundation for this lay in his honest conviction that indeed air
power was superior to sea power and that there was no longer a real future for the
Navy. Navies were suddenly vulnerable to a force faster and more mobile than
themselves—aircraft. Because naval vessels (as well as land targets) were at the
apparent mercy of aircraft bombs, navies (and land armies) became obsolete. Even
before there had been any substantive strategic bombing, Mitchell and others in the
^The name Armv Air Service was changed to Armv Air Corp as part of the Armv
Air Corp Act of 1926.
The ships were unarmed, adrift and unable to maneuver which some criticized as
invalidating the tests.
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Army Air Service were already committed to the primacy of aerial bombing as the
preferred strategy for winning war [Ref. 1: p. 171]. Mitchell had visited Major General
Sir Hugh Trenchard, commander of the Royal Flying Corp in Britain, where Mitchell
adopted Trenchard's philosophy of strategic bombing. This strategy held that the
airplane was an offensive and not a defensive weapon and as such was more effective
operating independently of other forces, far beyond the battle lines and against the core
of enemy resistance--as a strategic weapon [Ref. 10: p. 250]. By adopting this
philosophy Mitchell instilled a strategy upon the Air Corp that would later come to
dominate the entire national defense effort.
Mitchell's whole philosophy on the character of aviation and strategic bombing,
confirmed in his mind the logic of his second objective in attacking the Navy which he
hoped the bombing test would support-to remove naval aviation from the Navy and
integrate it with Army aviation into a new service The Admiral's Lobby. [Ref. 7: p. 29].
He believed that the U.S. Navy was obsolete, that it did not need an air force, and that
what it did have would be more effective if under a unified command with army
aviation--as a new and separate service.
The Navy, which regarded naval aviation as an integrated element of a combined
naval force, rejected the idea that any one strategy like strategic bombing could
invalidate traditional military strategies and much less naval strategy. The
development of an aerial bombardment capability for naval aviation expanded the
striking force of the Navy but certainly did not invalidate the value of other branches
of the naval service and their contribution to an overall defensive and a warfighting
capability. The Navy, while not yet ready to commit to naval aviation the preeminent
position it achieved during World War II. did hold it as essential to the mission of the
Navy and was not inclined to tolerate any moves that would have it removed.
If the Navy had fully understood Mitchell's ultimate objectives in his drive for a
separate service, one can doubt if it would have cooperated so readily in the bombing
tests. Ultimately, the Navy did oppose Mitchell and was quite successful in frustrating
his plans. Mitchell eventually grew so impatient with inpediments to the establishment
of an independent air force that he resorted to aberrant behavior that brought on a
court-martial and his departure from the Army Air Service [Ref. 8: p. 124].
The Navy joined in the move to hinder Mitchell primarily in an effort to stave off
attempts to divorce aviation from the Navy under a 'Unity of the Air' policy which
would combine it with the Army Air Service in an independent air force. However, no
less objectionable to the Navy was Mitchell's strategic doctrine [Ref. 3: p. 42].
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The Navy had always fancied itself the first line of defense against aggression.
Mahan clearly proved the vital role of the navy in a nation's defense. The U.S. Navy
would be the first to sally forth and confront an enemy who would necessarily be
corning across the seas in his attack. Mitchell threatened this role by claiming strategic
bombers could move more quickly and be more effective in providing the first line of
defense against an enemy. This difference in opinion on a role vital to the Navy and
essential to the Army Air Service provided the grounds for the first skirmish between
the services.
C. THE FIRST CONFLICT OVER ROLES AND MISSIONS
Until the advent of aircraft, the dividing line of responsibilities between the Navy
and the Army was rarely disputed. It was generally accepted that the only area for
contention could be in the shared responsibility for coastal defense. In that regard
conventional wisdom held that the Navy controlled all operations beyond the range of
Army coastal batteries. The adoption of aircraft by both services with its longer range
blurred the fine line that divided the responsibilities of both services and soon brought
on a dispute. [Ref. 4: p. 70]
Starting in 1921, General Mitchell and the Chief of the Air Service, Major
General Patrick, initiated a campaign to divorce the coastal defense responsibilities
from the Navy and give all such responsibilities to the Army Air Service [Ref. 11: p.
34]. Patrick reasoned that naval aviation should be following the fleet and would not
logically be available to provide coastal defenses. Mitchell was more specific. He had
formulated a strategy to provide complete control of coastal defenses by the air service.
• Reconnaissance by air to locate approaching air forces and surface fleets.
• A series of sky battles to determine control of the air.
• After control was attained, direct attack on enemy vessels. [Ref. 11: pp. 33-34]
Mitchell's strategy, true to form, contained no provisions for naval aviation. The
Navy and naval aviation were to be removed entirely from coastal defense and
restricted to their responsibilities of meeting the enemy fleet offensively on the high
seas. Mitchell's efforts were taking place despite the conclusions of the Aeronautical
Board in 1917 which held that the responsibility of coastal defense should be shared.
[Ref. 11: p. 35]
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Nevertheless, Mitchell pursued the matter, until General Pershing established
another board under Brig. Gen. Charles E. Kilbourne which predictably concluded the
matter differently. The Kilbourne board determined that shared responsibility was
unwise and that the Army should control coastal defense. [Ref. 11: p. 23]
General Patrick was particularly concerned with the increasing number of land-
based naval aircraft. He petitioned the War Department to transfer all land-based
aircraft to the Army Air Service in the interest of "economy and security".
Furthermore, he wanted the Army Air Service charged with responsibility for all aerial
operations originating from land. Mitchell added that the Navy should be restricted
from operating aircraft within 200 miles of land.
Even the War Department became concerned when in 1928 the Navy began
stationing torpedo planes ashore in Hawaii and Panama [Ref. 12: p. 53]. This forced
the Navy into assenting to another board which resulted in an ambiguous ruling that
still allowed naval aviation shore-based aircraft if they were for scouting and patrol.
The result disappointed the Army and allowed the Navy to continue its land-based
expansion. It was aided by Rear Admiral William A. Moffett whose struggles with the
Army Air Service extended into the halls of Congress where he defended the Navy's
coastal defense role as "essentially naval operations".
When Douglas MacArthur became Chief of Staff in 1930, he sought out the
Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral William V. Pratt and demanded that the matter be
settled once and for all. The MacArthur-Pratt agreement, though attempting to be
specific, left too much to interpretation to work by itself. Admiral Pratt supported the
Army's assertions over rightful control of coastal defense. Pratt agreed only because
he did not want to spend scarce funds on what he considered a secondary mission.
[Ref. 12: pp. 55-56] He was concerned about the striking power of the fleet, which
included naval aviation, and being able to defeat the enemy at sea. He subsequently
renamed all shore naval air establishments fleet air stations, and ensured they were
controlled by fleet commanders. Shore-based aircraft were expected to deploy with the
aircraft carriers or seaplane tenders. He did not feel that peacetime funding could
maintain both missions, supporting the fleet and coastal defense, adequately.
Naval aviation was disgusted with the agreement but found it did not have to
wait long for its revenge. In August of 1931 an old freighter, Mount Shasta was
donated to the Air Corp for target practice. The ship was towed 55 miles out to sea to
be sunk. The Army sent out nine bombers on the first day who failed to locate the
ship. On the second day, although located, the bombers failed to sink, the ship with
their 300-pound bombs. It was finally sunk by the Coast Guard.
The Navy made the most of the affair and cast as much doubt as possible on the
Army's effort to actually accomplish its new coastal defense role. The bickering
between the services continued unabated. Meanwhile both services were involved in
the development of land-based coastal defense bombers. The Army, convinced it
needed to address the possibility of a sea-borne invasion [Ref. 10: p. 269], developed
the B-17 and B-18 [Ref. 13: pp. 42-43], while the Navy, under the direction of Admiral
King, chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, purchased long range flying boats.
The Army complained that the Navy was violating the MacArthur-Pratt
agreement and demanded another board. Subsequently, the Navy agreed once again
that the Army could control coastal defense while reserving for itself the legitimate role
of anti-submarine warfare and any other activity beyond the close-in area of the coast.
This allowed the Navy free use of long-range seaplanes which, while having the
primary function of supporting the fleet, could still operate beyond the immediate
coastline. With this minor concession the conflict came as close to being settled as it
possibly could have-leaving both services still far less than satisfied. Even up until
Pearl Harbor there never existed a clear cut system of joint Army-Navy coastal defense
[Ref. 13: p. 31].
D. THE EVOLUTION OF CONTEMPORARY NAVAL STRATEGY BEGINS
The rise of naval aviation and the integration of the aircraft carrier into the fleet
both supported and challenged the theories of traditional naval strategy. While the
traditional strategy of engaging the enemy fleet on the high seas was complemented by
the capabilities of the aircraft, the role of the battleship in those engagements was
seriously challenged. Additionally and perhaps more revolutionary was the
introduction of a strategic capability into the Navy made possible by the ability of
naval aircraft to project naval power far past the historical limits of naval gunnery deep
into enemy territory. This evolution began with a rather innocuous display of strategic
thinking utilizing naval aviation against a land target.
The popular idealism that promoted the formation of the League of Nations after
World War I also spawned what proved to be futile efforts to limit naval armament.
The Washington Naval Treaty placed limits on the tonnage, armament and number of
ships of the participating nations. As a signatory to the Treaty, the U.S. was forced to
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abort the construction of two battle-cruisers then being built. [Ref. 10: p. 247]
However, the Treaty did allow uncompleted ships to be converted to aircraft carriers, a
course of action approved by Congress on 1 July 1922. Both ships, Saratoga and
Lexington, were completed and commissioned in 1927 as CV-3 and CV-2 respectively.
While preparing for deployment with the fleet, the first pilot to take off and land on
the Saratoga was Commander Marc A. Mitscher who as a Vice Admiral would fly his
flag on a second Lexington during World War II [Ref. 8: p. 138].
After preparations for deployment had been completed, both ships were assigned
to opposing sides in a fleet exercise called Fleet Problem IX to be conducted off the
Pacific side of Panama in 1929. In this exercise the use of carriers as the primary fleet
striking force began to displace what had been their traditional role as supporting units
to the battleship.
The Blue fleet which included the Lexington was tasked with the defense of the
'o '
Canal. The Black fleet with the Saratoga was to attack from the West. The Saratoga
embarked Commander Air Battle Force. Rear Admiral J.M. Reeves, a brilliant
tactician who although not an aviator himself was an extremely strong proponent of
naval air power, and her executive officer, Commander Whiting, who had previously
commanded the Langley. Reeves, having formulated ideas on the striking power of
naval aircraft, requested permission from the commander-in-chief of the Black Fleet, to
detach from the fleet and operate independently against the Blue Fleet. Permission was
granted and the Saratoga sailed south 100 miles to anchor at the Galapagos Islands.
Meanwhile Blue and Black Fleets made contact upon which the Lexington was
promptly declared heavily damaged by gunfire from the opposing battleships. The Blue
Fleet was perplexed at not finding the Saratoga. The exercise was only to last three
days, 23 to 26 January, to end at 0800 on the 26th. The Saratoga and her destroyer
escorts had still not been sighted by noon on the 25th, the last full day of the exercise.
Finally, on the evening of the 25th, after falling in behind what was mistaken to be the
Lexington, the Blue Fleet battleship, Detroit, was declared by the Saratoga' to have
been sunk by her 8 inch turrets after 60 minutes of fire. The Detroit, despite the
exercise umpire's agreement with the call, radioed the Saratoga's position to the Blue
Fleet.
The Saratoga had returned to the exercise area under the cover of darkness the
night before.
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At 0400 on the morning of the 26th, the Saratoga turned into the wind and
launched eighty aircraft which were directed to strike the Canal then attack any
battleships encountered while returning to the ship. The aircraft passed over the target
at 0600 catching the Army defenders completely by surprise. AA guns were covered by
tarps and guncrews were at breakfast. The Army Air Corp at the adjoining field,
Albrook Field, sent up planes to attack the "carrier". Unfortunately, they encountered
and "sank" their own Blue Fleet carrier, the Lexington.
Meanwhile, the Saratoga steamed into the Panama Gulf and recovered her
aircraft. She immediately came under fire from the remaining Blue forces, who
declared her sunk. Unfortunately the damage had already been done and the point
made. The Saratoga had accomplished what the Black Fleet battleships had not been
able to do-successfully attack the exercise target. By her actions the Saratoga
demonstrated that the aircraft carrier could accomplish a naval objective independently
of the battleship fleet. From that point on the aircraft carrier began its path toward
dominance over the battleship. The World War II Carrier Strike Force can trace its
origin to that attack on the morning of 26 January 1929. The aircraft carrier had
commenced its drive to dislodge the battleship as the primary instrument of naval
strategy. Admiral Reeves, who was accused of trickery, survived the hubbub cause by
his unconventional tactics to become the Commander-in-Chief U.S. Fleet two years
later. [Ref. S: pp. 139-141]
The battleship era receded slowly until 7 December 1941 when it swiftly expired
and sank to the bottom of Pearl Harbor [Ref. 3: p. 256]. However, naval strategy
fashioned from the teachings of Captain Alfred T. Mahan was not so easily overturned.
In fact, the aircraft carrier only appeared to create a new strategy. The carrier strike
force performed the same functions as the battleship, only it did so with an extended
range. Fleets continued to meet on the high sea, engage one another until victory was
declared and then stop to pick up survivors from the sinking ships. Now, however,
they engaged from hundreds of miles apart, and threw airplanes at one another instead
of cannon shot. U.S. naval strategy continued to adhere to Mahan's principles of
naval warfare. The Navy still felt the only correct objective for the application of
naval power was the enemy's fleet and associated forces. Strategic bombing as touted
by the Air Force was recognized but rejected as ineffective and "immoral" [Ref. 14: p.
309]. One could not control the seas with strategic bombing—and sea control was
necessary for victory. Naval strategy had begun its alteration that would replace the
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battleship with the aircraft carrier as the premier striking arm of the fleet. However, it
did not abandon what had been the Navy's most basic purposes.
E. THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER AND THE BALANCED FLEET
The United States concluded World War II with complete mastery of the seas.
Had the aircraft carriers been in Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, the situation might
or might not have been different. Nevertheless, no one can contend with the
preeminent position achieved by aircraft carriers, particularly in the Pacific where they
reigned supreme. Admiral King, wartime Commander-in-Chief. US Fleet, paid a
significant tribute to the carrier as follows:
With the possible exception of amphibious warfare, which covers a field
of considerablv broader scope, the outstanding development of the war in the
field of naval' strategv and tactics has been the convincing proof and general
acceptance of the fact' that, in accord with the basic concept^or the United~States
Naw, a concept established some 25 years ago, naval aviation is and must
alwa'vs be an integral and primarv component of the fleet. Naval Aviation has
proved its worth not onlv in its basic purpose of destroving hostile air and naval
forces, but also in amphibious warfare involving attacks In support of landing
operations, in reconnaissance over the sea and in challenging and defeating
hostile land-based planes over positions held in force bv the enemv. In these
fields, our naval aviation has won both success and distinction. Because of its
mobility and the striking power and long range of its weapons, the aircraft carrier
has proved itself a major and vital "element of naval strength, whose onlv
weakness-its vulnerability-demands the support of all other types, and thereby
places an additional premium on the flexibilitv and balance of our fleet. The
balanced fleet is the effective fleet. [Ref. 2: p. 9[
This highly supportive attitude permeated all naval thinking after the war. The
versatility of naval aviation in accomplishing all of the naval strategic precepts of
Mahan made it the ideal focus of naval strategy. Naval aviation was effective at
maintaining control over sea lines of communication by sinking enemy forces bent on
sea denial. It was equally effective at meeting enemy forces on the high seas or in
coastal areas, either independently or in support of other naval operations. The usual
doctrinal intransigence of naval leadership had been significantly moderated before the
war by the aerial demonstrations already discussed. Pearl Harbor and the sinking of
the battleship fleet left little choice but to rely on the aircraft carrier. In that way
naval aviation was forced to prove itself early which it did with spectacular success at
such places as Midway and Marianas.
Along with its preeminent position as the striking arm of the fleet, the aircraft
carrier was easily adaptable to a new role-showing the flag. Its mobility and strength
made it the ideal instrument of foreign policy for a nation inclined toward isolationism
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yet forced into international leadership by world events. The carrier could move into a
situation, and by its mere presence ameliorate events or take positive action if
necessary—yet, be ready to pull out if circumstances warranted. The aviation admirals
who had risen to positions of authority during the war had the uttermost confidence in
the aircraft carrier and were eager to apply it in a peacetime role.
As Admiral King stated, the carrier depended on a balance fleet, a concept that
had been instilled in the Navy several years previously. There could be no effort by
naval aviation to separate itself from the rest of the naval community. The aircraft
carrier was totally dependent upon the fleet for assistance at anti-submarine warfare,
and logistical support. The process of advancement and path to "command at sea"
contributed to a unified outlook by aviation officers that prevented any separatist
attitudes. Simply stated, naval aviation could not be separated from the rest of the
fleet; doing so was not possible.
Naval aviation finished World War II as the premier strike force of the fleet.
There were 115 carriers in commission or under construction. Subsequently, even with
the inevitable post-war standdown, the Navy and naval aviation in particular were
looking forward to a long period of prosperity after the war. The immediate task
ahead was the integration of the atomic bomb into the carrier strike force strategy of
the fleet.
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III. PLANNING THE POST-WAR NAVY
A. PLANNING FOR DEMOBILIZATION
The course and fashion of postwar planning in the U.S. Navy was heavily
influenced by various developments that occurred as byproducts of the war although
not specifically products of combat or warfighting. The first development was the
growth of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which was instituted under the persistent idea that
the more unification achieved between the services, the more efficient would be their
operations. In reality, by bringing the services together bureaucratically against their
will, it merely provided them an opportunity to learn and frustrate each other's plans
[Ref. 3: p. 6].
A second development was that the Navy and the Army once again reached
loggerheads on coastal defense. The specific conflict came over jurisdiction for anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) within reach of Army aircraft. While this disagreement was
relatively obscure in light of the ongoing war, it did keep alive the antagonistic feeling
generated ten years earlier. And, while the argument over ASW was the most blatant
of the disagreements, a general feeling of rivalry extended throughout the entire front
of Army-Navy cooperation. This negative sentiment carried over into planning for the
postwar Navy.
A third influence was the attitude of naval officers toward the participation of
allied navies in the U.S. Navy combat role. There was a strong tendency in the Navy
to scorn cooperation with the Royal Navy [Ref. 15: p. 105]. Although there was plenty
written about the benefits of combined operations with the Russian Navy against
Japan, Admiral King, Chief of Naval Operations, made it perfectly clear that they were
not "indispensable" (Ref. 16: p. 397]. King was not anxious for any cooperative action
between the U.S. and Soviet fleets in the Pacific.
This "go it alone" attitude by the Navy was later reflected in planning for the
Navy's role in patrolling the postwar oceans. The Navy wanted the maritime
equivalent of "spheres of influence". Rather than cooperating in joint responsibilities
with the Royal or Russian Navies, the U.S. Navy wanted the Royal and Russian
Navies to share control of the North Atlantic, the Royal Navy to patrol the Indian
Ocean, and the U.S. Navy to patrol the Pacific. With this attitude, the pre-war Royal
24
Navy was credited with ending the war as strong as it had started, and the Russian
Navy seriously overrated. They were trusted to control their naval responsibilities by
themselves while the U.S. Navy concentrated on its traditional interests-the Pacific,
and particularly the defense of the Philippines. [Ref. 3: p. 17]
In June of 1943 a retired admiral, C.C. Bloch, wrote a letter to vice-CNO, Vice
Admiral Home, addressing the question of preparing for a postwar navy. Bloch
presented several ideas and made several recommendations that stand as the first
attempt at planning for a peacetime fleet. Admiral Bloch did not display any particular
strategic insight in his recommendations nor did he address the possibility of a postwar
threat. But he did vary from traditional U.S. policy on one particular recommendation.
Traditional policy formulated under Mahan's strategy held the fleet close to home until
an enemy appeared on the horizon. Then the fleet would be directed to sally forth to
engage the enemy. Bloch departed from this strategy by suggesting foreign patrol areas
for six lesser units of the fleet while the six major task forces remained near home.
[Ref. 3: p. 11]
No further action was taken on postwar planning until the Secretary of the Navy
was prompted by a secret memorandum from the Secretary of War. Robert P.
Patterson wrote to inform Navy Secretary Knox of the Army's new planning division
and suggested that the Navy's planners collaborate with his office on postwar planning.
[Ref. 3: p. 12] Knox immediately tasked the Navy leadership to step up its efforts in
planning for the postwar environment. The CNO, Admiral King, soon had a directive
for the Secretary's signature naming Admiral H.E. Yarnell, U.S.N. (Ret) to head the
Special Planning Section of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. The Special
Planning Section was formed to plan preparations for the demobilization of the naval
establishment after the war.
Admiral Yarnell was given two ideas as general guidance from VCNO Home:
• The peacetime fleet should be as large as possible, even if the ships were
undermanned or in the fleet reserve.
• The fleet should be broken into task groups and stationed around the world
rather than concentrated on the east and west coasts of the United States.
[Ref. 3: pp. 13-14]
The first idea was merely an attempt to preserve the wartime strength of the
Navy despite the inevitable force reduction that would accompany demobilization. By
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keeping ships in commission, even if undermanned, the Navy would save itself for a
while from the burden of squeezing shipbuilding funds from the Congress. The second
idea was borrowed from Admiral Bloch's earlier memorandum and was novel in that it
contradicted the traditional U.S. strategy of keeping the fleet close to home.
Admiral Yarnell's preliminary study on postwar demobilization for the Navy was
submitted in the rough on 11 September 1943. Ironically, it did not concern itself as
much with postwar reductions and demobilizations as it did with postwar strategy.
Yarnell's work was heavily influenced by his failure to anticipate the growing struggle
with the Soviet Union. He projected a rather peaceful postwar environment and
believed the wartime allies would continue their cooperation long after the war. In this
regard, he divided up the world and left the responsibility of Europe to Britain and the
Soviet Union. He felt the traditional interests of the U.S. in the Pacific were correct
and should continue. In Europe, he foresaw as the major job that of keeping Germany
unarmed--a task the Allies could handle with only minimal assistance from the United
States.
Domestically, he anticipated that the American public would continue to support
a large military, that the Navy would maintain significant strength, and that the
services would cooperate with each other on defense matters. He downplayed the role
of the aircraft carrier and postulated that improvements in anti-air warfare would
reestablish the vitality of the surface navy. He adhered to the strategy of Mahan in
that he saw the only military objective of naval forces as the defeat of the enemy fleet.
He assumed a large peacetime role for the British navy and dismissed the Russians as
ever having a credible sea-going capability.
Four major events that Yarnell neglected to foresee but which would invalidate
most of his work were: first, the development and employment of the atomic bomb;
second, the postwar position of the Soviet Union as a world leader in conflict with the
West; third, the lack of domestic support for a large military, and fourth, the rivalry
and acrimony that would break out between the services. [Ref. 3: pp. 17-19]
Vice Admiral Home revised Admiral Yarnell's draft and promulgated it as "Navy-
Basic Demobilization Plan No. 1." He retained most of what Yarnell had written but
did rewrite some parts with which he disagreed. Naval aviation was reemphasized as
the striking arm of the Fleet, and the capability of Russia to attain a significant naval
presence was adjusted to predict the possibility of the same. In general, Home did not
share Yarnell's optimism for a peaceful postwar environment. He was more inclined to
see the lack of discernable enemies as a sign for the need to trust no one.
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Once again, Home's planning document, although it toyed with the possibility of
a Soviet threat, did not adequately lay out what enemy the Navy could expect to
confront in the future. Instead of spelling out the threat, and addressing a strategy to
meet that threat, the document was more a compendium of what the Navy would like
to see, and how it would like to operate if given its choice regardless of outside
influences. A clear identification of the threat is vital for military strategic planning.
Without an identified enemy, naval leaders were left without being able to justify even
in their own minds the level of expenditures that they wanted for the postwar navy.
An additional consequence of the lack of an identifiable threat, was the tendency
to revert to prewar strategies. Subsequently, the inclination was terribly strong to
relegate the defense of Europe and European waters to the British and Russians, to
draw the fleet back home, and wait for the enemy to identify himself prior to taking
action. Admiral Home's moderate effort to identify the Soviet Union as a potential
naval threat was a step in the right direction but was not strong enough to provide
strategic planners the framework they needed to be truly effective. [Ref. 3: p. 37]
B. THE SECOND CONFLICT OVER ROLES AND MISSIONS
In October 1943 just as the Navy began initiating its efforts to plan for its
postwar role in national defense, the Army and Army Air Corp launched their second
attempt at emasculating the Navy. The JCS had formed a joint committee to comment
on the Navy's request for aircraft appropriations that had been returned to them by
the President for review. The committee's final report said: (1) the U.S. needed a
single military chief of staff with genuine command authority, or a single defense
department, (2) that the Navy was duplicating the Air Force's mission and did not
need an aviation arm, and (3) that the Marine Corp was duplicating the Army's role
and should be severely limited. The naval members of the committee deadlocked the
discussions with their adamant rejection of the radical proposals. On 18 October the
committee gave up and shelved its report. [Ref. 3: p. 52]
Meanwhile, Congress, responding to pressure from the Army as well as the
public, called a special committee under the chairmanship of Clifton A. Woodrum,
(D.,Va.), to conduct hearings on military matters including the question of reorganizing
the military after the war. The Woodrum Committee sat on Monday, 24 April 1944
and opened with three days of testimony from the Army and Army Air Force on their
proposals for reorganization.
27
A very distinguished group of Army Officers proceeded to explain to the
Committee how dividing the Army into two services and the establishment of a
separate air force would actually further unification of the services! They explained
that only through autonomy could the Air Force realize the true potential of air power
which the ongoing war was proving to be so important. They were joined by the
Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, who helped them explain that unification of the
services would prevent another Pearl Harbor, ensure better co-ordination between
military policy and foreign policy, guarantee better military planning and efficiency,
and. finally, give the Congress only one military budget to consider.
On Friday, the Navy was allowed to commence its rebuttal. Those who testified
for the Navy included Under Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, VCNO Home,
Marine Corp Commandant Vandegrift, and other distinguished naval officers.
While the Army and Air Force had emphasized that at the time they only wanted
general approval of the plan not legislation, the Navy testimony strove to prevent any
approval much less a decision until the war was over [Ref. 9: p. 197]. The Navy-
attempted to tie the unification issue to the broader issue of examining the entire
governmental bureaucracy trying to show the need for reorganization far beyond just
that of the services. The Navy rejected the "fraud and waste" theory for reorganization
saying that separate services actually stimulated competition in the acquisition process
in the finest traditions of free enterprise. Finally, the Navy, assisted by a friend on the
Committee, Carl Vinson, pointed out the real motivation behind the Air Corps support
for unification-its desire for autonomy. The illogic behind the idea that a separate air
force would create more unification of the services was pointed out to the Committee.
The Committee, who had made its benign objectives well know at the beginning
of the hearings, was not there to do anything more than hear each side's arguments on
unification. It had never planned to initiate legislation and was only interested in
ending the hearings on a positive note. So as to prevent embarrassment all around, the
Committee agreed on May 19 to postpone the hearing indefinitely.
The hearings are generally accredited as having been a victory for the Navy.
Certainly the Navy profited most from what was presented. The Navy realized that
the Air Force was determined to pursue unification, and that severe damage could be
done if the Navy was caught unprepared for future maneuverings. The fact that the
Navy presented its case last was a positive aspect. By going first the Air Force was not
able to refute the opposing position. The Navy could. Secretary of Navy Frank Knox
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who supported some aspects of unification died during the hearing and was not able to
testify. This left Under Secretary Forrestal. a brilliant man and ardent opponent of
unification, to speak, freely in support of the Navy. [Ref. 9: p. 192]
In the aftermath of the hearings, the Navy General Board took upon itself the
responsibility of preparing the Navy's case for future encounters with Congress on
unification. This represented a sharp departure from the traditional naval aversion to
playing high level politics. The case the Board prepared was passed on and provided a
basis for later efforts in frustrating Air Force machinations.
C. FORRESTAL AND THE POSTWAR NAVY
Upon Secretary Knox's death, James Forrestal was immediately appointed
Acting Secretary, and less than a month later he was officially appointed Secretary.
Secretary Forrestal immediately applied pressure on the Navy to put its planning
efforts into high gear. Forrestal felt that the modest victory at the Woodrum Hearings
was short-lived at best. He was sure that the matter would be brought up again as
soon as the war was over. Furthermore, he believed that one way the Navy could
prepare itself for future hearings would be to have a clear cut plan for itself in the
postwar environment.
The original planning document, Navy Basic Demobilization Plan No. 1, was
replaced by Plan No. 2 formulated by the same group who developed No. 1. Once
again it reflected a lack of perspective. The planners went about their work totally
isolated from other government agencies that might have provided a broadened
outlook on the international environment. They based their planning on the second
document as they did on the first one-on an uninformed expectation of the
international postwar situation. They did not seek the help of intelligence agencies,
governmental leaders of the U.S. or any other country. [Ref. 3: p. 95]
However, the second plan did differ markedly from the first in two ways. There
was an emphasis in Plan No. 2 on the place that technology was predicted to play in
the postwar world. The Plan encouraged the Navy to pursue a vigorous program of
technological development and warned that the next war could possibly depend on the
country's degree of technological superiority over an enemy. This emphasis
represented a dramatic departure from the historical reluctance of the Navy to address
technological improvements. The outcome of World War II had finally awakened the
Navy to the necessity of actually seeking out new developments to maintain its
technological edge over the enemy.
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The second plan also addressed the possibility of significant budget cuts that
would come with the end of the war. Whereas Plan No. 1 had been formulated under
the assumption that the public would continue to support a large military
establishment. Plan No. 2 was more realistic in assuming a significant personnel
reduction and tightening of the congressional purse strings. Plan No. 2 projected a
required budget of S3 billion for the postwar Navy versus the S7 billion projected in
Plan No. 1.
Although Plan No. 2 was a more mature planning document, its major weakness
continued to be a total lack of accounting for the possible hostile nature of the
postwar international system. It assumed that the oceans would be divided between
the U.S. and the British, with the U.S. concentrating once again on the Pacific region
leaving the British Navy to patrol the eastern Atlantic.
Secretary Forrestal rejected both plans. He held suspicions of Soviet intentions
that he was disappointed not to see in the plans. Forrestal appeared bitter at the
ability of Stalin to acquire the Balkans and half of Poland with the apparent best
wishes of the West, while the U.S. could not take any step to preserve its international
security without being condemned as an imperialist or fascist [Ref. 17: p. 14].
From his growing concern Forrestal had concluded "that Russia was the
emerging new enemy toward which not only the Navy's planning but. indeed the whole
of postwar U.S. foreign policy should be directed." [Ref. 3: p. 101] Not finding this
potential threat adequately addressed in the plans, Forrestal initiated a major shake-up
in the Navy's planning process that began in October 1944. The Chief of Naval
Operations, Fleet Admiral King, assigned Admiral R. S. Edwards to assume the role as
the head of postwar planning, replacing Yarnell who had developed both Plans No. 1
and 2. The job was elevated in rank to that of deputy CNO making the four star the
second most powerful man in the Navy. Postwar planning had become top priority in
the Navy.4
The new planners were told to disregard the Navy Basic Demobilization Plan No.
2 and start from scratch while basing their planning on an overall strategic outlook.
This was to steer them clear from the previous tendency to get bogged down in
specifics at the expense of seeing the bigger picture.
Although Japan had not yet surrendered, fear of anything but eventual victory
had long since" passed.
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Forrestal was concerned about the necessity of maintaining control of the Pacific
islands recently won back from the Japanese. He was aware of the vacuum that the
policy of "unconditional surrender" had created in the Pacific and Europe. By
disrupting the balance of power and destroying the ability of the Axis powers to rule
themselves after defeat, a tremendous gulf had been created which Forrestal felt the
Soviets would readily fill unless stopped. [Ref. 17: p. 24] His apprehensions were
extended to include Europe and the Mediterranean. He expected to see such concern
reflected in Navy planning and postwar strategy.
On 2 March 1945 the new planning document entitled "The United States Navy
(Postwar)-Basis o[ Preparation of Plans" was submitted in the rough to Admiral King.
With apparently few revisions by King, the document was distributed the very' next
day.
The strategy outlined by the document clung to the isolationist sentiments of it
predecessors that would concentrate U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere and the
Pacific. However, it did admit to the necessity of being ready to go anywhere in the
world required to exert force in support of American interests. The document
postulated the probable institution of a world-wide peacekeeping organization of
nations patterned after the League of Nations. However, it was pessimistic on the
ability of such an organization to actually prevent war. This opinion was based on the
recent two wars and the failure of the League of Nations.
The most interesting part of the plan for the purposes of this study was its
discussion of the nature of a future war. It speculated that such a war would cause
tremendous destruction and a "vast loss of life and treasure" [Ref. 3: p. 1 10].
Furthermore, the document said the U.S. undoubtedly would be involved in the next
war and that it would probably start with an attack upon the United States. In order
to prevent such an attack, the plan proposed to have a strong military force that could
be applied against the aggressor.
Planning for the postwar Navy did not get much further than this. There were
sporadic efforts and infrequent flurries of memorandums, but nothing substantial was
produced. The death of President Roosevelt and the succession of Harry S. Truman to
the presidency brought with it a renewed effort by the Air Corp, the Army. Congress,
and the public for unification. While Roosevelt had always been particularly impartial
toward most of the maneuverings on unification and establishment of an air force,
Truman, an Army veteran was decidedly pro-unification and anti-Navy. For the Navy
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it suddenly seemed what plans it had been able to make for itself no longer seemed
realistic or applicable to the political climate brought on by the new president.
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IV. FORRESTAL AND NAVAL STRATEGY
A. CONTRASTING TRADITIONAL STRATEGY
The quiet evolution in strategic thinking that had begun with the introduction of
aircraft carriers was still in motion. It was particularly active in the minds of naval
officers engaged in the Pacific war. They saw naval aviation in action, recognized its
capabilities and acknowledged its weaknesses. They had the opportunity to analyze
naval aviation's contribution to the Navy's mission and were beginning to see where
that mission could be expanded beyond the traditional limits established by Mahan's
naval strategy.
This evolution was not adequately reflected by the high level leadership in
Washington such as Admirals King, Edwards and Home who directed planning for the
postwar Navy. These men had long been removed from the operational arena and had
settled into the Washington naval bureaucracy missing a good deal of the latest lessons
in naval warfare. They had spent their formative years of operational service at sea
during World War. I and in the intervening years of peace. They were all in their 60s
and would already have been retired under normal circumstances. [Ref. 3: p. 208] They
were generally "battleship sailors" who had been schooled in the strategy of Mahan.
Subsequently, they held a philosophy of naval warfare that colored all their thinking
about the employment of U.S. naval forces. This philosophy held that the U.S. fleet
should be directed in action against the naval forces of the enemy. They were strongly
attached to the importance of protecting and preserving the Western Hemisphere and
only extended their interests to include the Pacific with particular emphasis on
controlling the access to the Philippines. They placed a traditional trust in the Royal
Navy to protect the Atlantic approaches to the United States. The U.S. fleet would, in
their expectations, spend most of its time in port on the U.S. Atlantic and Pacific
coasts. During war the fleet would concentrate itself into a striking arm and sail out to
sea to protect the maritime approaches to the United States. The U.S. fleet would then
engage in a great decisive battle with the enemy fleet.
This strategic philosophy was perfectly modeled on the teachings of Captain
Mahan. The implications of such a strategic doctrine are numerous and in part
contributed to the disagreement with the Air Corp over national strategy.
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By restricting the role of the Navy to only attacking its opposite number, the
enemy's fleet, the Navy naturally rejected strategic warfare. The historical range
limitations of naval weaponry7 had never forced the Navy to consider the benefits or
consequences of strategic warfare. Battleships could not strike deep into the enemy's
homeland with sufficient strength to hinder the enemy's ability to carry on the war or
continue his production of military weaponry. Consequently, the inevitable strategy
that developed was totally lacking in strategic emphasis. A naval force was most
effective in striking the opposing naval force. A fleet could sail against an enemy
intending to achieve a military goal. However, that goal could not realistically include
the subjugation of the enemy's homeland. The navy could bombard the coastal towns
and cities, land raiding parties to harass and intimidate the civilians, but could not
expect to occupy and control the enemy's homeland. To defeat and occupy the
enemy's homeland required an army.
Therefore, a fleet, sailing to attack the enemy, unless it had an invasion force
from the army embarked, could not have achieved any more than that of generally
harassing the enemy's coastal areas. However, should it encounter the enemy fleet, it
could then achieve a defeat of the force that would otherwise oppose an invading army
arriving by sea. By achieving victory it could clear the way for an unopposed approach
to the enemy's coast. The fleet was therefore shown to be much more efficient in its
role of attacking the enemy fleet than in attacking coastal areas. It could achieve
much more decisive results by engaging the enemy fleet than by harassing actions upon
civilians. From these calculations on efficiency, Mahan derived his strategy of
concentrating the fleet in attacks against approaching enemy fleets.
The naval strategy espoused by Mahan was unconventional because it rejected
the traditional naval tactics of attacking commercial shipping and coastal raiding that
had dominated U.S. naval thinking up until his time [Ref. 7: p. 101]. Captain Mahan
preached the formation of capital ships that would meet and defeat the enemy fleet or
blockade him in port thereby establishing undisputed control of the sea. It was this
logical strategic outlook inherited from Mahan that had influenced naval thinking up
until World War II and continued to dominate thinking in Washington up to the end
of the war. The naval officers in Washington who had been isolated from the
developments in strategic thinking in the Pacific continued to incorporate their
traditional attitudes into the planning documents they produced, Plan No. 1 and Plan
No. 2.
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Another consequence of the rejection of strategic warfare by the Navy was a
tendency to divorce the Navy from any concern over changing world conditions
including internal developments in other countries be they friendly or not. The Navy
was inclined to stand pat on what it had prepared for versus addressing possible
changes in the international balance of power. Subsequently, the Navy continued to
attribute far more strength to the Royal Navy than was warranted. The Navy had
traditionally expected the Royal Navy to protect the Atlantic approaches to the U.S.
and continued that expectation in its planning at the close of the war. The Navy was
ready to ignore developments until they appeared on the horizon at which time the
fleet would react.
Finally, the lack of strategic emphasis promoted isolationism among the Navy
leadership. They were perfectly willing to abdicate the world-wide sea control
established by the Navy during the war to an international peace-keeping organization"
which they expected to be formed at the end of the war. Their interests were
concentrated on maintaining the traditional pre-war roles of the Navy and not toward
consolidating those roles assumed by the Navy during the war.
The introduction of the aircraft carrier and naval aviation had begun to force the
evolution of naval strategy. By giving the Navy the ability to strike deep into the
enemy's heartland, naval aviation had provided the Navy the opportunity to adopt a
strategic role-strategic bombing. However, it was a role that the Navy had so far
declined to exploit. The Navy leadership had to that point preferred to apply naval
aviation in the traditional manner of naval strategy by directing it against opposing
fleets.
The Air Corp, as a tool for prying itself apart from the Army, had been
expounding the doctrine of strategic bombing since General Mitchell's controversial
efforts on behalf of military' aviation. It had been rejected by the Navy as a
contradiction of traditional naval strategy. However, as with the historical
introduction of new developments and innovative ideas into the Navy, a slow process
began to erode the traditional strategy of Captain Mahan. Several events began to
turn traditional naval strategy upside down and convert naval thinking to strategic
warfare.
'Despite the failure of the aborted League of Nations to keep the peace.
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B. THE EVOLUTION IN CONTEMPORARY NAVAL STRATEGY
COMPLETED
The leadership of James Forrestal was one of the primary factors that completed
the evolution of naval strategy at the end of the World War II. While the evolution
was in part attributable to the naval officers who had fought in the Pacific, it was
James Forrestal that brought them to Washington where they had a chance to
implement their new strategic thinking. Forrestal surrounded himself with a group of
"young" admirals and captains who had been responsible for the brilliant victories of
the war. [Ref. 3: p. 201]
These men had seen the war First hand and were predominately aviators who well
understood the capabilities of naval aviation not only in direct support of the fleet but
also in strategic roles. Navy bombers had been integral participants in the strategic
bombing of industrial targets, transportation lines and military installations far behind
enemy lines. The first strategic bombing of the Pacific war wras conceived by the Navy
although flown by the Army Air Corp—the Doolittle Raid over Tokyo. These younger
men were perfectly willing to adopt strategic bombing as a naval role.
But, as much as the new naval leadership, it was Forrestal himself who brought
about the change in naval strategy. He developed an increasing animosity toward the
Soviet Union and that country's ideological imperative to destroy the West. He felt
there was a similarity between Soviet ideology, Nazism and Fascism in that they were
all three incompatible with democracy. [Ref. 17: p. 57J Not finding adequate attention
paid to the Soviet threat in naval planning wmen he took over as Secretary, Forrestal
ordered a shake-up in the planning apparatus and directed that more attention be paid
to international events.
However, as soon as the Navy found itself devoting more attention to Russia as
a threat to the postwar peace, it found itself opening up for attacks by the Air Corp.
This was based on the Navy's own assertions that Russia was a land power with little
possiblity of becoming a sea power. By the Navy's traditional definition of the Navy's
responsibility-engaging the enemy's fleet-the Navy was admitting that it would have
no role in a conflict with the Soviet Union. Carried to the extreme, the Air Corp could
contend that if the nation expected the future war to be with Russia, then the Navy.
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who would have no meaningful role, was obsolete, should be reduced and the money
given to the strategic bomber force who soon would be able to attack. Russia from U.S.
airfields.
6
Finding itself in this dilemma, the Navy was not long in justifying a strategic role
for itself. Admiral King quickly made up for his recent lack of strategic acumen and
began embracing the idea that the Navy was much more versatile than it had been in
the past, and was committed to becoming more capable in the future by developing a
strategic role [Ref. 3: pp. 188-189].
Secretary Forrestal began manifesting his apprehensions about the Soviet Union
by directing that exercises should be undertaken in both the Arctic and the Antarctic
as practice for operating in northern climates. [Ref. IS: p. 25]. Meanwhile, he became
concerned over Soviet intervention in areas like Greece, Iran, the borders of Turkey
and in the Balkans. And, he came to a conclusion that would have a lasting impact on
the Navy. He was well aware of the Soviet ideological imperative to ferment
revolution wherever possible, and felt the Soviets would very likely attempt action
throughout the world wherever they felt unopposed. He therefore decided that the
Navy would be deployed to those areas to present a deterrent to Soviet aggression.
In pursuing this decision, Forrestal approached Secretary of State Byrnes on the
idea of establishing a task force assigned to the Mediterranean. They agreed to send
the battleship Missouri which would also return the body of the Turkish Ambassador
who had died in his post at Washington. [Ref. 17: p. 141] The Missouri was joined by
two Eighth Fleet cruisers already in the Mediterranean. Together the group visited
ports throughout the area. Finally, on 30 September 1946 Forrestal formally
established the "U.S. Naval Forces, Mediterranean" which was renamed in 1950 the
"U.S. Sixth Fleet." [Ref. 3: pp. 224-225]
The establishment of a permanent naval presence in the Mediterranean was of
tremendous significance. It broke in half the long tradition of naval isolationism that
had been fostered by Mahan's strategy. It committed the Navy toward a vital interest
in the internal affairs of countries as naval deployments began to be adjusted according
to instabilities in the international balance of power. The Navy was no longer directed
solely at the naval forces of a potential enemy, but would be directed at the country
itself. This provided the solution to an earlier problem of finding a strategic role for
Assuming strategic bombing could defeat the enemy by itself, there would not
even be need for the Navy to transport troops and supplies to Europe since bombers
would eventually be able to take offTrom and return to U.S. bases.
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the Navy. The Navy was required to prepare itself for conducting operations using
either conventional or nuclear weapons (once they became available) against countries
that would perhaps not even have a naval force. Involvement in such operations
would necessarily include the tactical as well as the strategic bombing of military and
civilian targets. Secretary Forrestal. in a very short period of time, had completed the
transformation of the Navy from its traditional foundation on the strategy of Mahan
into a much more versatile military organization that was justified through national
mandate in exploiting every arena of military warfare necessary to its mission.
The transformation o[ the Navy was accomplished by Forrestal and the war-
tested officers he brought from the Pacific to Washington. However, the
transformation could not have taken place without the proven capability of naval
aviation. The Navy's new role was based almost entirely on the power and capabilities
associated with naval aircraft. Naval aviation had achieved it preeminence in World
War II and then made possible the transition of the Navy as a viable fighting force
into the postwar world. All of the ridicule heaped upon the Navy by its critics,
particularly from the Air Corp, who said the Navy had no further role in the postwar
environment, was suddenly without foundation.
The Navy was clearly still a viable institution and there was no reason to predict
otherwise for the future. However, since it was based upon the continuing viability of
naval aviation, it did little to stifle the critics. In fact it only made the Air Corp more
determined than ever to divorce aviation from the Navy. No doubt this was due to the
fact that for once, the Navy, with the real possibility of developing a potent strategic
capability, was actually starting to threaten the Air Corp's role! [Ref. 3: p. 229] For
the first time, the Navy was in a position to question the value of an army air force.
The destructive power of the atomic bomb once adopted into regular service meant
that bombers no longer needed tremendous bombbays. nor if placed on aircraft carriers
did they need forward airbases in uncertain territory. Bombers would more likely need
to be small and fast to evade enemy air defense-characteristics that were perfectly
compatible with carrier aviation. This only added to the hostility between the two
services that was soon to erupt again.
The final evolution of naval strategy through the end of the war and into the
postwar period can be credited to James Forrestal who created it through the
international scope of his perceptions. He was not just concerned about the naval
budget. He did not allow himself to become bogged down in the minute details of his
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responsibilities despite the continuing struggles with other services. He maintained his
concern for the national welfare and sought to determine the best application of naval
power in preserving that welfare. He was concerned about the Soviet world-wide
threat and employed naval forces so as to meet that threat as best he could.
With the deployment of a permanent presence in the Mediterranean the Navy
entered another stage of preparation for the adoption of nuclear weapons. By
accepting strategic bombing as a viable employment of naval force projection, the
Navy was unconsciously creating the justification that it would later use against critics
when it commenced its struggle to adopt nuclear weapons into its naval maritime
strategy.
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V. THE NAVY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB
A. A NEW ATTITUDE TOWARD INNOVATION
As was pointed out in the introduction to this study, the Navy did not have a
good record of adopting new technology or innovative ideas into its organization. Also
discussed was the impact upon traditional thinking in the Navy by the diversity of
naval operations brought on by the submarine and airplane. These developments
slowly eroded the close-minded character of the naval leadership toward innovation in
both hardware or strategy.
The legacy of Mahan did not really contribute positively toward adopting
innovation. It was more likely to stifle the pursuit of new developments because it
purported itself to be the definitive word on naval strategy. Such an attitude is never
conducive to change or improvement. The preoccupation with meeting the enemy's
fleet in one great concentrated battle inclined the fleet toward quantitative not
qualitative improvements in naval forces [Ref. 3: p. 1SS]. There was a world-wide
appreciation for the work of Captain Mahan and subsequently a world-wide
preoccupation with the quantity of ships in opposing fleets. The outgrowth of a
mutual concern for the quantitative balance among the world's fleets resulted in the
Washington and London naval treaties. Each naval power was vitally concerned with
the tonnage, size and armament of the other naval powers in order to forecast the
chances of victory in a concentrated battle upon the high seas.
The battleship was the quintessential expression of naval thinking under the
influence of Mahan's expositions on naval strategy. The battleship was not built for
shore bombardment other than as a secondary role. It was built with steel armor
belting to protect it from the 16 inch guns of its opposite number in the enemy fleet.
The battleship was strictly a tactical weapon whose purpose was to confront and defeat
the enemy fleet.
The advent of naval aviation initially complemented the traditional strategies of
naval warfare. Naval aviation extended the range of the fleet and ultimately, at
Midway, allowed the fleet to engage the enemy beyond the line of sight. Eventually,
however, naval aviation proved itself to be more than just an extension of traditional
naval stratesv.
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Naval aircraft could strike deep inside enemy territory and achieve strategic
objectives that had always been denied the battleship fleet. While this evolution in
strategy progressed slowly at first, it was finally pushed forward with a desperate thrust
not just as a newly discovered innovation to enhance naval effectiveness, but also as a
last minute defense against the onslaught of the Army Air Corp.
The Air Corp wanted independence from the Army in order to pursue strategic
bombing which it had determined represented the final word in military strategy. For
the Air Corp strategic bombing made both navies and armies obsolete. A future war
would start with a surprise bombing attack and end with a bombing attack. The
swiftness with which the war would progress left no room for navies or armies both of
whom were vulnerable to the airplane.
In the minds of Air Corp officers, because it was obsolete, the Navy had no need
for an aviation branch. It certainly had no need for a strategic role, nor did it have a
need for nuclear weapons. In order to protect itself from the efforts of Air Corp aimed
at its destruction, the Navy "discovered" its strategic capability and reevaluated its own
concept of its mission which had historically been defined by Mahan's strategy.
The Navy had historically conceptualized its mission as defensive. It would
remain close aboard the Atlantic and Pacific coasts until ordered to sea to fight an
approaching fleet. The potentialities of a strategic role forced a rejection in part of this
historical role. Involvement in strategic warfare required the abandonment of a
defensive mentality.
The Navy had contented itself with ignoring the strategic political developments
around the world and had only been concerned with the quantitative balance of naval
forces. Suddenly, upon discovering its strategic capabilities, the Navy became
concerned with much more than the naval forces that it might encounter on the high
seas.
Secretary Forrestal's apprehensions over the Soviet Union and its world-wide
activities provided the Navy with the mandate to address its strategic capabilities to all
potential threats to American national security. Under Forrestal's direction the Navy
finally overcame its historical predilection toward ignoring world events and once and
for all abandoned its opposition to innovation. As the traditional strategy of Mahan
was superceded, so was the obsession with quantitative comparisons.
With the change in strategy and the explosion of the atomic bomb, it became
accepted in the Navy that while quantitative measures would always be important, the
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next war might very well rest on qualitative superiority [Ref. 3: p. 58]. Subsequently, in
order for the Navy to be qualitatively superior to the potential threat, it became
expedient that the Navy ensure it had the very latest hardware, tactics and strategy.
The Navy became the most eager recipient of new and innovative developments--a
dramatic departure from its historical legacy! 7
When Secretary Forrestal defined for the Navy its strategic capability, he gave
the Navy its greatest boost into the postwar environment. From that point the Navy
looked around and inevitably saw a new development that would hopefully finally
establish a place for the Navy far above its critics. That new development was the
atomic bomb. Applying the atomic bomb to naval aviation seemed to many to be the
panacea for all the domestic problems the Navy had encountered over the many years
of struggle with the Army and the Army Air Corp. If the atomic bomb could be
adopted to the Navy in a strategic role, many felt that once and for all the critics, who
claimed the Navy was obsolete in the modern era of strategic bombing, would be
silenced. The truth unfortunately proved far from that.
B. THE NAVY'S ROLE IN DEVELOPING THE BOMB
In 1915 the Secretary' of Navy, Josephus Daniels, organized a naval consulting
board with Thomas A. Edison as the chairman [Ref. 19: pp. 307-309]. The most
significant outcome of their otherwise undistinguished activities was the establishment
of the Naval Research Laboratory which began operations in 1923. The NRL was
very active on a variety of projects between the wars and helped develop radar.
[Ref. 20: p. 140]
Serious research in atomic physics had been going on not only in the United
States but also in Germany, France, England and somewhat less so in Japan. The
radiation of particles from uranium had been studied extensively but there had not yet
been a controlled chain reaction. A report was made in January 1939 by Enrico Fermi,
an Italian physicist from Columbia University, on the success of two German
scientists, Hahn and Strassmann, in splitting the uranium atom, the first step toward a
chain reaction.
A beneficial byproduct of the Navy's craving for innovation and new technology
was that it provided'further ammunition with which to stave off the Air Corp in its
incessant attacks on the Navy. By integrating the new developments of modern
warfare into its capabilities, the' Navy refuted the"Air Force's claims that the Navy was
vulnerable, obsolete and unnecessary' in modern warfare.
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Ross Gunn, superintendent of mechanical and electrical divisions at the Naval
Research Laboratory, heard the report and was determined to pursue the possibilities
of nuclear reactions and their applications for naval science. Gunn convinced Fermi to
talk to the Navy Department, which he did on 16 March. While Fermi did point out
the potential inherent in atomic power, he was not extremely optimistic on when a
chain reaction could be brought about. Unfortunately, his lack of optimism infected
his naval audience. [Ref. 21: p. 15]
The Navy leadership present at the meeting with Fermi were more interested in
the possibilities of nuclear power applied to propulsion for naval vessels than they were
in atomic bombs. 8 With the less than enthusiastic recommendation from Fermi, they
saw atomic power as a long-term project and not something that could have an
immediate impact on national defense. Gunn was neither discouraged not did he give
up. He approached Rear Admiral H. G. Bowen, Chief of the Bureau of Engineering,
who provided the Lab very7 modest funding for naval research into nuclear physics.
The research was actually attempted at the Carnegie Institution because the NRL was
more oriented toward applied than theoretical studies. Although the research was very
limited in scope, it did establish the Navy as the first U.S. government agency to take a
particular interest in atomic power [Ref. 22: p. 15].
One of the tremendous obstacles encountered in developing nuclear power was
the necessity of isolating the isotope Uranium 235 from uranium. Uranium 235 will
sustain a chain reaction and uranium in its natural state will not. Unfortunately,
U-235 only comprises about one percent of the uranium found in nature.
Subsequently, it required a tremendous effort to determine the technique required to
separate the two. [Ref. 23: p. 8]
Under Navy sponsorship one method of separating uranium, thermal-diffusion,
was developed at the NRL. The effort was expanded and a pilot plant built at the
Philadelphia Navy Yard to process uranium under the thermal-diffusion method.
Three years later, General Groves, who was placed in charge of the nation's effort to
build a nuclear bomb—the Manhattan Project-considered the efforts of the NRL but
felt the process, thermal-diffusion, was too slow to meet the needs of the war effort.
The Navy was undaunted and continued its research independent of the
Manhattan Project. They were not all that interested in the line of development
toward which the Project was directed-the atomic bomb. The NRL was much more
8World War II had not yet started.
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interested in pursuing atomic power as a propulsion system for submarines.
[Ref. 21: p. 16]
Later General Groves, encouraged by Robert Oppenheimer, reconsidered the
Navy's process. Other processes used proved to be little better than what the Navy
had already developed. Convinced the other processes were just as inefficient, General
Groves adopted the Navy process and built a full-scale thermal-diffusion plant at Oak
Ridge, Tennessee where the main effort at separating U-235 was taking place.
Although still extremely inefficient, the plant did provide a contribution to the total
amount of U-235 isolated. [Ref. 22: p. 21]
In his memoires, AT<?w It Can Be Told. General Groves mentions that while being
briefed on his new assignment to head the Manhattan Project, he was told the Navy
had so far been left out of the project9 at the explicit direction of President Roosevelt
[Ref. 23: p. 22]. Nevertheless, once in charge he personally visited the NRL to observe
their processes and later was quite happy to name a naval officer to head the ordinance
program at Los Alamos that would actually build the bomb. Groves named Captain
William S. Parsons who had graduated in 1922 from Annapolis and later from the
Naval Postgraduate School. Parsons went to Los Alamos after having worked
extensively in developing and fleet testing proximity fuses. Upon his arrival at the
security gate of Los Alamos the dearth of naval personnel at work on the project
contributed to his arrest by the guard on duty. The guard claimed to his superiors that
he had "... caught a spy ... his uniform is as phony as a three dollar bill. He's
wearing the eagles of a colonel, and claims that he's a captain." [Ref. 23: pp. 160-161]
Eventually other Navy experts were drafted for work at Los Alamos. The effort
to develop a method of exploding the bomb brought personnel from the Naval
Ordinance group at Dahlgren, Virginia. Two principle methods for exploding were
evaluated. One method, similar to the principles of conventional naval gunnery,
consisted of firing one mass of uranium into a second mass to form a "critical mass."
Lieutenant Commander E.F. Birch, USNR, was placed in charge of pursuing that form
of detonation. The second method consisted of encasing the uranium mass inside a
shaped explosive charge that would compress the uranium by implosion to achieve a
critical mass. Lieutenant Commander N.E. Bradbury, USNR, took charge of
developing the second method. [Ref. 2: p. 153]
9One author attributed this to the Navy's "go it alone" attitude and single-
minded pursuit of atomic propulsion.
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The Navy was an integral participant in dropping the bomb on Japan. The Navy
directed the preparations of the facilities upon Tinian. the island from which the B-29's
would fly, and made arrangements for rescue operations for the aircrews should the
need arise. Captain Parsons and his assistant, Commander F.L. Ashworth, had carried
out tests of the three bomb designs while at Los Alamos. They also determined the
best procedures for dropping the bomb so as to provide the maximum protection for
the crew. Subsequently, both Parsons and Ashworth Hew on the actual missions over
Hiroshima and Nagasaki as weaponeers. As such they insured the correct arming and
fusing of the bombs. Parson's log of the actual drop on Hiroshima proves interesting
reading:
6 August 1945 0245 take-off
0300 started final loading of gun
0315 finishing loading
0605 headed for Empire from Iwo
0730 red plugs in 10
0741 started climb. Weather report received that
weather over primary and tertiary targets was good
but not over secondary target.
0838 leveled off at 32,700 feet
0S47 electronic fuses were tested and found to be o.k.
0904 course west
0909 Target Hiroshima in sight
0915.5 drop bomb Flash followed by two slaps on
plane. Huge cloud
1000 still in sight of cloud which must be over 40,000 feet
feet high.
1003 fighter reported
1041 lost sight of cloud, 363 miles from Hiroshima
with the aircraft being 26,000 feet high [Ref. 23: p.
318]
inThe plugs armed the bomb.
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Both Parsons and Ashworth had worked long and hard on the atomic bomb. They
were vitally interested in seeing the Navy adopt the bomb and both later played a
leading role in bringing that to pass.
The Navy had been the first of the services to pursue nuclear power. The Naval
Research Lab, although discounted early on by General Groves, eventually contributed
to the final development of the bomb. By playing a part, however minor, in the
Manhattan Project the NRL had established for the Navy a certain "right" to not only
send officers to work at the project after the war but also to benefit from the results of
the research. The later efforts of Parsons and Ashworth in developing the Navy's
atomic bomb delivery capability proved that while the Navy's contribution to the
Manhattan Project had been small, it was a wise investment.
C. THE BIKINI TESTS
The Air Corp based its case against the Navy on the proposition that strategic
bombing had made navies obsolete. Ever since Mitchell had demonstrated the
vulnerability of surface ships to bombing from aircraft, the Air Corp had pursued even.'
avenue possible to denigrate the Navy. Not only did the Air Corp want to appropriate
Navy funding for itself, but wanted the threat of naval aviation removed, either by
reducing it to a few flying boats or transferring it all to the Air Corp.
The lessons of World War II had been interpreted by the Air Corp to reinforce
their position. They reasoned that strategic bomber attacks had broken the back of
Germany and would have done the same to Japan regardless of the atomic bomb. The
Air Corp and its proponents in Congress were convinced that the next war would be
fought entirely within the context of strategic bombing. The pace of future combat
was believed to be so quick as to dilute beyond significance any contribution that
navies or armies could possible hope to make to the war effort.
Congress was ready to accept such a philosophy albeit for different reasons. The
Air Corp, whether or not it actually believed such a strategic outlook, hoped to exploit
strategic bombing to not only free itself from the Army but to ultimately establish its
primacy as the premier service in the nation's defense. Congress on the other hand was
inclined toward acquiescing in the Air Corp's thinking for other reasons that although
different where just as political in nature. First, the Congress wanted to believe any
strategy that would envisage little or no occasion to use U.S. ground troops. Second,
the strategy must promise a quick decisive victory over the enemy with the battle as far
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away as possible from the United States. [Ref. 3: p. 243] Strategic bombing fit in
perfectly well with both of those demands.
The atomic bomb only seemed to complement what the Air Corp had been
saying all along. The atomic bomb, now that the expense of development was over,
could combine the political benefits of strategic bombing with the more pragmatic
benefit of economy. The atomic bomb combined with strategic bombing gave the
United States a capability that aptly fit its new role as the world's policeman. From a
position of safety, aloof and omnipotent, the U.S. could quickly reach out and punish
any violator of world peace with a blow so devastating as to be a deterrent from even
the thought of violation. 11 The foundations of massive retaliation as national strategic
doctrine were buttressed by the pragmatic principles of economics.
The writing on the wall was clearly read by the Navy- who realized that two
points had to be established immediately:
• The fleet was still a viable force in the atomic environment, and
• The fleet, specifically naval aviation, could also exploit the potential of nuclear
weapons. [Ref. 3: p. 243]
If the Navy was to continue with any semblance of its wartime strength it would have
to quickly establish itself as capable of meeting the atomic threat, surviving and
presenting an atomic capability of its own. The immediate interest of the Navy in
establishing its "atomic credentials" was a dramatic manifestation of the Navy's new
attitude toward technology. The historical reluctance to explore new developments
was completely discarded.
One month after the bomb was dropped, Secretary Forrestal established the
Office of Special Weapons and tasked it with developing atomic weapons and
determining "the capabilities and inherent advantages of aircraft operating from mobile
bases, in attacks on vital targets" [Ref. 5: p. 221]. The newly assigned Deputy Chief of
Naval Operations for Special Weapons, Vice Admiral W.H.P. Blandy, was joined by
Commodore W.S. Parsons and Commander F.L Ashworth—both fresh from their
flights over Japan. To their group was added Commander Horacio Rivero assigned as
Officer in Charge of Atomic Weapons. [Ref. 2: p. 154]
The Navy shared this attitude. Admiral King, CNO, said, "Every country
knows, and realizes, our good intentions. . . I believe more attention will be paid to our
views if we are readv to knock down anyone who interferes with world peace." quoted
in New York Times, '28 October 1945.
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The first assignment for the new office, designated OP-06, was to conduct a test
of naval ships under the impact of an atomic blast. It was recognized that the future
of the Navy would rest on the outcome, but it was not something that could be
avoided or postponed. The sooner the results were known, hopefully favorable to the
Navy, the sooner the criticisms in Congress could be silenced.
The outline of the test was given by Admiral King in Kansas City on Navy Day,
27 October 1946:
Here for a Navy Day celebration, Admiral King said the plans would be subject
to the approval of anv body that Congress might establish to control atomic
research. A bomb would be exploded above water in one experiment, and below
in the other, with approximated forty or fiftv ships to be used in each test.
"We're going to have plentv of ships to work with.' the Fleet Admiral declared.
"We're going to discard at least one-third of the ships we wound up the war with.
The Japs have a number, not much eood for anything else, We also may look at
the German fleet for some." [Ref. 24": p. 35]
Actually, the Navy was not the first group to wonder what effect the atomic
bomb would have on naval vessels. The Los Alamos scientists had wondered the same
thing while the bomb was still in development. Their concern centered on the
effectiveness of the bomb if it had to be dropped on Japanese fleet concentrations.
[Ref. 25: p. 9]
A senator, Brien McMahon (D., Conn.), recommended on 25 August 1945 that
the bomb be tested on the remaining Japanese Fleet [Ref. 25: p. 10]. His
recommendation was soon followed by an Army recommendation for the same test-
proposing that two bombs be dropped on the surrendered fleet. Shortly thereafter.
General Hap Arnold, the Army Air Corp representative on the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
recommended that an order given by Admiral King to sink the remaining Japanese
fleet be countermanded and that the ships be made available for testing with the
atomic bomb to be carried out by the Army Air Corp. [Ref. 25: pp. 10-1 1]
Admiral King promptly made a broader proposal to include both the Navy and
the Army in the exercise, and that one bomb be dropped from the air and one be
placed under water. 12 The two services struggled over details of the test, the
configuration of the targets, and, most importantly, who would be in charge. Finally,
control of the test was given to the Navy's Office of Special Weapons under Vice
Admiral Blandy. Admiral Blandy was designated Commander of Joint Task Force One
Thereby, ensuring that each service had control over at least one of the bombs.
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and specifically told to adequately represent "land, sea and air forces" on his staff as
well as civilians. (See Appendix A)
Inevitably, involving the two services in the tests provided plenty of opportunity
for disagreement and conflict oi" interests. Test Alfa of Operation Crossroads, the
name chosen for the tests, was to be set off at some undetermined altitude. Discussion
was held on the feasibility of placing the bomb on a tower or suspending it from a
balloon-probably a subtle effort to reduce the role of the Air Corp. Naturally, the Air
Corp would have none of that but insisted that the bomb be dropped from an airplane
so as to provide ". . . invaluable experience in precision atomic bombing," as well as to
allow the bomb to be exploded at an altitude where it could do the most damage
[Ref. 25: p. 23] -probably a subtle effort to enforce its contention that ships were
extremely vulnerable.
Eventually, the details of the test were hammered out. The first test was to be
conducted on 15 March 1946 and the second test six weeks later. 13 Test Alfa was to be
conducted by dropping the bomb from a B-29 and Test Bravo by exploding the bomb
deep underwater. A tremendous amount of effort went into preparing Bikini Atoll for
the test. Eventually 42,000 men were involved with a myriad of ships from the U.S.,
Japanese and German fleets serving as targets. Animals were placed on board the
target ships and around the atoll to test their exposure to nuclear effects.
The tests were conducted and the results analyzed. The interpretation of the
results was inevitably controversial. The ships had been arranged in a target array that
bore no resemblance to an actual naval formation. The ships at the bull's eye had
been drained of fuel in order to prevent resultant fires from distorting the actual
damage created by the bomb's effects. Additionally, the ships were stationed so that
none would be shielded by another from the bomb's total force. Finally, much to the
chagrin of the Air Corp, the bomb did not land on target. The Nevada, the zeropoint
target, had been given a high-visibility paint job as well as a flashing light to identify
itself. Nevertheless, the bomb exploded almost two miles from the target. [Ref. 14: p.
224] Although the air burst sank five ships, the Navy contended that the scenario was
so artificial and the bomb so far off target that it proved nothing about the
vulnerability of warships to an actual atomic attack. It contended that the real value
of the test was the tremendous amount of scientific data gathered on blast pressures,
The tests were postponed for six weeks bv order of President Truman in order
to allow interested Congressmen who had to wait for the summer recess to attend.
July 1 became the new target date.
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bulkhead damage, wave formation, etc.. The Air Corp contended that the test once
again proved the vulnerability of ships to aircraft [Ref. 2: p. 155].
Test Bravo sank nine ships and pushed two million tons of water into the
atmosphere over the atoll. The strength of the underwater shock wave did most of the
damage, crushing the ship's hulls. The Saratoga which had figured so strongly in the
adoption of naval aviation, sank after five hours of floundering.
In the end, the results of Operation Crossroads were not conclusive for either
side, the Navy or the Army Air Corp [Ref. 14: p. 225]. Both could interpret the results
to suit their own needs. The Navy had hoped that the results of the test would provide
data on what measures could be taken to enhance the survivability of naval vessels in
the atomic environment. The Air Corp hoped the tests would show the obsolescence
of the Navy. Indeed, there was a tremendous similarity between the Bikini tests and
the air bombing demonstration under General Mitchell. In both tests, the Navy was
actually seeking data on how to improve the fleet while the Air Corp was seeking to
demonstrate its own superiority.
Regardless of the controversial nature of the results, one thing was clear-the
atomic bomb was a potent weapon that had to be considered by the Navy. The
officers intimately involved in the tests—Parsons, Ashworth and a Commander John T.
Hayward -became convinced more than ever that the Navy had to develop a
platform for the delivery of nuclear weapons and formulate a reasonable employment
strategy or else the Air Corp would monopolize the bomb for itself. [Ref. 5: p. 221]
They soon became involved in doing everything possible to make both happen.
D. A NUCLEAR BOMBER FOR THE NAVY
In late 1945 Commander Ashworth visited the Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics to
inquire into the types of airplanes being developed and to determine whether or not
they were suitable for carrying atomic bombs. From there he visited North American
Aviation in Los Angeles to see the mock-up of the XAJ-1 Savage which was being
developed for carrier aviation. [Ref. 3: p. 249] Although he did not have access to the
exact specifications of the atomic bombs then being built, he did have a general idea of
their dimensions and was satisfied that the Savage could be easily adopted to carry a
nuclear payload.
14Hayward had worked as director of development for the Bureau of Ordnance
and then as a physicist on the Manhattan Project.
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Upon returning to Washington, Ashworth drafted a letter for Secretary Forrestal
to sign and send to the White House requesting the XAJ-1 be modified to provide an
atomic delivery capability for the Navy. After sitting in Forrestal' s office unsigned for
months, suddenly the Secretary decided it did not need the President's approval and so
approved the proposal himself. [Ref. 5: p. 221].
North American (later Rockwell) was subsequently allowed access to the
technical data on the Mark IV bomb and contracted to produce prototypes o[ the
Savage modified to carry atomic bombs. [Ref. 5: p. 221].
On 1 August 1946 President Truman signed the law establishing the Atomic
Energy Commission. Although the military lost their monopoly on controlling nuclear
weapons, a Military Liaison Committee (MLC) was established to provide substantial
military input in the Commission. Rear Admiral Parsons was on the MLC as well as
were Ashworth, the executive secretary, and Commander Hayward (previously
mentioned and a fellow proponent of a naval strategic nuclear role) [Ref. 2: p. 157].
From their positions on the Committee, Parsons, Ashworth and Hayward were in
an excellent position to promote the Navy's cause as well as keep tabs on the activities
of the other services in regards to atomic weapons [Ref. 3: p. 250]. Perhaps, just as
important, they were able to influence the designers and engineers at work on atomic
bombs to refine the weapon in size and capability to increase its compatibility with
carrier aviation. At the time the bomb was so big and heavy (60 inches in diameter,
128 inches long and weighing 10,000 lbs), the only platform that could carry it was the
B-29. The Army Air Corp had a vested interest in discouraging attempts to reduce the
bomb's size. They knew any miniaturization of the bomb's components would
promote the Navy's efforts to adopt it to carrier aviation.
Meanwhile, Commander Hayward had worked to have the three largest carriers
designated as storage sites for atomic weapons [Ref. 2: p. 158]. The ships were
modified so as to have handling facilities, safety equipment and bomb-assembly spaces.
The modification of the carriers and the pending development of the XAJ-1 Savage
would guarantee the Navy a nuclear capability. However, Hayward was worried about
the long lead time required for the development of the Savage. He did not feel
comfortable allowing the Air Corp to dominate the atomic bomb delivery capability
unchallenged during the interim. He realized the mood in Congress was still inclined
toward unification and felt that further distance was needed between the Navy and its
critics. He therefore asked Vice Admiral Forrest Sherman, Deputy CNO, to go before
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Congress and ask for an endorsement of the Navy's plan to develop an atomic bomb
delivery capability immediately. [Ref. 3: p. 251]
Sherman declined saying it would be strategically smarter to develop the
capability first, then present Congress with a fait accompli. He reasoned Congress
would be more likely to endorse improvements to a program than to endorse initiation
of new program. Commander Hayward then set out to establish a make-shift delivery
capability while the Savage was still in development. The three Midway-class carriers
were in modification, but the only wheeled airplane the Navy had that could carry
10,000 pounds was the P2V Neptune patrol bomber. It was designed specifically to
operate from a land base against submarines and certainly never meant to take off or
land on an aircraft carrier.
Undaunted, Commander Hayward had 12 of the P2V's modified to accept a new
version of the atomic bomb, the Mark VIII. The aircraft were stripped of unnecessary
equipment, more powerful engines installed and additional fuel tanks added. Nothing
however could be done about the wingspan which was calculated to clear a carrier
superstructure by just ten inches. In April, 1948 two of the Neptunes were craned
aboard the Coral Sea where the next day they took off from the ship's deck and flew
back to Norfolk Naval Air Station, Virginia. After completion of the trials,
Commander Hayward was given command of a squadron of 12 modified Neptunes
with Commander Ashworth as his executive officer [Ref. 3: p. 253]. Composite
Squadron 5 (VC-5) was stationed with the Neptunes at Moffett Field, California where
it eventually received 12 AJ-1 Savage bombers.
The Squadron demonstrated its capability most vividly when it launched from the
deck of the Coral Sea on 7 May 1949 with newly promoted Capt Hayward at the
controls of a Neptune and a simulated atomic bomb in the bombbay. The aircraft flew
from off the coast of Virginia and across the country where it dropped its practice
bomb at El Centro bombing range in California. After returning to the East Coast it
circled the Coral Sea and then landed at Patuxent River Naval Air Station, having
been aloft for 23 hours. With this flight Hayward demonstrated that the Navy had
achieved its goal of obtaining a true nuclear bomb delivery capability. A landing on
the carrier was never attempted with the Neptunes. The attack plan held that the
airplanes would either proceed to friendly territory and land, or ditch along side the
carrier where the crew would be picked up. [Ref. 5: p. 222]
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Although unconventional, the Navy was enthusiastic about its new capability.
In September of 1949 Hayward took ofT from the USS Midway with the Secretary of
the Navy onboard. Reinforced by this demonstration, the Navy formed another
squadron, VC-6, under the command of Commander Ashworth. VC-6 was created to
back-up VC-5 which was about to make its first operational deployment. VC-5
conducted its carrier trials with the newly delivered AJ-1 Savage. Finally, on 31
August 1950 Hayward led his squadron to a landing onboard the Coral Sea and
commenced the first operational deployment of the Navy's atomic bomb delivery
capability. [Ref. 2: p. 161]
At the end of 1948, two years before the deployment of VC-5 to the
Mediterranean, Admiral Sherman had succeeded in convincing the Atomic Energy
Commission to set aside several of the "Little Boy" atomic bombs to be issued to the
Navy during a national crisis. Although the Navy's capability to carry a 10,000 pound
dummy bomb had been demonstrated as far back as May 1949, the Air Force (recently
given its independence and renamed by the National Security Act of 1947) refused to
include the Navy in its national war plans and targeting for nuclear weapons until the
actual deployment of VC-5 in August 1950. [Ref. 3: pp. 255-256]
The Navy had succeeded in challenging the Air Force for a role upon which the
Air Force had founded its entire reason for existence. However, even though the Navy
did deploy its strategic bombing capability, it was far short of what Hayward and the
other proponents of naval aviation would have liked. When the earliest efforts of
Parsons, Ashworth and Hayward became publicly known in 1946, the Air Force (as it
would soon be known) recognized the threat to its role and mission in national defense
such a capability for the Navy would represent and quickly took steps to stifle the
Navy's program as much as it possibly could. The halls of Congress became the battle
ground for the third conflict between the services over roles and missions.
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VI. THE THIRD CONFLICT OVER ROLES AND MISSIONS
From the very beginning, the Army Air Corp had been allowed to pursue its own
interests. The first airplanes assumed the role that balloons had held from as early as
the Civil War-reconnaissance and targeting. However, the flexibility of the airplane,
its long range and ability to bring its own weapons to bear on the enemy immediately
established it as much more than a reconnaissance platform. However, the Army Air
Service was not content to stay on the front lines of battle supporting friendly troops
[Ref. 5: p. 20], but found itself drawn behind enemy lines to attack and bomb lesser
defended positions. The Army acquiesced to the Air Corp's desires and allowed the
Service to gravitate toward a strategic role at the expense of valuable tactical support
for the ground forces, a job the Air Corp had never liked.
The division in roles and missions between the Army and the Air Service
promoted and partially justified the Air Service in pursuing its own independence. The
willingness of General Mitchell to sacrifice his career in the effort to aggrandize the Air
Service reflected the passion among Air Service proponents for anything that would
support and justify the independence of an air force. The uncontestable integration of
naval aviation into regular naval forces represented to the Air Service a demonstrable
refutation of their contentions and rationale for independence. It was necessary that
they attempt to denigrate the relationship between the Navy and naval aviation in
order to promote the validity of their own pursuit of independence.
Additionally, and more significant, was the threat posed by the capability of
naval aviation to usurp the responsibilities that the Air Corp felt were its own. Not
only did naval aviation's relationship with the Navy pose an embarrassment, but naval
aviation threatened the very elements upon which the Air Corp based its raison d'etre.
The developing capability of naval aviation to conduct strategic bombing eroded the
justification the Air Corp presented for its own independence.
Strategic bombing, in the minds of the Air Corp, had relegated both armies and
navies to obsolescence. Therein lay the necessity for an independent air force. The
advent of nuclear weapons confirmed to the Air Corp that the nature of war had
forever been changed. Future war would consist of strategic bombing attacks
exchanged between adversaries. Only by preparing a force to deliver such an attack
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could war be avoided. The Air Corp saw itself as a force to deter war; to spend money
and resources on the Navy was wasteful and counterproductive. It would be much
wiser to direct all funding toward the development of a tremendous strategic bombing
capability. The first step had to be the creation of an independent air force.
The Air Corp's agenda was therefore divided into two goals: first, achieve its
own independence and secondly, prevent the Navy from developing its own strategic
role in the nation's defense.
A. UNIFICATION AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
The idea of somehow unifying the services was certainly not new to the post-war
era. Unification, an issue that developed at the turn of the century, had descended
from the earlier issue of maintaining civilian control over the Army and Navy while
centralizing their decisionmaking processes. The Army and Navy had divided
themselves into a network of bureaucracies each responsible for its own area of
interest, frequently frustrating the progress of the others and without a joint point of
control or accountability. The consequences of such an arrangement were made
apparent by the inept conduct of the Army Department during the Spanish-American
war. [Ref. 9: p. 10] This created a tremendous outcry for the reorganization of the
Army and to a lesser degree the Navy. Reformers wanted to establish a single civilian
chief over the services as well as provide for a clear cut chain of command and
accountability over the service bureaucracies. [Ref. 9: pp. 11-12]
The role model for reorganizing the Army was the German General Staff as it
had developed in the early to mid ISSO's. The waste, corruption and ineptitude
displayed by the Army in the Spanish-American War forced the McKinley
administration to take action on the matter which they did by bringing in Elihu Root,
a corporate lawyer, to head the War Department. Root was told to straighten out the
bureaucratic mess that had engulfed the Army department. The Army department had
been divided into two parts, (1) operational—which was attempting to execute national
policy on the frontier, and (2) bureaucratic-which was centered in Washington and
spent its time cultivating political influence. Root saw the lack of a clear cut
centralized command as fostering anarchy in the Army department administration.
[Ref. 9: pp. 11-12]
To alleviate this, Root proposed to change the position of Commanding General
of the Army to the Chief of Staff of the Army. Although he based this on the
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structure of the German General Staff, he did not want to adopt the same high degree
of autonomy. He meant for the Chief of Staff to function directly under the Secretary
of War in directing the entire Army according to the instructions of the Commander-
in-Chief as they came through the Secretary of War. The Commanding General, as he
was then constituted, did not have direct control over several Army department
bureaucracies which were directly linked through their own chiefs to Congress. Root
felt that such a decentralized structure created parochialism, rivalry, and disunity of
command. He intended that the very name, Chief of Staff, should indicate that the
chief would advise, inform and assist a superior officer—the Secretary of War. The
Chief of Staff would be the Secretary's personal military adviser, general manager of
the military establishment and agent of the Secretary's policies [Ref. 9: p. 22].
Secretary of War Root hoped to centralize the direction of all aspects of the
Army under one authority, the Chief of Staff, who would report to the Secretary of
War thereby ensuring civilian control of the Army. Naturally enough the incumbent
Commanding General, who did not favor increased civilian meddling in Army affairs,
opposed the changes. But with the public demand for action. Root's proposals were
passed as a bill by Congress in 1902. From that point every department in the Army
that had previously enjoyed direct recourse to Congress became responsible to the
Chief of Staff.
The demand for reorganization in the Navy was more constrained than it had
been for the Army. However, there was perhaps more support among naval officers
for reform than there had been among the army officers. Captain Alfred T. Mahan
provided some influence for that by his emphasis on the development of a naval
strategy. Before Mahan, the officer corp in the Navy had gravitated away from the
development of strategy and the overall direction of the Navy. They had become
increasingly caught up in their long and tedious efforts to analyze and implement the
various technological developments that had recently been presented. Changing from
sail to steam, the new rifled guns and the technical lessons of the Civil War were
dominating the attention of naval officers. They appeared little interested in strategy
or the overall operation of the fleet. They seemed perfectly content to leave the
governing of the Navy and the preparation of strategy to civilians. [Ref. 9: pp. 50-52]
The establishment of the Naval War College in 1884 began an awakening in the
officer corp of the necessity to reestablish control over the management of the Navy.
As an increasing number of senior officers graduated from the college instilled with an
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appreciation for strategy they had received from Captain Mahan, they began to
challenge the decisionmaking structure of the Navy and to call for a general staff of
naval officers to centralize planning and strategy formulation as well as to run the
administrative operations of the Navy. [Ref. 7: pp. 15-16]
The call for reform inside the Navy was combined with one from without. A
Strategy Board was established to provide more input into naval matters, but it failed
to accomplish all that the reformers wanted. Finally in March 1900 the Secretary of
the Navy created the General Board tailored along the lines of a general staff.
[Ref. 7: p. 16J However, the Board was not given the authority it needed to take charge
of the Navy. The Board was tasked with drawing-up and revising war plans in
coordination with the War College and the Office of Naval Intelligence. [Ref. 9: p. 55]
However, it had not been intended to manage the Navy, nor was it able to take any
substantive measures to centralize command and control under one leadership. The
Board did not report to the Secretary of the Navy and in fact operated independent of
him. It was thereby left out of any management role of the service. The Secretary of
the Navy was not anxious to threaten civilian control of the Navy by establishing a
stall of naval officers that had real power in determining the course of naval
operations.
The call for a general staff that would function in the chain of command between
the service and the Secretary' continued. President Theodore Roosevelt proposed the
establishment of four naval aides to assist the Secretary. But such an arrangement,
although implemented under President Taft, did not prove particularly effective at
achieving what the reformers had wanted. [Ref. 7: p. 18] It was left for the
administration of Woodrow Wilson to finally arrive at a workable solution. Ironically,
it was under Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, who opposed creating a general
staff arrangement, that a workable structure was brought about.
Daniels' Aide for Operations, Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, was not satisfied
that his boss was adequately moving the Navy toward solving its problems. He
therefore went to a friend, Congressman Richard P. Hobson, whom he convinced
should support legislation in the House that would create a Chief of Naval Operations.
The proposal would create a CNO to represent the entire Navy in dealings with the
Secretary. The CNO would be the counterpart to the Army's Chief of Stall. Hobson
introduced the bill into the House.
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Daniels was unhappy with the wording of the original bill and had it clarified by
stating that the CNO would work, directly for the Secretary of the Navy so as not to
usurp civilian control of the service. With that proviso, the bill was passed by
Congress and signed into law in 1915. Daniels, still fearing that he would lose control
of the Navy, selected as CNO Captain William S. Benson, who had never held a major
command and had neither sat on the General Board nor had attended the War College
[Ref. 9: p. 73]. Although Benson originally found his going rough, a pattern emerged
that has continued up to today. Once Secretary Daniels realized the benefits of dealing
through the CNO, both joined together to support each other in confronting critics
outside the service. [Ref. 9: p. 61]
While both services were independently dealing with attempts to centralize their
administration, moves to bring both together under a central body were taking place.
As with the move toward centralization, the influence of Mahan fostered support
among naval officers for at least some form of unification. Naval officers were more
and more concerned with the impact of foreign policy on naval policy. Under Mahan
they had been taught that the purpose of naval strategy was to implement national
strategy. Doing so required a clear definition of both the national strategy as well as
foreign policy of the government toward prospective enemies. To provide the
coordination between foreign policy and naval strategy they proposed that a council of
national defense be established that would provide a common centralized forum for
defining national security objectives.
Secondly, the Navy's General Board had encountered political obstacles in
building the fleet it desired. A council of national defense composed of the Secretaries
of State, War, and Navy as well as the chairmen of the Senate and House Military and
Naval Affairs Committee, the Chief of Stall of the Army, the presidents of the Army
and Navy War Colleges, and the Naval Aide for Operations was seen as a valuable
tool for overcoming congressional obstacles in the way of naval development. Both
services saw the proposed council as an instrument of political leadership, but the
Navy was most interested in the benefits it would provide for developing and
implementing naval strategy [Ref. 9: p. 70].
Although proposals to establish the council were before Congress as early as
1912, the legislators failed to take action and were soon overcome by the events of
World War I. In the meanwhile, a development occurred that seriously impacted on
the Navy's interest in unification—the incremental growth of military aviation both in
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the Navy and Army. The Navy had pursued unification measures to provide for a
"unity of command" which was intended to enhance the posture of both the Army and
Navy. However, the meteoric rise of the Army Air Service during and immediately
after the war and its yearning for independence soon conflicted with the Navy's
concept of unification. The subsequent efforts of the Army Air Corp to separate naval
aviation from the Navy shifted the Navy's attitude toward unification completely.
While the Navy supported a unified approach to the development of a national
strategy it certainly was not willing to give up naval aviation in the bargain. From that
point on the Navy began to oppose unification.
Finally, Congress acted by defeating the proposal to establish the Department of
National Defense and instead passing the Air Corps Act of 1926 increasing the newly
formed Air Corp's independence within the Army. The Navy was satisfied with the
relationship between the CNO and Secretary of Navy and was not anxious to see any
renewed effort at unification if it still threatened naval aviation. Nevertheless, during
World War II, the Navy supported the work of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in that it
enhanced the "unity of command" [Ref. 9: p. 202]. The Navy would not have objected
to an even closer cooperation with the Army on developing plans and strategy.
However, every proposal put forth by the Army promoting some form of unification
was so clearly engineered by the separatists in -Air Corp that the Navy could not do
anything but reject it. The Air Corp was committed to exploiting the idea of
unification to promote its own independence which necessarily included the
emasculation of the Navy. Nevertheless, the Navy was always willing to work with the
Army on deciding a coherent and united strategic policy for national defense. This was
first manifested by the formation of the Joint Board of naval and army officers in 1903.
The formation and limited success of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instituted by President
Roosevelt during World War II provides another example.
Roosevelt's Joint Chiefs of Staff sat together for the first time on February' 9,
1942. It was made up of General Marshall, representing the Army, General Arnold,
representing the Army Air Corp and Admiral King of the Navy. They met not only to
integrate their own strategies for the war but also to present the British chiefs of staff,
with whom they were meeting, the semblance of a united war effort from the military
of the United States [Ref. 9: p. 166].
The President of the United States was constitutionally instituted as the
commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Since the JCS consisted of the heads of the
59
armed forces, they felt it gave them direct access to the President on matters of strategy
and warfighting. This caused an uproar among the secretaries of the services who felt
coordination with the President should come through them. Subsequently, each side
appealed to the President and Congress for clarification of their roles. This dilemma
was added to the Air Corp's demand for independence as well as the whole issue o[
unification and given upon Roosevelt's death to President Truman to solve.
Harry Truman had already made his opinions on the unification of the services
perfectly clear long before he succeeded Roosevelt as Commander-in-Chief. As a
senator he had written an article for Colliers magazine entitled "Our Armed Forces
Must Be Unified." [Ref. 5: p. 18] In his capacity as chairman of the Special Committee
to Investigate the National Defense Program he had first hand knowledge of repeated
instances of waste, corruption and favoritism in defense matters and had committed
himself to doing something about it. While running for vice-president he proclaimed
himself an "ardent champion of a single authority over everything that pertains to
American safety." [Ref. 5: p. 17]
After attaining the White House, Truman relaxed the intensity of his fervor and
modified the proposals he had claimed were necessary to straighten out the defense
establishment. He relaxed his call for establishing a general staff and eventually agreed
to allow the Navy to retain both naval aviation and the Marine Corps—a separation he
had originally promoted.
As soon as the war ended Truman resolved to press legislation through Congress
that would represent as much unification as the services would tolerate. In an attempt
to solve the dilemma of retaining strong civilian control of the services yet provide a
unified command for strategy formulation, Truman proposed the creation of the
Department of Defense headed by a cabinet-level secretary assisted by non-cabinetlevel
secretaries for each of the three services, and the creation of an independent air force.
The JCS would be left intact to provide direct strategy advice for the President in his
role as commander-in-chief. To defend the interests of the Secretary of Defense, the
idea of a single chief of staff officer representing the combined interests of the military
was rejected. A National Security Council would be set up to decide matters of
strategic policy and would include the Secretary of Defense as well as a representative
from the JCS.
The Navy was satisfied with Truman's proposal. However, the fates of naval
aviation and the Marine Corp were still in question. Before encouraging its supporters
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in Congress to pass the President's proposal, the Navy wanted guarantees on the
sanctity of both. A compromise worked out by Major General Lauris Norstad and
Vice Admiral Forrest P. Sherman that satisfied the Navy's worries was added to
Truman's proposal and sent to the Congress, where it was passed in mid July 1947.
[Ref. 9: pp. 221-222] As a "balm" to the Navy, Secretary of the Navy Forrestal was
offered the job of first Secretary of Defense [Ref. 26: p. 249].
B. THE ATOMIC BOMB AND NAVAL STRATEGY
Secretary of the Navy Forrestal awakened the Navy to the threat of Soviet
incrementalism or "creeping aggression." The traditional neglect by naval officers of
the implications of international events on the Navy had been curbed by Forrestal's
demand that the Navy plan for a confrontation with a host of potential enemies
regardless of their maritime capabilities. He was able to alter the historical
preoccupation with the Pacific by establishing a permanent naval presence in the
Mediterranean. He accelerated the Navy's acceptance of a strategic outlook toward
warfare and thereby provided the Navy with its first opportunity to take an offensive
position in the struggle with the Air Corp.
Forrestal's antipathy for the Soviet Union was initially at variance with the
popular conception of U.S.-Soviet relations. The Grand Alliance, while necessary for
the war effort, took on the unrealistic aura of perpetual cooperation that barely
survived the war's end. On February 22, 1946 George Kennan's "long telegram"
arrived in Washington and initiated the process that eventually brought formal
recognition of the cold war. The services immediately developed a major interest in
determining a military strategy that would be effective in meeting the Soviet threat.
The staff of the Chief of Naval Operations, FADM Chester W. Nimitz, prepared
the Navy's contribution to a report analyzing Soviet-American relations that was
presented to President Truman. In the report the Navy reviewed the maritime
developments in Soviet worldwide expansionism and predicted the continued growth of
a Russian seaborne capability. As a response to the threat, the report called for a
three-part foundation for U.S. naval strategy with six supporting actions:
1. A Western Hemisphere and Philippine Island defense.
2. Preparations for a unilateral defense, although acknowledging the possible
support of allies.




a) Provision of naval support for U.S. troops overseas.
b) Maintenance of mobile striking forces--in particular carrier task forces--in
both the Atlantic and Pacific.
c) Maintenance of "sea lines of communication" to the Far East, to Britain, and
through the Mediterranean.
d) Formulation of a coordinated naval policv with the British Commonwealth,
particularly emphasizing cooperation in the Mediterranean and Near East.
e) Arctic training and preparation for U.S. Navy ships and personnel, especially
aircraft and submarines, as a defense against possible Soviet penetration of
North America.
f) Emphasis on maintaining an adequate naval intelligence svstem. [Ref. 2: p.
26]
Independently of the report prepared for Truman, the JCS had worked up a set
of tentative plans code-named "Pincher" that provided more or less an outline of
military activities that would be necessary to win a war with the Soviet Union
[Ref. 14: p. 219]. VADM Forrest Sherman, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
(Operations) led the Navy's efforts to define the maritime situation and establish a
basic strategy for the employment of naval forces against the Soviets. Ultimately,
Sherman also gave a report of the Navy's contribution to Pincher to President Truman.
Sherman started his presentation with a review of what the intelligence community had
to say about Soviet capabilities. He went on to outline the expected Soviet agenda for
conquest during a war and then presented what the Navy saw as the necessary
American response.
In outlining naval responsiblities, Sherman identified nine as most essential:
To protect the United States
To control essential sea and air communications:
To evacuate occupation forces from Europe;
To assist in protecting the United Kingdom;
To assist in holding Japan and in providing for the safety of forces in China and
in Korea;
To assist in retarding Soviet advances into Norway, Spain, Italy, Greece,
Turkey, and towards Suez;
To place the Army Air Forces in positions to initiate an air offensive as soon as
possible;
To prevent Soviet use of sea lines communications; and,
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To seize and defend positions from which subsequent offensives might be
launched.
Sherman went on to explain that the war could be divided into four distinct
phases. The first phase would involve containing the Soviets as much as possible while
mobilizing national defense to meet them. While this phase would necessarily be
defensive, both the Air Force and Navy would take offensive actions as soon as
possible. The second phase would involve the reduction of the Soviet war potential
while the U.S. build-up continued. Advanced bases would be secured and
transportation of forces to Europe would begin. The third phase would see the
sustained bombing of Soviet forces and the seizure of limited footholds in Europe and
the Middle East. The final phase would involve the systematic destruction of Soviet
industry, internal transportation systems and general war potential. [Ref. 2: p. 30]
Sherman listed amphibious forces of higher priority than carrier air forces in his
presentation due to the necessity, of eventually establishing a beachhead in Europe.
However, he credited the carrier forces with being the only method to provide a highly
mobile and tactical air force at sea or in the coastal areas far from established air
bases.
Sherman's description of a possible future conflict with the Soviets appeared very
pragmatic and well reasoned. He rejected the idea of a war fought long distance with
strategic bombers, but felt it would be a protracted affair that would entail
mobilization, defensive actions giving way to offensive actions and the conventional
concept of a war of attrition. Sherman cautioned that the nation's defenses must be
kept highly trained and well supplied and that excessive reliance on "push button" and
"Buck Rogers" equipment should be avoided. [Ref. 2: p. 31]
Subtly, Admiral Sherman's presentation initiated the process that would
eventually result in another showdown with the Air Force over roles and missions.
Sherman felt that a future war would not be much different than it had been in the
past. It would still allow time for a degree of mobilization. It would require a
tremendous national effort to provide the balance of forces necessary to defeat the
enemy. Actually fighting the war would require the coordinated efforts of all branches
of the military operating a tremendous variety of equipment, all of which would be
essential for eventual victory-
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The Air Force dissented from this view of the nature of a future war. It felt that
war had been drastically modified by new technology and the concept of strategic
bombing, that it would occur so swiftly as to prevent any opportunity for mobilization,
and that a perpetually vigilant strategic force was required to serve as a deterrent to
attack. Such an outlook left little for the Navy to do with its traditional role of sea
control. Therefore, Admiral Sherman could not accept such a philosophy but persisted
in his contentions that war would be protracted and would require a balance of forces.
In preparing his report. Admiral Sherman sought the advice of Captain George
W. Anderson who was then serving on the Joint War Plans Committee of the JCS and
asked for his views on the nature of a future war with the Soviet Union. Captain
Anderson, who would later become CNO, presented Sherman with a ten-page
document that pointed out new and interesting perspectives on a possible futuristic
conflict. Anderson credited the Soviets with an extremely strong conventional
capability that could overrun Eurasia, North China and Korea. He felt that the United
Kingdom was particularly vulnerable to Soviet air attack and sea blockade, and so he
supported a strategic air offensive against the Soviet Union as soon as the war started.
In supporting the strategic bombing of the Soviet Union, Anderson proposed the
use of atomic weapons. He felt that the vast area, numbers of forces, and targets
would be beyond the effective capability of destruction by conventional bombing. He
therefore recommended that atomic bombs be made available for use against centers of
government, industrial areas, and oil refineries from "both carrier (emphasis added) and
land bases." [Ref 2: p. 35]
As the concept of employing atomic weapons in war with the Soviet Union
began to take root among naval strategic thinkers, the admission was made that the
Russians too might soon have the atomic bomb. Captain (later VADM) Herbert D.
Riley who served as assistant director of the Strategic Plans Division submitted a
memorandum to his boss on the implications of such an event on World War III. He
reasoned that the Soviet Union would not start a war until they had obtained nuclear
weapons and, if that were the case, they would very likely initiate a conflict with the
destruction of the United Kingdom. Such an attack with nuclear weapons would dwarf
the impact of the Battle of Britain to miniscule proportions. The implications were
that bases for the advanced deployment of B-29 bombers to England would not be
available thereby prohibiting the initiation of strategic bombing by U.S. forces. 15 Riley
15
In the immediate postwar period B-29's were the only available platform for
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had worked on the Bikini Tests and had a healthy respect for the results of an atomic
explosion. [Ref. 2: p. 38] His proposals were modest. Riley recommended that
additional consideration be given to the defense of Britain against attack as well as the
overall implications of the Soviet's possession of atomic bombs.
On the heels of Riley's memo came two from Rear Admiral Daniel V. Gallery,
director of OP-57, the Guided Missiles Division of the DCNO (Air) organization.
Although it is doubtful that he saw Riley's memo, Gallery prepared two memorandums
for the Assistant CNO (Air) Rear Admiral J.J. Clark, where Gallery speculated on the
Navy's role in a future war. In the first memo. Gallery proposed that the Navy could
become the premier instrument for delivering the knock-out blow to the Soviet Union.
He based this presumption on the possible loss of Great Britain under atomic attack
from the Soviet Union. Such a move would prevent the Air Force from conducting
any strategic bombing attacks on the Soviet Union and would place the Navy at the
forefront as the only possible means of delivering atomic bombs on target.
Gallery criticized the B-36 under development by the Air Force as inadequate,
vulnerable to inevitable improvements in fighter aircraft and still requiring vulnerable
bases in England to complete their missions. He proposed that the Navy initiate work
immediately on the development of a strategic bomber for carrier aviation. Aircraft
carriers and a strategic bomber could establish the Navy as the premier atomic strike
force in the U.S. defense community.
Gallery's second memorandum emerged three days after the first on 17
November 1947. In it he proposed that formal steps be taken to realign the roles and
missions of the armed forces to give the Navy the primary mission of atomic weapons
delivery supplanting the traditional role of sea control, which would be relegated
secondary position. He proposed that the Air Force be given responsiblity for the
defense of the United States from air attack with the strategic bombing as their
secondary mission.
The unorthodox proposals in Gallery's memorandums were generally disregarded
as "wishful thinking" by fellow naval officers. When they became public, the Secretary
of the Navy, John Sullivan, and the CNO, Admiral Denfeld, disavowed their contents.
However, while Gallery's observations and proposals were rash, they pointed out
deliverins atomic bombs. Their limited range required that thev operate from bases in
EnelandTn order to attack the Soviet Union. The Air Force was hard at work on the
B-3~6 which would solve that problem. It was designed to take off from U.S. bases with
sufficient range to attack the Soviet Union and return to England
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significant problems in accepted military strategy that needed to be addressed. The
vulnerability of England to atomic attack and the subsequent impact on U.S. bomber
bases there had generally been ignored by mainstream military leadership and the
possibilities of naval aviation in a strategic nuclear role were certainly worth
investigation.
In 194S the Navy's General Board was still in operation after having been created
in March 1900 to quell demands among naval officers for increased attention to
strategic planning. However, the Board, recognizing that most of its planning duties
had been assumed by the office of the CNO. could foresee its imminent demise. As
one of its last contributions to naval strategic planning, the Board assigned a member,
Captain Arleigh A. Burke, to prepare a study on the Navy's contributions to national
security over the next ten years.
Burke worked on the study for six months before presenting it to the Secretary of
the Navy on 25 June 1948. The study, among other subjects, addressed its views on a
possible conflict with the Soviet Union, the nature of the conflict and the contribution
that the Navy and naval aviation would make to that conflict. The study was, as a
whole, much more conservative in flavor than had been Gallery's memorandums.
The study adopted a view of the Soviet Union complementary to that which had
been espoused by Forrestal and Kennan. Russia was seen as dedicated to the eventual
demise of the capitalist world albeit more immediately concerned with consolidating its
position internally and its control over its immediate satellites. The study speculated
that war would likely result from miscalculation or a direct and deliberate Soviet
decision to challenge the U.S. in Europe. The possibility of a Soviet attack on the
continental U.S. was postulated and was attributed to the frustration of the Soviets to
advance their gains beyond what they held in Eastern Europe.
The study attributed the Soviets with the imminent capability to develop nuclear
weapons and felt sure that they would be used in attacks on the continental U.S. in
event of hostilities. Actions by the U.S. in response to Soviet aggression were spelled
out:
Continental and hemispheric defense,
Preserving the security of Western Eurasia and restoring the balance of power,
Destruction of the communist international network,
Overthrow of the Soviet hierarchy,
Liberation of the satellite states,
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• Restriction of the USSR to pre-World War II borders, and
• The maintenance of American economic strength in order to prevent postwar
chaos. [Ref. 2: p. 48]
Explaining that particular characteristics of the Soviet Union-its size, the
dispersal of its factories and military forces-made it a difficult target even for atomic
bombing, the study proposed that a significant effort be made by strategic planners to
formulate plans that would provide the most effective utilization of atomic forces.
However, the study also cautioned against an overreacting departure from conventional
concepts of warfighting.
The study took a much more conservative attitude toward the employment of
naval forces than had the Gallery memorandums. It did not propose that carrier
aviation assume the responsibilities for land-based aviation either during the first stages
of conflict or thereafter. The study proposed the use of carrier strike forces to
maintain the freedom of the seas and to provide security for advanced bases. However,
the study also discussed the impact of the Soviet submarine force and what its use
could mean to the entire war effort. In that regard, the study proposed the use of
atomic bombs as effective weapons against enemy submarine bases and gave the Navy
primary responsibility for that mission.
Additional naval responsibilities proposed by the study included the seizure and
defense of advanced bases and beachheads. Carrier aviation would prove vital in
defending the sea accesses to advanced bases. The Navy was also tasked with
controlling the sea lines of communication and the establishment of air superiority
overhead. Finally, the study admitted that there would perhaps exist targets inside the
Soviet Union that only carrier aviation could possibly attack. Such peripheral attacks
would also serve to disperse enemy forces and reduce their concentrated attack at other
points.
The study was careful to adhere as much as possible to the conventional wisdom
of the day. It explained the unique contribution that could be made by the Navy and,
particularly, naval aviation while emphasizing the necessity of cooperation with the Air
Force in the overall air battle. The study did not propose that the Navy assume any
role that had been previously reserved for the Air Force, nor did it challenge the
capability of the Air Force to carry out its mission of strategic bombing. Rather, it
proposed how the Navy and naval aviation might contribute to ensure the success of
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the Air Forces's role by seizing and defending bases from which the Air Force would
deploy.
The General Board's study was a sophisticated and detailed outline of the Navy's
role in a future conflict [Ref. 2: p. 53]. Furthermore, the study was a response to an
actual concern for the developing Soviet threat. The Board had not approached its job
out of parochialism or in defense of the Navy and naval aviation. It had actually been
an effort to establish a basis upon which naval strategic planners could build.
Subsequently, the study provided just that. It was not widely recognized outside the
service but did provide a broadly based imput in the Navy's strategic planning.
[Ref. 2: p. 53]
Rejecting the drastic recommendations of Gallery, the Board had defined for the
Navy a moderate and reasonable role in a future conflict that included the use of
atomic weapons. A strategy had been proposed that did not seriously challenge the
perceived role of the Air Force yet, provided a strategy for confronting a realistic
appraisal of the threat. There was reason to believe that acceptance of such a Navy
role was possible if not highly probable. Unfortunately, such was not the outcome. A
struggle over budget restraints necessarily twisted the military services' orientation from
addressing the external threat of the Soviet Union to a preoccupation with the internal
threat posed by their respective and conflicting demands on the national economy.
C. ROLES, MISSIONS, AND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR POLICY
The Navy felt that the mission or function of a service should determine the
limits of its operations and the systems employed to complete that mission. In
accordance with that attitude, the Navy felt justified in adopting any weapon system or
any operation that contributed to the overall effectiveness of its ability to complete the
mission. Furthermore, the Navy was willing to allow the other services freedom in
determining what systems they needed to do likewise.
The Army and Air Force maintained that the missions of the services should be
determined by the element in which they operated or the weapon system that
corresponded with the element in which they operated. In other words, the Army
would operate land vehicles-tanks, jeeps, etc., the Navy would operate sea vehicles-
battleships, cruisers, destroyers, etc., and the Air Force would operate all air vehicles-
aircraft, rockets, and even space vehicles [Ref. 5: p. 22]. From this division in element
of operation and weapons would their mission be derived. The Army would conduct
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operations that required land forces, the Navy would conduct operations requiring sea
forces, and the Air Force would conduct operations requiring air forces. None of the
services would be allowed to operate out of their environment nor would they be
assigned to. or allowed to pursue a mission that required them to operate beyond their
element. [Ref. 5: pp. 63-64]
According to the Navy, the tremendous diversity of naval activity brought on by
the capability to operate not only on the sea but above and below it as well naturally
and legitimately led the Navy to develop a submarine force as well as an air force. The
Army-Air Force philosophy, if carried to its logical conclusion, would have forced the
development of a separate service for the submarine. 16 The Air Force wanted all
aircraft under its control and would have restricted the Navy to operating ships. The
Navy rejected any idea of restricting the means whereby a service could pursue that
which was vital to its survival or that which contributed to the accomplishment of its
mission. The Navy recognized that surface ships were vulnerable to attack by aircraft
and that the best defense against air attack was an airborne defense. The Navy could
not accept the idea of being restricted from operating an airborne defense which was
vital to the survival of the fleet. The best defensive measure against Soviet submarines
which also threatened the fleet was the patrol bomber. To place all patrol bombers
under Air Force control and to force the Navy to rely on another service to provide
the Navy protection seemed as ludicrous as it was dangerous, particularly when such a
restriction was, in the Navy's opinion, a parochial fabrication.
It seemed much wiser, in the Navy's estimation, to assign the services missions
and allow them to decide the strategy required to accomplish the mission, the tactics
required to accomplish the strategy, and weapon system most capable of executing the
tactics. Assigning weapon systems first and basing the missions on the weapon
systems would force the services to exercise a degree of cooperation that was artificial,
counter-productive, and cumbersome.
The Navy did not intend to usurp the traditional responsibilities of the other
services. Although Captain Gallery had proposed just that, it had been rejected by the
mainstream of naval thought. The conclusions of the General Board study clearly
recognized the primacy of the Air Force in strategic bombing, and would have
concentrated Navy efforts in that regard to anti-submarine warfare. It only
Admiral Kine expressed his fear that alone with naval aviation, the submarine
forces would be take~n awav from the Navy and made a separate service. See Vincent
Davis, Postwar Defense Policy and the U.S.' Navy, 1943-1946. p. 231.
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moderately acknowledged the potential contribution of naval aviation to strategic air
warfare. However, the Board did mean to emphasize the nature of future warfare and
the necessity of balanced forces.
Three years earlier, Vice Admiral Arthur W. Radford, the Deputy CNO (Air),
had already provided a very articulate summation of the Navy's position and the
direction to which it was committed.
The Navy entertains no desire to encroach on the proper functions of the
Armv Air Forces whether there be one. two. or three military departments of the
government and regardless of the state ol~ the autonomv which the Armv Air
Forces enjov within the present structure of the War Department. The Nan
does not contemplate: the creation of a land-based strategic bombing command:
developing a lana-based fighter force for the defense of the United "States or of
major outlying bases; building a tactical air force for land campaigns: or
maintaining a "competitive transport service. These are not nor have thev ever
been the intentions of the Navy. As is well-known, however, a most important
part of the Navy is its air arm,' complete and adequate, to fulfill naval missions.
It includes aircraft based on ships, tenders, seadromes, or fields; with anv tvpe of
landing gear— floats, wheels or skis: powered bv any type engine—reciprocating,
turbine, or jet: earning anv tvpe of useful weapon— gun, rocket, torpedo, bomb,
mine, or atomic explosive. We intend to take full advantage of scientific research
and development applicable to air warfare including guidetl missiles and pilotless
aircraft. , We will continue to coordinate our enterprises with those of the Armv
in anticipation that each service will benefit bv the progress of the other:
unwarranted duplication will be avoided but no promising field of aeronautical
science or tactics will remain unexplored. Our aircraft" will continue to be
manned bv pilots, aircrewmen and technicians who will be unexcelled by anv
other in the world. [Ref. 2: p. 66]
In his remarks, Radford expressed the Navy's intention to pursue whatever
development was necessary to accomplish the Navy's missions. He did not indicate
any plan to displace the role or mission of the other services. The Board's report
complemented what Radford had said years earlier. The Navy was not confining itself
to a single weapon system nor to a single strategy. Even while pursuing a nuclear role,
the Navy remained committed to a balanced fleet and a traditional strategy. Following
this line of reasoning the Navy refused to accept strategic bombing, with or without
nuclear weapons, as the single foundation of national military strategy.
As has been stated, the Navy adhered to a concept of four phases in a future war
with the Soviet Union. First, defensive holding actions and national mobilization;
second, offensive actions around the periphery- and establishment of forward bases;
third, major offensive actions directed at the Soviet homeland and invasion of occupied
territory'; and, fourth, the concentrated destruction of the Soviet warmaking potential.
The Navy's perception of strategy for a future war harmonized with traditional
concepts of warfighting. Each phase required the employment of all allied military
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forces, each with their own valuable contribution to the overall war effort. Winning
the war would require the traditional application of balanced forces. The Navy saw its
role in a future war as having expanded more in depth than in concept. The naval role
would still consist of the traditional elements of naval strategy-sea control, and power
projection. The Navy would convoy forces to the war area, would provide logistical
and air support of land forces, would engage the enemy on the seas, and would project
naval power inland against enemy forces. However, the capabilities of naval aviation,
both land-based and carrier-based, had greatly extended the range at which the Navy
could carry out its missions. Particularly extended was the range at which naval forces
could engage the enemy over land. The capability had been developed to utilize naval
forces in a strategic role to interdict the enemy's warmaking potential.
The Navy felt perfectly justified in exploiting its new capability as a contribution
to the overall war effort, not to usurp the primary responsibility of the Air Force, nor
at the expense of other necessary tactics. Rather, the Navy saw strategic bombing and,
particularly atomic strategic bombing, as a capability that the Navy had to integrate
into its traditional strategies in order to defeat the threat. For example, the Soviet
submarine force and its bases were targets that demanded the employment of an
atomic bombing capability.
Certainly, some naval officers particularly intimate with the details of the roles
and missions controversy with the Army and Air Force saw nuclear strategic bombing
as a vital adjunct to the struggle for maintaining the viability of the Navy. Atomic
bombs had indeed changed the nature of warfare albeit the extent of which was
debatable. In light of these still unknown consequences those officers who were
involved in defending the Navy against its critics felt that the Navy required an atomic
strategic bombing capability in order to justify its existence and maintain its credibility
as a vital element of national defense. However, although it provided the Navy a
strong position in the roles and missions debate, to say that is why the Navy developed
a strategic bombing capability in concert with the adoption of atomic weapons would
not be correct. First, the officers who brought about the development of the Navy's
strategic nuclear bombing capability, particularly Commanders Hayward and
Ashworth, were too junior to be involved in the roles and missions struggle with the
Air Force [Ref. 2: p. 77]. While they undoubtedly were well aware of the Air Forces
efforts to dominate atomic bombing they were not involved in Congressional hearings
and public wranglings on the subject. Secondly, had the Navy leadership perceived the
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atomic bombing role as anything more than just another new development for
incorporation into naval forces, it would not have occured at the half-hearted pace at
which it proceeded. It took five years, from 1945 to 1950, for the Navy to accomplish
the minimal things required to deploy an initial nuclear deliver}' capability.
The Navy pursued a strategic nuclear bombing capability for its contribution to
the capability of it forces, and secondarily used that capability to justify to Congress
and the President its contribution to national defense. In conjunction with its
moderate attitude toward nuclear weapons, strategic bombing itself was an outgrowth
of Forrestal's leadership at directing the Navy's attention at the Soviet threat as well as
other international threats to world peace. By altering the Navy's historical
predilection for ignoring Europe and combining that with the extended range of naval
aviation, Forrestal led the Navy to recognize a strategic capability as another mission
of its regular forces. Combining these elements in a whole, one sees that a strategic
nuclear capability was developed and implemented as a contribution to traditional
naval strategy and forces. While the impact of the atomic bomb was respected, in the
Navy's mind it did not alter the value of a well-balanced fleet nor the necessity for a
well-balanced national defense.
The Air Force's plans for a future war were markedly different from those of the
Navy. They divided the phases of war into three parts:
• the "Build-up Phase" or mobilization of strategic, sea and land forces;
the "Decisive Phase" involving strategic attack upon the enemv using atomic
weapons from both overseas and U.S. "bases;
the "Exploitation Phase" consisting of tactical operations to consolidate the
gains made by strategic attack, i.e. '"mopping up". (Ref. 2: p. 86]
•
•
The Air Force's strategy for war clearly reflected their belief in the role of
strategic bombing in warfare. All other traditional warfighting strategies were
secondary if not unnecessary altogether. They were fortified in their belief by their
own interpretation of the lessons of strategic bombing in World War II, although the
Strategic Bombing Survey cast doubt on the actual benefit that bombing had played in
the war [Ref. 14: p. 309]. In fact one analyst suggested, ". . . there is much in the
history to suggest that the Army Air Force may have sacrificed almost as many lives
(its own and others') to its dogmatic faith in independent air power as to the conquest
of the nation's enemies." [Ref. 10: p. 257] Nevertheless, the Air Force persisted
unremittingly in its convictions.
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The difference in Air Force and Navy strategic nuclear strategies contributed to
the third roles and missions controversy between the services'. The disparity between
the Air Forces's and Navy's philosophy on strategic bombing led to a
misunderstanding that amplified the hostility still lingering from their previous disputes
over roles and missions. With its strategy of warfighting based upon the preeminence
of strategic nuclear bombing, the Air Force interpreted the Navy's acquisition of a
strategic nuclear role as an attempt to usurp the responsiblities of the Air Force. This
was far from the truth. The Navy expected its strategic nuclear role to complement its
other naval activities, particularly anti-submarine warfare. The Navy had no intention
of achieving a strategic nuclear role of proportions that would challenge the Air Force.
Despite the fact that this was publically expressed both by Radford [quoted above] and
by Navy Secretary Forrestal [Ref. 5: p. 57], the Air Force did not believe it. It
perceived the Navy's desire for a new class of "flush-deck" carriers as a blatant effort to
promote the Navy's role in the air offensive and the delivery of nuclear weapons
[Ref. 2: p. 106].
Consequently, the argument between the services became two fold. On one hand
the Navy disagreed with the Air Force's single-minded promotion of strategic nuclear
bombing. While on the other, the Air Force accused the Navy of itself trying to
dominate strategic bombing.
The difference of opinion over the role of strategic nuclear bombing became more
acute as an understanding of the consequences of a nuclear war developed. The Navy
began to question the actual utility of nuclear bombing in and of itself. This went
beyond whether or not it had displaced traditional warfighting strategies and tactics,
something upon which both services bitterly disagreed. The Navy began to question
whether nuclear bombing should actually be used at all.
The Strategic Bombing Survey had suggested that the use of strategic bombing
was inhumane [Ref. 14: p. 309]. The Navy went beyond this to question whether
nuclear bombing might be worse than inhumane and actually "immoral" [Ref. 14: p.
309]. Whether or not the struggle between the services and the apparent futility of the
Navy's efforts to defend itself brought on the change of attitude toward the
employment of nuclear weapons or whether it was prompted by an actual questioning
of the morality of the bomb is difficult to say. Regardless, the Navy began to propose
that reliance on a strategy of nuclear bombing was not only militarily inept but morally
wrong. Believing sole reliance upon the atomic bomb was militarily foolish, the Navy
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concluded that use of the bomb was therefore morally wrong. The Navy developed a
sophisticated argument to support the growing conviction of their stand. Ironically, it
was Rear Admiral Daniel V. Gallery who had earlier written a very intense
memorandum supporting the Navy's acquisition of a strategic nuclear role who now





The purpose of war. in harmonv with the teaching of Von Clausewitz. is to
impose me victor's will upon the Vanquished.
For a nation with the moral character of the United States, war cannot simplv
be to achieve the total destruction of the enemy, but must be oriented toward
allowing the U.S. to impose its will upon the enemv and therebv establish
peace.
Military planning that included the massive use of atomic weapons seemed to
be aimed at the single-minded goal of not losing the war.
It "not losing the war" were the only goal, then the use of atomic weapons
would seem appropriate.
However, such an attitude of "not losing the war" contradicts the purpose of
war, and would establish a post-war environment as difficult to deal with as the
war. It would leave unprecedented damage costing staggering sums to rebuild
and an alienated populace to threaten the establishment "of international
goodwill upon cessation of hostilities.
Finally, a strategv based upon the sole object of preventing defeat is a strategy
of weakness ancTdesperation, unworthy of the United States. [Ref. 2: p. 130]
The Navy's indictment of strategic nuclear bombing continued with a
memorandum from Captain Arleigh Burke questioning whether a strategic air offensive
against Soviet city targets would have any appreciable effect on their formidable land
forces that would be invading Europe and the Middle East [Ref. 2: p. 131]. Burke went
on to recommend that whatever action the U.S. took against the Soviet Union must
show consideration for post-war consequences.
The immorality of strategic bombing was presented in its purest form by a paper
responding to the debate on the new Air Force bomber, the B-36. Rear Admiral Ralph
Ofstie drafted the following in August 1949:
This matter of genocide has not been squarely faced. It is time that
strategic bombing be examined relative to our own American principles to the
decent opinions of mankind, and to the traditions of civilization. There, has been
a great deal of talk about "survival in the air age." Survival of what? If we mean
the bare and simple physical survival of American lives, the answer is easy. Do
not fight at all. But if we mean the survival of the values, the principles, and the
traditions of human civilization, we must insure that our military techniques do
not strip us of our self-respect. If we consciously adopt a ruthless and barbaric
policy towards other peoples, how can we prevent the breakdown of ethics and
morality in our domestic affairs? The concept of indiscriminate atomic attacks





Ofstie went on to proposal a more traditional approach to solving the security
problem of Western Europe. He proposed defending Europe with naval forces, tactical
air forces, and strong European armies-all of which reflected the Navy philosophy of a
balanced military force.
The Navy was partially supported in its contentions by a report prepared by
Lieutenant General Hubert Harmon who had been commissioned by the Secretary of
Defense to address the effect of a nuclear blitz attack on the Soviet Union. The
Harmon Report doubted the effectiveness of atomic bombing in actually stopping the
Russian army or demoralizing the Russian national will. Rather, the Report
speculated that such bombing would solidify the support of the populace behind the
Soviet government and create tremendous post-war hostilities toward the West. Oddly,
the Report concluded, despite its own speculations, that the rapid and extensive use of
atomic bombing might still help win the war. [Ref. 27: p. 16]
The Navy had recognized its strategic bombing capability and had pursued the
development of a nuclear attack bomber both to enhance the effectiveness of its forces
as well as to remain "competitive" in the atomic age. However, the Navy could not
accept strategic bombing as anything more than just another tactic to be employed in
support of an overall strategy. As a tactic, the Navy was ready to accept it; but as a
single strategy it was deemed militarily unacceptable and therefore immoral. The Navy
had participated in testing the atomic bomb and clearly recognized the revolution in
destructive power that it brought on. For the very reasons that some felt the atomic
bomb essential for modern war, the Navy began to reject it as unusable. The
indiscriminate and destructive capability of the atomic bomb was too extreme for many
in the Navy to accept. Ironically, the same elements made it attractive to the Air
Force.
For the Air Force the atomic bomb represented two things: first, a unique
weapon whose characteristics supported its strategic bombing philosophy; and second,
a valuable argument for its supremacy as a military service. The destructive capability
of the bomb complemented strategic bombing by making all other military forces
seemingly obsolete. And its indiscriminate nature, as with strategic bombing, was
capable of breaking the enemy's will to fight. It was the ideal weapon for the Air
Force. The indiscriminate destructiveness of the bomb, and later, its relative economy,
would cause it to become the foundation of the entire U.S. national military strategy.
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D. THE DEFENSE BUDGET AND THE FLUSH-DECK SUPER CARRIER
Late in 1944, Admiral Marc Mitscher. while commanding Fast Carrier Task
Force 3S ofT Leyte in the Phillipines, had recommended to then Secretary of the Navy
Forrestal that plans be made to build a new class oflarger carriers [Ref. 5: p. 30]. The
idea for the carrier had nothing to do with atomic weapons. Mitscher recommended
that the carrier accommodate larger, heavy bombers and the new jet aircraft that were
currently under development. Part of his plans included a modification in carrier
design that would remove the island structure from the flight deck.
.... it is believed that these existing carriers [CVB] approach the ultimate in basic
design under existins limitations. Foremost among these limitations is the island
structure. This structure places a definite restriction on the size of aircraft which
mav be operated. The foreseeable future may well find that this limitation is
unacceptable. Therefore it is considered that ''our thoughts as to carrier design
should include design and construction of a flush deck type. [Ref. 2S: p. 322]
As it was finally designed, the flush-deck carrier would displace 80,000 tons fully
loaded. It would have two catapults on the forward bow and would be the largest ship
ever built. Her reinforced decks would allow her to operate planes weighing 100,000
pounds. She would cost SI 24 million and take forty-six months to build.
The plans for the flush-deck carrier sat idle under budgetary restraints until the
passage of the National Defense Act of 1947. Under the Act Forrestal wras elevated to
the position of Secretary of Defense and his position as Navy Secretary was taken by
John L. Sullivan who had been Under Secretary of the Navy. Sullivan was committed
to the Navy as much as had been Forrestal. On assuming office, Sullivan resurrected
the plans for the new carrier and committed himself to seeing their completion
[Ref. 29: p. 470].
Work was already underway to reinforce the decks of some existing carriers to
carry the P2V and then the AJ-1. Commander Hayward had already prodded the
Navy into committing itself to the slow development of a nuclear role. Sullivan was
told by the chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics that Forrestal had already asked
President Truman to authorize facilities in carriers for delivering atomic bombs. Upon
that approval the path was clear to give the new carrier all it needed to have a nuclear
capability. However, Sullivan's plans for a new super carrier were interrupted by
budget restrictions pressed upon the services by the fiscal austerity program of
President Truman.
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The military budget of 1946 had been S45 billion. In 1947 it was cut to S13.1
billion and in 194S to SI 3 billion. [Ref. 30: p. 359] The Navy was laying up ships in
mothballs, and discharging personnel throughout the period all as part of
demobilization. However, by late 1947 the situation was rapidly changing. 1. The Navy
load reduced itself to what it felt it needed as a minimum and was not inclined toward
further reductions. The wartime high of 115 carriers was reduced to just 11 large and
10 escort carriers. To go any lower would have threatened national security-
particularly in light of the increasing hostility between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
[Ref. 31: p. 122]
In late 1947, as deliberations in the Navy began over the 1949 military budget,
Sullivan was told that to keep the super carrier in the Navy's building program, he
would have to cancel the construction o^ thirteen other ships that had not yet been
completed. Sullivan agreed, although it hurt the Navy's principle supporter in
Congress Carl Vinson, who had worked hard to put the thirteen ships in the budget.
[Ref. 5: p. 74] Construction of the new carrier was finally approved by Congress on 25
June 194S. Early the next year, Truman agreed to name the ship United States.
The Air Force was not silent on the issue. The National Security Act of 1947 did
little to put an end to the rivalry of the services even though it had created an
independent air force. Now, after achieving its goal, the Air Force was not content
with the extent of unification brought about by the Act. Although the Act had
centralized civilian command of the services, it had not settled the matters of missions
and roles to the approval of the Air Force. (See Appendix B) After the Act was
passed, President Truman issued Executive Order No. 9S77 (See Appendix C) under
pressure from the services to provide further clarification on the definition of their
individual roles.
The Air Force was still not satisfied. The development of the super carrier
seemed to the Air Force to be a clear indicator of alleged Navy intentions to squeeze
the Air Force out of its primary role, that of strategic bombing. The super carrier had
passed through the roles and missions controversy relatively unscathed until the "leak"
and publication of Rear Admiral Gallery's memorandums advocating that the Navy's
carrier aviation assume the Air Force's role in strategic bombing. The Air Force then
identified the new carrier as the embodiment of the Navy's efforts to take over strategic
The Truman Doctrine was announced in March and the Marshall Plan in June
of 1947, both articulations on the Cold War.
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bombing. Admiral Denfield renounced Gallery's memorandums in a futile attempt to
return the super carrier to relative anonymity, but it was too late. The Air Force had
perceived the carrier as a threat to the strategic bombing role as well as a new
competitor for budgeted funds. There seemed little possibility for the Air Force to get
70 air groups while the Navy was building and equiping super carriers. [Ref. 29: p.
481].
Both the Air Force and the Navy responded to the rivalry with bitter public
attacks upon each other through newspaper interviews and magazine articles.
Secretary of Defense Forrestal initially forbade the services from publicly attacking
each other, and then called the service chiefs to a meeting in Key West, Florida on 1
1
March 1948 to try and straighten things out. The result eventually became Executive
Order No. 9950 that replaced No. 9877 as a definition of the service's roles and
missions. The meeting in Key West guaranteed the Air Force dominance in strategic
bombing but also continued to support the Navy's role in aviation. It also supported
the building of the super carrier and refused to deny the Navy the use of the A-bomb.
[Refs. 31,5: pp. 122, 68]
Unfortunately, the Key West meeting, although followed later by an identical
meeting in Newport, Rhode Island, failed to curtail the interservice rivalry. Even as
Forrestal was preparing the press release on the results of the Key West meeting, he
was put on notice by the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Carl Spaatz. While Spaatz
concurred that the meeting had arrived at an agreed interpretation of the services roles
and missions as outlined in the National Security Act. Spaatz did not agree on the
principle of the interpretation or the substance of the Act. [Ref. 29: p. 475] He
intended to pressure both publically and privately for amendments to the Act that
would increase unification.
The extremely restricted budget was the principle element that kept the rivalry
alive, although not it cause. The President promulgated the Truman Doctrine which
expanded the services' worldwide commitments yet he refused to budget the money
necessary for them to carry out those commitments. In the Navy's particular case, the
Navy felt obligated to support naval operations in the Eastern Mediterranean to
counter Soviet moves in Greece, Turkey and the Middle East. However, it could not
be done on the funds allocated. The Navy was forced to contract its overseas
operations just as it was forced to reduce the number of operating aircraft carriers.
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The Air Force, as supported by the Finletter Commission's report on 1 January
1948, Survival In The Air Age, A Report by the President's Air Policy Commission,
insisted on 70 air groups. To get that, it recommended cutting the Navy to four
aircraft carriers if not retiring them altogether. The Navy was intent on building the
super carrier and recommended cutting the Air Force to ensure funds would be
available.
Congress was frequently at odds with the President. It authorized S822 million in
additional funds in 194S to allow the Air Force to proceed with building its 70 air
groups. Truman impounded the funds. [Ref. 5: p. 82] Each of the services badgered
Secretary Forrestal to pressure Truman for more funds. Truman had set the 1950
budget ceiling for the services at S14.4 billion. Secretary Forrestal solicited spending
requests from the services and committed each service to divide the funds evenly while
remaining below the ceiling. In response, each service formulated its own budget and
sent the total S30 billion request to Forrestal for him to reconcile with the President.
[Ref. 29: p. 484] Forrestal struggled to convince the President to increase his allocations
for the services but to no avail.
The President was subjected to repeated presentations by the various services
bemoaning their situation. They had determined that under such budgetary restraints,
the only defense and warfighting option available in a war with the Soviet Union would
be to conduct strategic nuclear bombing attacks from bases in England. There was not
enough money in the defense budget to build and maintain a forward defense, or to
carry out what they interpreted to be their responsibilities under the Truman Doctrine.
Truman seemed unperturbed. In fact, he ordered Forrestal to make further cuts.
Truman was determined that domestic needs should be met first while the military
would have what remained.
The pressure upon Forrestal eventually became too great. He requested to be
replaced at the end of March 1949. James Forrestal, who had been such a profound
and positive influence upon the Navy, collapsed from nervous exhaustion after his
release from public service. Flis improving condition was cut short by a fall to his
death from a hospital window on 22 May 1949. [Ref. 5: p. 128]
Truman had replaced Forrestal with Louis Johnson, a West Virginia lawyer, who
nominated himself for the job. Mis fund-raising talents had provided Truman's whistle-
stopping tour during the last presidential campaign. He was totally committed to
unification of the services and was particularly hostile toward naval aviation and the
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Marine Corp. Although he was Secretary of Defense, Johnson ". . .devoted himself not
to war but to economy, where the interests of the administration and his own political
future appeared to lie." [Ref. 10: p. 325]
Upon taking office, Johnson immediately set to work to clear away what he did
not like in the services. He targeted the super carrier as one of those items. He
requested the JCS's views on the new carrier and predictably received a divided
opinion. Both General Hoyt S. Vandenburg, the Air Force Chief of Stall, and
General Omar Bradley, the Army Chief of Staff, were against it; Vandenburg because
the carrier was vulnerable to submarines, and Bradley because it did not lit into what
seemed to be the results of the Key West and Newport conferences and because Russia
was not a naval power. Admiral Denfeld, who had replaced Nimitz as CNO,
supported the carrier:
I am convinced that our present strategic position is such as to make it
mandatory, the interest of national security, constantly to improve the
capabilities of our naval forces. I do not agree that forces and weapons
otherwise available in the foreseeable future would permit us properlv to, meet
war conditions without effective, modern naval forces. It is axiomatic that failure
to prosress is to accept unwarranted deterioration of our strength. 1 consider
that the construction of the United States is necessary for the progressive
improvement of naval capabilities and is fullv warranted 'as insurance to cover
the unpredicted exigencies of the future. [Ref. 2: p. 117]
Secretary Johnson, seeing the vote of the JCS as two to one, issued a press
release on Saturday, 23 April 1949 cancelling the ship's construction only two days
after its keel had been laid at Newport News, Virginia.
Navy Secretary Sullivan was furious. He flew back from a meeting in Corpus
Christi, Texas where he had received a telephone call informing him of the cancellation.
He submitted his resignation to Johnson and bitterly complained that not only had the
President already approved the carrier, but substantial sacrifices, thirteen ships whose
construction had been stopped, had already been made to build the carrier. [Ref. 32: p.
6] Johnson readily accepted Sullivan's resignation. However, he used an earlier
perfunctory resignation that Sullivan had submitted upon Forrestal's departure to
respond to the media. [Ref. 29: p. 536] He stated that Sullivan had actually been
unwilling to go along with unification and had already resigned as was evidenced by his
earlier resignation. His opposition to the carrier cancellation was peripheral.
The cancellation of the carrier was heralded in the newspapers as a victory for
the Air Force, which of course it was. The impact was devastating upon the
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ambitions, plans and morale of the Navy. The entire course of Navy strategy had been
directed toward the new carrier. Suddenly, the Navy could see itself being reduced to a
negligible force of coastal patrol boats [Ref. 7: p. 210]. With the cancellation of the
carrier, naval aviation came into serious jeopardy. Captain Arleigh Burke summarized
the Naw's worst fears:
It appears that one of the Air Force objectives is to take over the Navy's
roles and missions of control of the sea. There are rumors that additional naval
units such as Marine aviation, attack carriers, naval shore-based aviation units,
amphibious units, etc.. may be drasticallv reduced or eliminated, and also that
there is a strong possibility that a National General Staff Corps will be created.
If these rumors "are based on fact, the Navy will be unable to perform its primary
role of control of the sea. If this should" come to pass, it is possible mat the
Naw's roles mav be reassigned, all or in part, to one of the other services
whether or not those services have the actual eapabilitv of earning out those
roles. [Ref. 5: p. 139]
Unfortunately, the tenure of Secretary Johnson brought with it other bad news.
The worst crisis in Navy history was still to come. Johnson chose Francis B.
Matthews to head the Navy as a replacement for Sullivan. Matthews had absolutely
no experience with military matters much less with the Navy [Ref. 29: p. 470]. He had
served in the USO during the war. His only allegiance was to Johnson, whom he
fawningly supported. In the words of Admiral Radford, who would later serve as CNO
in the Eisenhower administration, Matthew's "appointment as Secretary' of the Navy
verged on a national catastrophe." [Ref. 31: p. 176]
The projected military budget for 1950 was S14.4 billion which Johnson was
committed to support. His game plan was the following:
Transfer funds from the Navy to Air Force and give the Air Force total
monopoly over strategic air power;
Keep the Army at current strength;
Reduce the Navy to an anti-submarine and transport force by halving funds for
naval aviation;
Reduce the number of heavy carriers to four, light carriers to eight, as well as
other surface forces, and;
Use the savings to quadruple the number of Air Force heavy bombers.
[Ref. 5: p. 159]
^
The Navy was facing the nadir of its post-war status.
The Air Force was developing a new bomber, the B-36, upon which it were
placing its entire effort and strategy. Johnson, in supporting the B-36, was more
concerned about economy than national defense. He had been lured to the idea that
reliance upon bombers earning atomic bombs was cheaper and just as effective as
maintaining a complete national defense establishment. He accepted the exact position
touted by the Air Force.
The Navy began a campaign to salvage itself by disputing the military strategy
inherent in a reliance upon the B-36 as the sole foundation for national defense.
Johnson had combined the Air Force's confidence in the A-bomb, its indiscriminate
and destructive character, and the economy of relying upon a single weapon system to
form the entire basis for national defense. Such a single-minded idea had been the
nemesis of naval planners since Billy Mitchell twenty-five years earlier.
When Congress began hearings in mid-August 1949 on the B-36 controversy, the
Navy leadership erupted into what bordered on an "admiral's revolt." Despite
Matthews' efforts to stifle them, admiral after admiral appeared before Congress and
decried the treatment the Navy had received at the hands of the Defense Department.
They bitterly criticized the civilian leadership, the B-36, strategic bombing, budget
restraints, and, most of all, unification. Secretary Matthews was hauled before the
Congress to answer the accusations. He answered by blaming naval aviators as
"insubordinate, faithless, and guilty." [Ref. 5: p. 184]
Although the "revolt" did not resolve anything substantial, it did provide the
Navy a public forum to vent the frustration it had felt for so long while under attack
from the Air Force. The Chief of Naval Operations. Louis E. Renfield, was ultimately
fired by Matthews for his outspoken contention that the Navy was being left out of the
national defense structure. However. Congress ensured there was little other
recrimination against those officers who had "revolted."
E. THE FOUNDATIONS OF A NATIONAL STRATEGY
The National Security Act of 1947 had attempted to force unity upon the
services as well as establish a single and accountable chief through whom the President
could direct national defense. Actually, the bill failed to do either. By leaving naval
aviation in the Navy and creating an independent air force, the Act promoted or, at
least, institutionalized the structure that would inevitably promote rivalry between the
services. The Act tried in vain to prevent further rivalry by defining the functions of
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each service. Unfortunately, the definitions were too vague and too unsatisfactory to
prevent the ensuing arguments.
The Act did established a civilian point of accountability over the services but
failed to give the Secretary of Defense the necessary authority commensurate with the
responsibilities of his position. On 2 August 1949 Congress attempted to correct some
of the faults in the original bill by passing the National Security Act Amendments of
1949. The new amendments demoted the individual services to military departments
and no longer allowed them to go over the head of the Secretary of Defense 1 "- to
appeal directly to the President. Under the Amendments, however, they could appeal
to Congress after informing the Secretary. The Secretary of Defense replaced the
Chairman of the JCS as the principle military advisor to the President. Finally, the
individual service secretaries were deleted from the National Security Council which
reduced them in authority below the Deputy Secretary of Defense. [Ref. 5: pp.
164-165] The Amendments did much toward correcting the structural faults that had
hampered the efforts of the Secretary to establish control over the services. However,
they did not resolve those elements that fostered interservice rivalry.
The conferences at Key West and Newport should each have ended the acrimony
between the services. They spelled out as clearly as possible the separation in roles and
missions that were to exist between the services, a separation that all the services
agreed upon at both conferences. One has to ask why the rivalry continued. If the
services had each agreed both at Key West and Newport on their own responsibilities,
one would think that the matter had been solved. But it was not. The answer lies
beyond the question of roles and missions. The real source of contention was not roles
and missions but a conflicting perception of what should be the national strategy for
the employment of the atomic bomb [Ref. 33: pp. 15-16]. The difference centered
around reliance upon strategic nuclear warfare as the centerpiece of American
warfighting and defense strategy. As James Forrestal wrote in his Diaries,
It became clear that the area of disagreement between the services is not
necessarilv very wide but it is quite deepT It deals fundamentals with the
concepts of so-called strategic warfare, and this boils down to use ofthe atomic
bombf [Ref. 17: p. 464]
i o
The name originallv assigned the unified structure for controlling the services
was the National Military Establishment. The Amendments changed that name to the
Department of Defense.
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The difference in perceptions between the services was manifested outwardly by
the controversy over roles and missions and was amplified by the struggle over the
budget. In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee during hearings on
"Unification and Strategy," Admiral Radford identified the essence of the difference in
thinking. He was testifying on the dubious capabilities of the B-36 bomber:
. . . The plane itself is not so important as the acceptance or rejection of the
theorv of atom blitz warfare which it svmbolizes. It is fortunate that honest
doubts as to the adequacy of the B-36 have served to bring this more vital issue
before the countrv. . . I do not believe that the threat of atomic blitz will be an
effective deterrent to war. or that it will win a war. I do not believe that the
atomic blitz theorv is senerallv accepted bv militarv men . . .. In the minds of our
citizens this fallacious "concept promises a 'short cut to victorv. Our citizens must
realize that its militarv leaders cannot make this promise-that there is no short
cut, no cheap, no easy way to win a war. [Ref 31: pp. 1S1-1S2]
Year before, under the influence of Billy Mitchell, when the Army Air Corp
began the embrace strategic bombing as its primary warfighting strategy and then, after
World War II, promoted the threat of strategic bombing as a deterrent to aggression, it
laid the foundations for what later became known as the strategy of Massive
Retaliation. However, when the Air Force embraced strategic bombing as the single
dominant method of warfighting, it adopted a strategy that violated the established
principles of warfare. As Rear Admiral Gallery was to point out years later--the
purpose of war was to impose the victor's will upon the defeated foe, and strategic
bombing as a single strategy, could not do that. Strategic bombing could wreck havoc
and destruction upon the enemy but if applied with conventional weapons, could not in
all cases, as the Strategic Bombing Survey determined, cause his defeat. Even if
applied with nuclear weapons against a country as broad and dispersed as the Soviet
Union, there was serious doubt if it could bring about victory. The only thing it could
do with great efficiency was cause tremendous destruction and kill millions of civilians,
neither of which would necessarily impose defeat. Admiral Marc Mitscher summed up
the Navy's position:
Wars cannot be won without air power-strong air power-but I know of
nothing in this past war which indicates that air power itself can bring an enemy
to its knees. It is mv firm belief that all armed forces are necessarv to win a war.
[Ref. 28: p. 335]
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Ultimately, under the Eisenhower administration when the national strategy did
become integrally tied to strategic nuclear bombing (at the expense of conventional
forces), the U.S. found itself attempting to address Soviet low-intensity incrementalism
with the threat of massive nuclear retaliation. While such a doctrine undoubtedly
restrained outright Soviet aggression in Western Europe, as nuclear parity developed
between the two superpowers, a stalemate emerged that decreased its utility in
preventing low-intensity communist aggression. Massive retaliation, when the Soviets
too could retaliate, implied virtual national suicide and, therefore, was not a logical
response to limited conflicts. It was just this situation that the Navy foresaw, and
which it struggled against in the controversy over roles and missions.
The Navy was committed to a balanced fleet of naval forces which included the
integration of the nuclear bomb. In refutation of sole reliance upon strategic nuclear
bombing, the Navy favored as well a balanced national warfighting capability and
would have allowed each service to pursue those armaments that would best
complement the achievement of its missions. Therein was the essence of the
controversy over roles and missions. The agreements that had been reached in Key
West and Newport did not solve the difference in fundamental outlooks toward a
national strategy and so, the roles and missions debate continued unchecked eventually
culminating in the "revolt".
The hubbub brought on by the B-36 hearings resulted immediately in little or
nothing for the Navy. In fact, the 1951 budget proposed by Truman and sent to
Congress in January 1950 held the defense budget to S13.5 billion, actually SI. 2 billion
less than the year before. More cuts were proposed for the Navy; for example-
reducing the carrier force from eight large carriers to six, and dropping 31,000 men.
The fall of 1949 was the all time low in U.S. naval history in terms of morale and
expectations for the future. Surprisingly, just as everything looked the worst, the
Navy's situation began to improve [Ref. 7: p. 224]. In part this was brought on by the
appointment of Admiral Forest Sherman to replace Denfield as CNO. Matthews and
Johnson had both been discredited by the "revolt." Admiral Denfield, as a
consequence of his earlier support for Matthews, lost the confidence of the Navy
admirals. [Ref. 35: p. 56]. Then during the unification hearings, he reversed his
position and spoke out in support of the "rebels," thereby losing the support of
Matthews. Subsequently, he was of little use to either side. Sherman, his successor,
proved a fresh start for both the Navy and its civilian leadership. [Ref. 29: p. 507]
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Sherman had a reputation for being "pro-unification" which helped dispel suspicions
that the Navy wanted to usurp the roles of the Air Force. Although his appointment
was not initially popular with many naval officers, he proved his worth as a proponent
of Navy interests by pressuring Congress for support of carrier aviation. [Ref. 36: pp.
20-21]
Congress developed a significant respect for Sherman who also enjoyed the
President's favor. In fact, on 25 April 1950 Sherman asked the House Armed Services
Committee for authority to build a nuclear-powered submarine, and a new sixty-
thousand ton carrier. The Committee unanimously voted to add S350 million to the
defense budget to start building an atomic age navy. [Ref. 5: p. 220]
The growing Congressional sympathy for the Navy and Sherman's excellent
leadership enabled the Navy to weather the darkest period of its recent history and
actually start to look with more optimism upon the future. However, the real rebirth
of the naval service which began under Sherman had little to do with unification,
Congress or the Navy's struggle to change the course of national strategy. It began on
the Korean Peninsula 25 June 1950 when North Korean troops crossed over the 3Sth
Parallel into allied controlled South Korea [Ref. 7: p. 225].
R THE KOREAN WAR AND VINDICATION
While the Navy was presenting its case against strategic nuclear bombing, it was
careful not to condemn every use of nuclear weapons. Simultaneously with its
testimony against strategic nuclear bombing, the Navy was supporting the gradual
adoption of a nuclear strike capability. Commander Hayward was assigned as the
commanding officer of Composite Squadron 5 in December 1948 and given twelve P2V
patrol bombers converted to carry the atomic bomb. The following August the Navy
found itself before Congress condemning both the B-36 and the doctrine of strategic
bombing. As has been pointed out, the Navy rejected strategic bombing not as a tactic
but as the centerpiece of national strategy.
In reconciling its rejection of strategic bombing as espoused by the Air Force and
its own pursuit of a nuclear bombing capability, the Navy sought a way to integrate
nuclear weapons into its traditional perception of warfighting. The General Board
study of June 1948, reviewed above, had defined for the Navy* the form and fashion o[
adopting the atomic bomb into naval warfare. The Board suggested that the
contribution of a naval nuclear capability could be divided into two basic areas:
87
primary missions of the Navy-anti-submarine warfare, and maintaining freedom of the
seas, and secondary missions-striking those land targets beyond the capability of the
strategic bombing forces of the Air Force. In this regard, the primary target of naval
strategic forces would be submarine bases and enemy fleet concentrations. The
secondary role would develop if the necessary forward basing for Air Force strategic
bombers were not available or if there were targets geographically situated so as to
require attack from carrier-based forces. This perspective on the employment of carrier
aviation set the pattern for the role finally adopted for atomic weapons within naval
aviation [Ref. 2: p. 52].
The course the Navy would follow was also foreshadowed by remarks made by
Rear Admiral Ralph A. Ofstie to the House Armed Services Committee holding
hearings on the general subject of "Unification and Strategy." Ofstie, who was
supporting his contention that strategic bombing was ineffective, had been the senior
naval member of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey. In his testimony, he
drew from his own experience as a member of the Survey as well as that of the British
Bombing Survey Unit.
. . . strategic bombing campaign asainst essential war production did not have a
decisive effect on the outcome of the war . . . [but in the case of Germanv] the
campaign against transportation targets ... so reduced the mobility and logistic
supplv of the German armies that the offensive on land was immeasurablv
assisted. [Ref. 29: p. 523]
Ofstie was identifying the contrast between bombing effectiveness in the strategic
versus tactical role. While he questioned the value of strategic bombing he clearly
supported tactical bombing-referred to in his remarks as the bombing of
"transportation targets."
Arleigh Burke added his voice in support of tactical air warfare when he wrote in
1949 that ". . . our emphasis should be upon a tactical air force so trained and
equipped, and of a size, that it can paralyze the hostile communications." [Ref. 2: p.
131]
The most specific announcement of the Navy's tactical emphasis on the use of
atomic bombing was drawn up by the Air Warfare Division (OP-55) directed by Rear
Admiral Cruise. Its report, "Future Development of Carrier Aviation With Respect to
Both Aircraft and Aircraft Carriers," came out during the height of the B-36
investigation hearings.
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It is believed that the Navy requires a limited number of long ranee heaw
attack aircraft. It is considered 'that this tvpe is not justified on a lafge scale
because of its limited use and the penalties in carrier flexibility. At this point it is
believed desirable to point out mat much unfavorable publicity which Naval
aviation has obtained of late has been due to controversies which have been
occasioned by the Navy's insistence on being able to use the atomic bomb. Due
to recent publicity coupling strategic air warfare and the Atomic bomb, the use
of the Atomic bomb is generally considered svnonvmous with the term "strategic
bombing." Such is not the case. It is not rhilitary practice to limit the
employment of any one weapon to the fulfillment of 'anv one function. The
Navy 'is justified In using anv available weapon to carry out its assigned
functions. The Navy's use""of the Atomic bomb would be tactical (italics added)
in nature, not strategic. [Ref. 2: p. 173]
In accordance with its position on strategic bombing, the Navy embraced nuclear
weapons as an adjunct to traditional naval forces. While the strategic use of the
atomic bomb was rejected as the single basis for a national strategy, it was accepted as
a tactic with some reservations, i.e., its ineffectiveness at achieving victory and
therefore the dubious moral justification for its use. The Navy saw much greater utility
in the atomic bomb's tactical use against enemy military forces than in its strategic use
against population and industrial centers. [Ref. 37: p. 233]
Forrestal had been the first to open a strategic role for naval forces when he
combined strategic bombing with naval aviation as a new mission for the aircraft
carrier. Now, the advent of the atomic bomb and the Air Force's determination to
make strategic bombing the national strategy caused the Navy to repudiate in part the
role that Forrestal had created. The cancellation of the flush-deck super carrier and
the Navy's failure to alter the course of national military strategy provided additional
impetus for the Navy to readjust its thinking.
The gradual revaluation in naval strategic thinking led the Navy to embrace the
tactical use of nuclear weapons as the best form of their employment. Tactical nuclear
weapons could be used in harmony with the traditional employment of other naval
forces. However, the war the Naw envisioned to accommodate its new tactical
thinking was not the same push-button intercontinental war envisioned by the Air
Force.
Forrestal had sent the carrier task force to the Mediterranean in response to
Soviet initiatives in third world countries and client states. He felt that Russian
military strategy might not include the transpolar surprise attack on the United States
feared by the Air Force. Instead he reasoned that they might not start a major war at
all but would pursue slow steady piecemeal aggression "supported by political and
economic measure, around the periphery of the Soviet homeland, especially in
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Southern Europe, the Middle East, and China." [Ref. 3: p. 223] These limited
confrontations were seen by Forrestal to be just as likely as outright Soviet aggression
in Western Europe. The Navy leadership reflected Forrestal's thinking and testified at
the congressional hearings on the need for a balanced military force to confront the
entire spectrum of conflict in which the U.S. might find itself. The tactical employment
of nuclear weapons, along with the other traditional forces, was seen as the best
approach toward achieving a balanced military force.
President Truman. Secretary Johnson and the Congress generally rejected the
Navy's arguments. The Navy attempted to forestall the shift in American military
strategy toward a reliance on strategic nuclear bombing. However, the economic
constraints of the Truman budget and the promises of strategic air warfare to save
American lives while keeping the war over the enemy's homeland induced the U.S.
leadership to progressively concentrate U.S. military strategy on strategic nuclear
bombing.
In June 1950 Secretary Johnson and General Bradley (chairman of the JCS) took
a thirteen-day inspection tour of the Far East. While visiting Japan they found Rear
Admiral Doyle there with an amphibious training unit. Amphibious operations had
been derided by Bradley during the unification debates as an archaic concept that
would never occur again in modern warfare. [Ref. 38: p. 19] When finding that Doyle
was there at the request of General MacArthur to provide amphibious training to units
of the Eighth Army, Bradly was scornful. [Ref. 5: p. 232]
The invasion of North Korean troops into the south on 25 June eventually
brought recognition to the validity of the Navy's position and accomplished two
things—both of which directly favored the Navy. First, it invalidated all but a few of
the popular assumptions touted by the Air Force on the nature of future conflict and
how it would be decided. Secondly, the Korean conflict opened the federal budget to
more realistically address the worldwide commitments of the military services.
[Ref. 7: p. 225] Forrestal's position on the world-wide threat of low intensity conflict
seemed to be born out by the Korean conflict. Although, initially many thought the
Korean invasion was a prelude to a general Soviet attack on Western Europe
[Ref. 10: p. 330]. However, as the war dragged on it was realized to be a conflict
entirely different than that expected.
The Air Force found itself unable to support the war on par with naval air
forces. The Army clearly preferred naval and Marine air support over that of the Air
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Force, if for no other reason than the fact that they could stay on station much longer
than their Air Force counterparts who had to fly over from Japan. [Ref. 5: p. 242]
The Inchon landing proved that amphibious operations could be as essential to
military operations in the atomic age as they had been in World War II. However, as
much as the lessons of the conflict seemed to totally vindicate the Navy's position,
another interpretation was made. In fact the lessons of the war both refuted and
supported what the Air Force had been saying about strategic bombing. The Air
Force had no strategic role in the Korean war and found itself deficient in meeting the
combat requirements of the war. But, the potential capability of the Strategic Air
Command to cam' out a devastating nuclear attack upon the Soviet Union perhaps
kept it from taking advantage of the Korean diversion to attack in Europe or overrun
Berlin. Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Vandenberg, stated that American air
power "is the single potential that has kept the balance of power in our favor. . . (and)
has kept the Russians from deciding to go to war." [Ref. 5: p. 261] General Maxwell
Taylor went so far as to say that "the ultimate effect of the Korean experience, oddly
enough, was not to weaken faith in atomic air power but rather to strengthen it."
[Ref. 34: p. 16] In that regard it was not the actual use of strategic nuclear bombing
that proved useful, but the potential use that served as a deterrent to Soviet action.
Nevertheless, the general interpretation of the lessons of the Korean conflict
supported the Navy's contentions that the U.S. should maintain a strong military
response across the board and not rely on the threat of strategic nuclear attack to halt
communist expansionism. Certainly in Korea strategic bombing was of little use and in
that regard there could be little argument with the Navy's position.
The principle fuel for interservice controversy, the tight military budget,
evaporated. From a 1951 defense budget of S14.4 billion, Truman expanded his 1952
defense budget to S60.6 billion. No longer forced to struggle with a penurious
President and Secretary, the services postponed further interservice wranglings until
after the war.
In the fallout resulting from the surprise invasion of South Korea, Secretary of
Defense Johnson was blamed for the pitiful shape of U.S. military preparedness,
although it had been Truman and Congress who had forced cuts upon the services
[Ref. 5: p. 244]. Johnson was fired by Truman in September and was soon followed by
his naval secretary, Matthews. They were replaced by George Marshall, who had just
retired from the Army and Dan A. Kimball, the Under Secretary of the Navy,
respectively.
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The interjection of money brought on by wartime spending is best represented by
Carl Vinson's "Atomic Navy" bill that called for 125 new ships, including an atomic-
powered submarine, a guided missile cruiser and a new super carrier-later named the
Forrestal. The Forrestal was soon followed by a second carrier, the Saratoga.
[Ref. 5: p. 300] Seemingly, the Navy had survived its darkest hour and was suddenly
heralded as a vital and worthy contributor to national defense. Ironically, the Korean
War had reestablished in the nation's mind the value of a powerful naval force even in
the atomic age-something the Navy had not been able to do on its own. The
historical legacy of "feast or famine" in congressional and public support for the Navy
apparently obtains even in the nuclear age.
92
VII. MASSIVE RETALIATION
A. A "NEW LOOK" AT STRATEGIC DOCTRINE
Dwight Eisenhower was elected on the strength of his personal popularity and his
promise to end the lingering conflict and truce negotiations in Korea. As soon as he
was elected, President Eisenhower initiated a "New Look" at the nation's strategic
nuclear- policy and reaffirmed strategic nuclear bombing as the foundation of the
nation's defense. Although the lessons of the war should have been enough to
discredit strategic nuclear bombing [Ref. 34: p. 5], Eisenhower adopted the threat of
massive nuclear retaliation by nuclear bombers as a deterrent to Soviet aggression. In
the words of one critic, General Maxwell Taylor, Eisenhower's New Look was nothing
more "than the old air power dogma set forth in Madison Avenue trappings and
buttressed upon Massive Retaliation as the central strategic concept." [Ref. 34: p. 17]
Eisenhower was concerned that spending on defense would bankrupt the
economy. The crash program to rebuild the nation's armaments that had started as
Truman's response to Korea was revised by the President to be extended over the "long
pull" to take ten or twenty years [Ref. 10: p. 339].
His "New Look" was not in any real sense a reexamination of strategic policy as
much as it was a euphemism for slowing down the expense of national defense. He
defended himself by declaring that an expensive defensive posture would do little good
if it ruined the domestic economy. The U.S. could not allord another war like Korea.
Eisenhower felt that the Soviet goal was as much to drive the U.S. into bankruptcy
through overseas entanglements as it was to defeat the U.S. militarily.
A correlative sentiment was also gaining influence-that of substituting "machines
for men"--which was made increasingly possible by the incremental growth in science
and technology [Ref. 10: p. 340]. The predilection in Congress to prefer a war as far
from the U.S. as possible and endangering as few American lives as necessary found
support through technology that promised a long-range war fought with machines and
not men. However, the explosion of the Soviet A-bomb and the quality of MIG
aircraft encountered in Korea were convincing proof that the Soviets were also
technologically astute. Combined, the two above points foreshadowed a technological
arms race. To stav ahead, the U.S. had little choice but to do what it was inclined to
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do in the first place-concentrate on the technological answer to warfare. [Ref. 33: p.
25]
Eisenhower's New Look promoted and even demanded, the accelerated
application of technology to warfare as he sought for economy in defense. As
Eisenhower said, "No longer could we afford the folly so often indulged in in the past,
of beginning each war with the weapons of the last." [Ref. 39: p. 498] The foreseeable
evolution would move from manned nuclear bombers to unmanned guided missiles to
intercontinental ballistic missiles while gradually removing soldiers from the battlefield.
The Air Force strategy of strategic nuclear warfare was the ideal expression of the New
Look. The technological emphasis of aviation and the economy of atomic weapons
were perfect complements to the course of strategy pursued by the President.
The logical assumption on the nature of war derived from a reliance on nuclear
weapons as the expression of U.S. military power was another important aspect
integral to the New Look strategy. It was felt that for the first time in history, war
could actually be prevented. Whereas many efforts in the past-building walls,
stockpiling arms, etc.-had been directed toward preventing war, they had invariably
failed in their objective. The lessons of World War I and II had clearly shown that
increased levels of armaments did little to prevent war if indeed they did not actually
promote it. Tremendous arsenals of conventional weaponry only made war more
horrible for the defeated. It did not make victory for an aggressor any less desirable.
Armaments, therefore, did not serve as deterrents to war, but only as the instruments
which made war possible.
However, the advent of the atomic bomb seemed to accomplish what defensive
arsenals had been unable to do-prevent war. The "absolute" character of the bomb
was purported to inexorably alter the nature of war. Atomic war was increasingly
viewed by the American leadership as too horrible to contemplate, immoral in
application, and futile as a warfighting strategy. The broad expanse of the Soviet
Union did not lend itself to strategic bombing nor did its dispersed military' structure.
The atomic bomb could only exploit its full potential against population and industrial
centers. While the Air Force thought this adequate to win a war, it was generally
believed that such attacks could not really bring "victory" but only an end to hostilities
at a horrible cost in innocent human life. Therefore, the atomic bomb was not viewed
as warfighting instrument. It assumed a superior character. It was an instrument that
could prevent war simply because of its horrible power. Whereas conventional
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weapons had failed to preserve peace, the threat of atomic war removed aggression as a
logical expression of national policy.
Upon this logical foundation of the new character of war brought on by nuclear
weapons, Eisenhower built his strategic nuclear policy of massive retaliation. As long
as the United States had the capability to threaten nuclear war upon the Soviet Union,
aggression by the Kremlin would be illogical. An American monopoly on the atomic
bomb would have buttressed the threat of massive retaliation. Nevertheless.
Eisenhower was not dismayed by the growth of a Soviet nuclear capability. Initially,
the Air Force pursued a numerical superiority in nuclear weapons—a move that seemed
necessary to legitimize massive retaliation. Its continual drive for more and more
strategic bombing air groups was rejected, however, by President Eisenhower who once
again weighed the effect such a growth would have on the economy. He relaxed the
requirement for nuclear superiority and decided upon a doctrine of "sufficiency." He
reasoned only a limited and specific number of nuclear weapons was needed to support
massive retaliation. The destructiveness of the bomb, even in finite numbers, was so
great that a continual build-up would only result in overkill without a corresponding
increase in effectiveness. It no longer mattered how many bombs the Soviets had as
long as the U.S. maintained a "sufficiency." [Ref. 40: p. 60]
Eisenhower sought to encourage or, at least, preserve the economic growth of the
nation by relaxing the fiscal demands of defense. He found a reliance upon nuclear
strategic warfare as a national strategy to not only satisfy his requirements for
economy but to also provide beneficial derivatives. First, air atomic warfare
represented the cutting edge of warfare technology and was an arena in which the U.S.
was felt to be highly competitive. Secondly, the warfighting inadequacies of the atomic
bomb were more than compensated for by its "absolute" and destructive nature which
made war illogical. The threat of a massive retaliatory attack upon an aggressor was
deemed to be the quintessential deterrent to war. If nuclear weapons could deter war,
then it did not really matter if they were valueless as warfighting instruments.
Eisenhower was satisfied that he had hit upon the answer to his objectives-
massive retaliation. He sent forth his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, to
expound upon the nation's strategy. Later, defending the strategy Dulles said:
It was not intended a brandishing of nuclear weapons.. Nor did it. mean
that the United Stated would drop nuclear bombs on Russia in reprisal for the
outbreak of small-scale conflicts anvwhere in the world. It was simplv designated
to make clear to the Soviets that if they attempted to take advantage of their
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superior conventional military strength to trv to overwhelm a strateeic area like
Western Europe, the United States would take advantage of its supenor nuclear-
delivery strength to defeat them. It was therefore designed to deter attack.
[Ref. 41: p. 123]
Since the cancellation of the super carrier, the Navy had drifted further from a
strategic emphasis and concentrated on the integration of nuclear weapons into a
tactical capability [Ref. 2: p. 141 J. With the first deployment of VC-5 to the
Mediterranean aboard the Coral Sea in September 1950. the Navy possessed a limited
nuclear strike capability. All successive deployments of Midway class carriers to the
Mediterranean carried non-nuclear components for atomic weapons. The nuclear core
components were to be flown from the U.S. to be assembled onboard the carrier as
needed. [Ref. 2: p. 166]. The Navy appeared able to deploy its nuclear forces to suit
its own needs and missions at its own discretion. The Air Force-which was tasked to
provide the nuclear targeting plan to be implemented upon Presidential order-had
refused to assigned any targets to the Navy. However, with the deployment of Captain
Hayward and Composite Squadron 5 on the Coral Sea, the Navy did receive targeting
assignments and has ever since had both nuclear weapons and targeting assignments
onboard even if nuclear strikes were not its primary mission. [Ref. 3: p. 256]
As the Navy entered the early 1950's under the new administration of Eisenhower
it possessed a well-balanced capability. The carrier had proved itself valuable in a
conventional role, and yet with the AJ-1 Savage also had a nuclear strike capability.
The Savage, although a less than satisfactory platform [Ref. 2: p. 176], did harmonize
with the established principles of a balanced force-integral to Navy thinking.
The Navy maintained a heavy emphasis upon the defense of the carrier from
airborne attack and the necessity of establishing control of the skies. Subsequently, the
complement of aircraft on the carrier was heavily tilted toward fighter aircraft with far
fewer attack bombers. Even with the attack bombers, the emphasis was not placed
upon heavy bombers like the Savage. The reestablished dependence upon a
conventional attack capability vividly demonstrated by the Navy's role in Korea
relegated the Savage to a backseat position to the increasing recognition of the carrier's
conventional usefulness-even in the atomic age.
During the early years of the New Look, Navy strategic nuclear policy remained
stable. The Navy was ready to earn' out a nuclear strike role if called upon. It
possessed targeting assignments and nuclear weapons. However, the Navy did not
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share the President's confidence in massive retaliation as a deterrent to war and was
not so inclined to forget the tactical and strategic lessons of the Korean War. The
threat of nuclear retaliation had not prevented the Soviet Union from supporting a
North Korean invasion of the south. Neither had it been sufficient to stop the
invasion once it started, nor did it serve to prevent the Chinese from entering the
conflict once they felt their security was threatened. It had taken the traditional
application of ground forces and conventional air support to stop the invasion and
regain the offensive. The doctrine of singular reliance on nuclear weapons did not
seem adequate. The Navy was much more comfortable with building and maintaining
a strong conventional capability to meet what it felt were the more likely
confrontations with communism. The Navy stressed its versatility to operate
offensively in both environments-conventional and nuclear. [Ref. 40: p. 23]
The Navy's commitment to a balanced force therefore differed from Eisenhower's
shift toward total reliance on massive retaliation. Two factors mitigated the level of
conflict that could have resulted from the difference in strategic outlook. First, despite
the avowed shift to massive retaliation, the emphasis in actual practice was not nearly
so one sided. The Navy was still benefiting from the Korean Conflict buildup and was
not in any serious danger of drastic reductions as had been experienced under Truman.
Throughout Eisenhower's administration spending for national defense never dropped
below S40 billion, an astounding sum considering Truman's SI 3 billion defense budget
of 1950 [Ref. 30: p. 359]. With that amount of money being spent on national defense,
the assertion that spending for conventional armaments was being short-changed for a
dependence on nuclear weapons was hollow. In fact, the Navy ended the Eisenhower
era with one-third more ships that it had at the end of the Korean war—which hardly
provided legitimate grounds for complaint. The fleet of Forrestal class carriers was
increased from two to seven and a whole new realm of naval activity was opened due
to the development of the fleet ballistic missile submarine force and its integration into
the national targeting strategy. [Ref. 42: p. 33]. The Navy, while disagreeing with the
course of national strategy, was still able to meet most of its priority budgeting needs—
ironically, because Eisenhower counted the carrier task forces as part of the nation's
crucial "offensive striking power." [Ref. 27: p. 51] Not only was it continually
improving its balanced capability, but the reluctance of the President to involve the
nation in armed conflict helped to preserve both naval manpower and equipment that
could have been wasted in combat.
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Besides the negligible effect that the New Look was actually having upon the
Navy, a second factor mitigating any negative reaction to the President was the
leadership of Admiral Arthur Radford as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Stall.
During the B-36 controversy, Radford had epitomized the ruthless partisan of Navy
interests. In contrast to his predecessor General Omar Bradley who had tried to
remain neutral on issues, Radford vigorously pushed his views upon the JCS and the
President (although they were not always accepted.)
This is not to say that Radford promoted the continual buildup of the services: it
was he who formulated the President's New Look policy [Ref. 40: p. 24]. Radford was
willing to accept and support the shift to a new emphasis upon nuclear retaliation in
order to economize upon national defense. Although this did not coincide with
popular opinion in the Navy, his personal prestige was already well established and the
resulting minimal negative impact of New Look upon what the Navy wanted for itself
combined to easily persuade the Navy to accept the new strategy without opposition.
In fact, once New Look had been fully adopted, the Navy found it advantageous to
promote it—provided it included aircraft carriers as part of the offensive nuclear
capability. CNO Admiral Carney spearheaded the Navy's qualified support of New
Look by submitting a memorandum to the JCS specifically identifying the aircraft
carrier as an integral element of the nations's overall offensive striking power. His
memo was formally endorsed by the JCS on 5 February 1954. [Ref. 43: p. 268]
B. DIENBIENPHU AND THE CHALLENGE TO NEW LOOK
The Navy's skepticism over President Truman's confidence in strategic bombing
had been vindicated by the role of conventional ground and naval forces in Korea.
Likewise, the Navy's basic disagreement with Eisenhower's emphasis on massive
retaliation was soon supported by events in Southeast Asia.
The Navy remained committed to meeting the communist threat with a balanced
force. Eisenhower disagreed. He felt the Soviets would initiate war with an atomic
attack and that the only prudent course would be to launch a responding nuclear
attack as soon as warning was received [Ref. 27: p. 42].
He also felt the Soviet conventional capability required a nuclear response.
Using Western Europe as an example, Eisenhower said,
... in view of the disparity of the strengths of the opposing ground forces, it
seemed clear that only by 'the interpositfbn of our nuclear weapons could we
promptlv stop a major Communist aggression in that area. . . . My intention
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was firm: to launch the Strategic Air Command immediately upon trustworthy
evidence of a general attack against the West. [Ref. 39: p. 503]
Eisenhower was committed to meeting Soviet aggression with nuclear weapons.
Among Eisenhower's critics was the Army Chief of Staff, General Taylor, who
challenged the President's position on the utility of nuclear weapons as a deterrent to
all forms of Soviet aggression. As the Soviet Union also attained a comparable nuclear
arsenal with that of the United States, Taylor felt that the threat of nuclear war would
diminish and be replaced by small, brush-fire conflicts between the East and West
[Ref. 27: p. 42J. In response to these "small wars" he joined the Navy in supporting a
conventional buildup of balanced military forces to quickly deal with such conflicts and
keep them from escalating to general nuclear war. To this Eisenhower provided an
argument:
To emphasize mv convictions, I stressed that the United States would not
employ the same policies and resources to fight another war as were used in the
Korean conflict. 1 saw no sense in wasting manpower in costly small wars that
could not achieve decisive results under the political and military circumstances
then existing. I felt that this kind of military policy would plav into the hands of
a potential enemv whose superiority in available military manpower was obvious.
We should refuse to permit our adversary to enjoy a 'sanctuary from which he
could operate without danger to himself; we would not allow him to blackmail us
into placing limitations upon the types of weapons we would emplov. Moreover,
in the matter of brush-fire wars I pointed out that we would not trv to maintain
the conventional power to police the whole world, even thoueh we would
cooperate with our allies on the spot. The Communists would have to be made
to realize that should they be guilty of major aggression, we would strike with
means of our own choosing at the 'head of the "Communist power. [Ref. 39: p.
504]
From his response, one can find several significant and telling conclusions that
each begs a question. First, Eisenhower believed that any results-good or bad-from
brush-fire wars could not be "decisive" for the United States. Does that mean they
could not be "decisive" for the Soviet Union either? Or that their cumulative effect
could not eventually become "decisive" for either the U.S. or the Soviet Union?
Secondly, if the U.S. refused to be "blackmailed" into limiting its options, does that
imply that nuclear weapons would be used in brush-fire wars? And thirdly, If the U.S.
were to "strike" at the "head of Communist power" should they be guilty of "major
aggression," would the U.S. strike if they were only guilty of "minor aggression?" And.
for that matter, where is the line drawn between major and minor? Actually, what
Eisenhower did say was that the U.S. would not enease itself in brush-fire wars but
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would "cooperate" with allies "on the spot." The use of nuclear weapons was an open
question. It was soon given the opportunity to be answered.
By 1954 the French had used up all the resources they felt able to dedicate to
their struggle to hold onto Indochina. They sought help from the United States.
Eisenhower, who was pushing the French to support the European Defense
Community Treaty, was inclined to help. The French were against the Treaty which
proposed the rearming of Germany because they were hesitant to rearm the country
that had caused them so much misery through two world wars. Eisenhower wanted
the Treaty and French participation in order to reduce the U.S. presence in Europe by
shifting it to the local signatories of the Treaty. To help convince the French to
participate, Eisenhower increased the U.S. burden of the French effort in Indochina to
S785 million reasoning that the cost would be offset by a savings on U.S. troop
deployments in Europe that could be curtailed by the Treaty. Eventually, despite the
aid they received and the subsequent actions taken by Eisenhower in their defense, the
French rejected the Treaty--a move the President called "a major setback for the
United States." [Ref. 44: pp. 1 18-125]
In March 1954, fifteen thousand men of the French forces defending their
interests in the region found themselves surrounded and besieged at a fortress called
Dienbienphu in northwestern Indochina (Vietnam), fifty miles from the Chinese border.
General Paul Ely, French Chief of Staff in Indochina, informed the U.S. leadership
that allied intervention was desperately necessary or all would be lost for the French.
[Ref. 45: p. 163] While not wanting to support French colonialism. Eisenhower and his
Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, were convinced that should the French fall, a
"domino effect" would obtain in the region resulting in the eventual communist
domination of all of southeast Asia. Dulles called for the "internationalization" of the
war in order to "cooperate with our allies on the spot." Many civilian and military
leaders called for what had not been accomplished in Korea-the destruction of the
Chinese Communist Regime, while others violently opposed another involvement that
seemed so much like Korea. Richard Nixon, the Vice-President, warned that U.S.
troops might have to follow the French collapse. Reaction to his remarks was so
negative, that four days later Dulles had to reassure the nation that U.S. involvement
was "unlikely." [Ref. 45: p. 164]
The French military command had originally rejected allied assistance in the war
unless the Chinese began air attacks upon the fortress. The air attack never
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materialized. However, its place was taken by a massive artillery barrage and anti-
aircraft capability that proved just as effective as an air attack would have been.
[Ref. 46: p. 29S] Sixty-two French planes attempting to resupply the fortress were shot
down, bringing the forces inside to their knees [Ref. 47: p. 341]. For quite some time.
Admiral Radford, the Chairman of the JCS. had been recommending U.S. intervention
into the war by using naval aviation to bomb Viet Minh positions around the fortress.
While Radford recommended unilateral U.S. air strikes, Eisenhower and Dulles were
against any but multilateral action with the British and French. Churchill and Eden,
the British Prime Minister and his Foreign Minister, were adamant against any
involvement. [Ref. 48: p. 202] They were convinced that any air strikes would be
followed in 48 hours by the irresistible demand for ground troops [Ref. 45: p. 165].
They feared that any involvement by other powers would bring a wholesale invasion by
the Chinese.
A conference of all parties had been called to meet in Geneva at the end of April.
Complicating the entire French involvement was the instability of their current
government which threatened to collapse any day. The French wanted immediate
unilateral help from the Americans without the complication demanded by Eisenhower
to include the support of the British. Eisenhower was determined that the mistakes of
Korea would not be repeated. He was not going to involve American troops in
another conflict that did not have a guaranteed favorable outcome. Fie insisted that
any action taken be multilateral with the U.S. contribution as small as possible. He
had originally agreed with Radford's plan to conduct air strikes but those actions
would be combined with other military assistance from British. Australian. New
Zealand, and Philippine troops. He intended that the French would continue to earn'
the primary burden of the fighting despite Allied intervention. Sensitive to the possible
accusation of supporting colonialism, Eisenhower stipulated that future independence
for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia would be guaranteed after peace had been restored.
[Ref. 44: pp. 122] On 3 April 1954, Admiral Radford and Secretary Dulles met with a
bipartisan group of congressional leaders (including Lyndon B. Johnson who would
later find himself more intimately involved in southeast Asia) to discuss Operation
Vulture. The operation would involve ninety-eight B-29 Superfortresses earning
fourteen tons of bombs each from bases in Okinawa and the Philippines. The aircraft
carriers Essex and Boxer were offshore and would provide jet fighter cover against the
possibility of Chinese MIG intervention. The President wanted the Congress to pass a
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resolution permitting him to use air and naval power in Indochina and so initiate
Operation Vulture. [Ref. 46: p. 300]
Led by Johnson, the congressional leaders flatly rejected the unilateral
intervention of U.S. forces and stipulated that any resolution would require the
following:
• United States intervention must be part of a coalition to include the other free
nations of Southeast Asia, the Philippines, and the British Commonwealth.
• The French must agree to accelerate their independence program for the
Indochina States so that the United States assistance would riot appear as
supporting colonialism.
• The French must agree to stay in the war. [Ref. 46: p. 301]
The likelihood of winning congressional support rested on British support.
Dulles left for Europe to pursue the necessary cooperation. Meanwhile plans for
Vulture were continued. The French commander was petitioned for air crews that
could fly in the B-29's. Aircraft were positioned and with at least one painted with
French markings [Ref. 46: p. 304].
In London, Dulles presented the planned operation to Churchill and Eden who
had to consult their cabinet. Meanwhile, Dulles went on to Paris to reassure the
French that help was in preparation for the fortress. During his meeting there on 14
April, Dulles asked the French Foreign Minister, Georges Bidault, if two atomic bombs
would be sufficient to save Dienbienphu [Ref. 46: p. 307]. Admiral Radford joined him
in trying to persuade the Allies to support an atomic strike from the carriers in the
Gulf of Tonkin—the only thing that seemed capable of snatching victory from the jaws
of defeat. [Ref. 48: p. 202]
The whole plan fell apart when on 25 April the British cabinet decided to
withhold support from the entire joint operation. They wanted to give the Geneva
conference, about to begin, a chance to provide a political settlement to the situation.
Meanwhile Dulles had become convinced that the cause was lost. He had sent a
message to the President outlining that the loss of Dienbienphu should not cause the
collapse of the French. Churchill was dubiously sympathetic. "I have suffered
Singapore, Hong-Kong, Tobruk: the French will have Dienbienphu. . ." [Ref. 46: p.
310] The fortress fell on 7 May 1954 after fifty-five days of intense battle with Viet
Minh forces.
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After the fall of the fortress, the French were forced to partition the country in
half--a very costly settlement. Eisenhower and Dulles continued to wrestle with trying
to define the extent of U.S. commitment to the French and to Indochina. Dulles
formed the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in November in an attempt to display
some strength in Asia after the weak showing over Dienhienphu. Unfortunately,
SEATO was nothing more than a ceremonial body that required only consultation
between members and no military commitments. [Ref. 47: p. 341] In this instance
massive retaliation failed to provide the nation with an appropriate strategy to deal
with a problem that everyone agreed demanded resolution. As one author has stated:
The doctrine-massive retaliation-died symbolically at the news
conference in which Dulles said we would not save northern Indochina because it
really was not vital after all. Instead, we created the Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization to prevent any further Red aggression in Asia. The actual death of
massive retaliation was that split second when President Eisenhower overruled his
vice president, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, his Secretary of State,
the Air Force Chief of Stall, and the Chief of Naval Operations in agreeing with
General Ridsewav (the Armv Chief of Staff) and deciding not to intervene In the
Indochinese war. ' [Ref. 33: pi 50]
All of those, the Navy included, who doubted the efficacy of massive retaliation
to solve the dilemma of meeting communist-inspired aggression were vindicated by its
inability to prevent the fall of Dienbienphu-its first serious test of effectiveness. It
would later fail again in the dispute over the communist's shelling and forced
evacuation by the U.S. Navy of the Chinese Nationalist Tachen Islands-massive
retaliation's second test.
The challenge presented to Eisenhower over Dienbienphu, clearly demonstrated
that the problems of Korea were not unique. The same form of aggression
characteristic of the Korean conflict was likely throughout Southeast Asia. The urge
to engage itself in limited conflicts to meet brush-fire wars was one that the U.S., in
this case, managed to overcame. President Eisenhower's doctrine of massive nuclear
retaliation was weakened by nuclear parity. Originally, with a preponderance of
nuclear weapons, the threat of U.S. nuclear retaliation seemed a legitimate national
strategy. It had been tested by Truman and finally adopted by Eisenhower. However,
with the growth of a Soviet nuclear capability and massive retaliation's inappropriate
character for limited conflicts, it was discredited. President Eisenhower readily
accepted its lack of utility in addressing brush-fire conflicts. However, he was intent
for other reasons to keep the U.S. out of such engagements. While some would have
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readily committed U.S. forces to limited wars, President Eisenhower managed to
exercise restraint. As he explained:
Durina the course of this meeting I remarked that if the United States
were, unilaterally, to permit its forces to Be drawn into conflict in Indochina and
in a succession of Asian wars, the end result would be to drain off our resources
(italics added) and to weaken our overall defensive position. If we, without allies,
should ever find ourselves fighting at various places all over the region, and if
Red Chinese aggressive participation were clearlv identified, then we could
scarcely avoid, Psaid. considering the necessity of striking directly at the head
instead of the tail of the snake. Red China itself [Ref. 46: p. 312]
Eisenhower apparently felt the fall of the French in Indochina was not "decisive"
despite the gain it undoubtedly represented for the communist camp. He did not feel
that it was worth the risk that involvement might entail-risk for the economy or for
American troops. While implying the above, he went on to reaffirm the threat of
massive retaliation against the Chinese homeland if and when the U.S. decided to act.
Despite the failure of New Look and massive retaliation, the Navy did not take
unnecessary advantage of its strategic vindication. It was the second time the Navy
had been proven correct. However, two elements served to restrain the Navy from
saying "I told you so." First, the Navy had turned from the ineffectual policy of
criticizing and trying to change national strategy characterized by the "admiral's revolt"
to a new policy of working within national strategy. This was evidenced by CNO
Admiral Carney's memorandum, mentioned previously, endorsing the Navy's carrier
force as part of the nation's strategic strike capability. By this, the Navy demonstrated
its ability to operate within national strategy without losing sight of its own goals and
identity. [Ref. 43: p. 268] Secondly, and perhaps a factor that more significantly
moderated the Navy's disagreement with massive retaliation, was the development of
the Navy's own contribution to that doctrine--the submarine-launched ballistic missile.
C. POLARIS
In some respects the impact of Polaris was anti-climactic. There can be no
question that it forever after altered the Navy's role in nuclear warfare. However, its
impact upon the Navy would have perhaps been much greater if it had been available
for deployment during the midst of the third period of interservice rivalry from 1945 to
1950 when the Navy was fighting for its very existence. Had it been available under
the the tenure of Navy Secretary Johnson, the Navy would have spared itself the
humiliating defeat it suffered at the hands of the Air Force and Truman's budget
constraints.
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Regardless, Polaris came to the Navy in a period of relative prosperity in the
Navy's recent history. In the aftermath of the Korean War. instead of the historical
cut-back accompanying all previous wars, the Navy continued to enjoy relative favor in
national defense budgeting. During Eisenhower's administration, the Army more so
than the Navy incurred the brunt of budget cuts [Ref. 49: p. 378].
As Arleigh Burke took over the job of CNO in August 1955, the Navy discovered
that solid fuel propellant could be used to launch a ballistic missile 1,500 miles.
Radical improvements in nuclear warhead technology reduced their weight to
manageable proportions. The two discoveries combined gave rise to the possibility of
developing a ballistic missile submarine.
The Defense Department's effort at developing ballistic missiles was slow to
develop and undoubtedly delayed by the concentrated attention given to the manned
bomber and strategic bombing. The Navy had previously developed the Regulus
surface-to-surface submarine-launched missile which entered service in 1955 as the
Navy's first nuclear strategic missile. The Regulus was stored in pairs in a round
hanger mounted on the deck of a submarine. It was launched by two solid rocket
boosters and then powered by a turbo-jet engine for ranges up to 500 miles. With its
nuclear warhead, it was designed for attack against strategic land targets. Regulus I
was followed by developmental work on Regulus II which was designed to be more
accurate and capable against strategic point targets such as submarine pens, airfields,
and nuclear weapons stores. [Ref. 50: pp. 2190-2191]
Although over 500 Regulus I missiles were built, both Regulus I and II were
abandoned in favor of the advantages of speed and invulnerability of ballistic missiles
[Ref. 51: p. 64]. The explosion of the Soviet H-bomb and knowledge of its
investigations into ballistic missiles added impetus to the Navy's efforts as well as the
the national effort to develop a ballistic missile.
President Eisenhower directed the National Security Council to form a committee
to analyze the East-West nuclear balance. The Killian Committee concluded its study
and gave its result to the President in the winter of 1955. The Committee
recommended the simultaneous development of an ICBM by the Air Force (the Atlas),
and a 1,500-mile intermediate range missile to be fired from either land or sea to be
developed jointly by the Army and Navy (the Jupiter). [Refs. 52.53: pp. 17, 76]
President Eisenhower subsequently directed that the recommendations of the
Committee be implemented.
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Admiral Hyman Rickover had already spearheaded the development of a nuclear-
powered submarine, the Nautilus, that had been launched in January 1955. The
assignment to develop a submarine-launched ballistic missile was eventually given to
Rear Admiral William Raborn, Jr., a naval aviator and expert in missile technology.
Raborn was assigned as director of the Navy's Special Projects Office by Admiral
Burke and, initially, told to work with the Army in building a liquid fueled missile to be
fired from a surface ship.
Unfortunately, the technology to put a ballistic missile in a submarine was simply
not available. Consequently, the Navy was willing although less than enthusiastic to
put them on surface ships. The current missiles under development were mammoth
objects up to five stories tall. Putting one on a rolling pitching deck and expecting to
launch it safely seemed an insurmountable task.
The advantages of placing the missiles on a submarine were clearly spelled out by
the report of the Security Resources Panel chaired by H. Rowan Gaither. The
Gaither Report entitled "Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age" promoted the
deployment of Polaris because of its "advantages of mobility and greatly reduced
vulnerability." [Ref. 27: p. 47] To the Navy a silent and highly mobile nuclear
submarine loaded with atomic missiles ready to fire at an attacker was the "ultimate
national deterrent" to nuclear war. [Ref. 27: p. 52] However, putting the missiles
aboard submarines was not deemed possible. At the time, all ballistic missile
propulsion systems were liquid fueled which required the extremely hazardous task of
loading volatile chemicals, liquid oxygen and RP-1, a kerosene derivative, into the
missile immediately prior to launch. Storing and transferring such explosive mixtures
on a submarine was too dangerous to consider seriously.
However, as the problems of using the same system aboard a surface ship seemed
nearly equally difficult, Raborn was finally given permission to explore a solid fuel
propulsion system. Although all research to that date on solid fuel had proved in vain,
the advantages were too significant to pass over. After a presentation given to the
Secretary of Defense on the possibilities of solid fueled missiles won his approval,
Raborn aborted the joint Army-Navy missile, the Jupiter, and began work on the
Navy's individual effort which he named Polaris.
Praise for Raborn's effort in the development of Polaris often mentions the
management techniques that he used to track progress on the overall project. Using
computers, Raborn instituted a system research and development planning, scheduling
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and control called Performance Evaluation Review Technique (PERT) that provided
him a constant picture of the progress of even1 aspect of the project. With PERT,
Raborn was able to spot delays, bottlenecks, and engineering problems that held up
progress on the system. [Ref. 52: p. 222]
Regardless of the management system, the hard work, concentrated effort, and
carte blanche given Raborn was bound to result in technological break-throughs.
Those in such areas as solid fuel propulsion, inertial navigation, miniaturization and
nuclear warhead design were achieved and. indeed, necessary to make the total Polaris
system work. Solid fuel, after several near disasters, was perfected. The intricate gyros
necessary for fine navigational accuracy were developed and refined. A major
breakthrough in nuclear warhead design allowed the eventual reduction in size of the
typical 10,000 pound atomic bomb to a more powerful warhead weighing just 600
pounds [Ref. 22: p. 314].
Polaris was intended to enter service in 1963. However, the timetable was
disrupted by an event figuratively and literally foreign to the project--the launch of
Sputnik by the Soviet Union on 4 October 1957. Although the Polaris program
seemed pressed to its limits, Congress soon began pressuring for the project to be
speeded up. Admiral Burke, taking the traditional Navy line, cautioned against over-
reaction and single-minded obsession with ballistic missiles. Conventional naval forces
had been much more useful, even during the cold war, than had been high technology
and nuclear weapons [Ref. 22: p. 311]. Burke was afraid that a concentration on
Polaris would delay the completion of other vital construction-namely. the USS
Enterprise, the Navy's first nuclear powered aircraft carrier which had just been funded.
Nevertheless, the Navy was pushed by Congress to accelerate Polaris. Raborn
shaved the range from 1,500 miles to 1,200 miles and claimed he could produce the
submarine and missile as a system by 1960—three years earlier than originally planned.
He was given the go-ahead by Secretary of Defense, Neil H. McElroy. [Ref. 52: p.
149]
The Air Force recognized the Polaris as a direct threat to its monopoly on
strategic nuclear warfare. It was currently developing its own liquid fueled ballistic
missile—the Minuteman. Consequently, the Air force engineered what defense it could
by disparaging the smaller warhead planned for the Polaris, and its price tag-SlO
million for each Polaris missile on station versus S2 million for each Minuteman in a
silo. [Ref. 52: p. 216]
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Failing there, the Air Force tried to obtain control of Polaris by suggesting that
it be integrated into the command and control structure of the Strategic Air Command.
The Na\y barely had to respond. Congressman Daniel Flood of Pennsylvania of the
omnipotent House Military Appropriations Subcommittee said to Arleigh Burke:
It is obviouslv a planned and determined effort to incorporate this Polaris
system of the Navy into some strategic bombardment concept of The Air Force.
No question about that, in mv opinion. That should not be done. I personally
hope that if and when this reaches the Joint Chiefs' level for final action, before
it goes to the Secretary level, if vour name is Burke. I think you know how to
handle the Navy's case. . . I expect you would and I am sure'you will. Do not
let these jokers push you around. That is nonsense. [Ref. 52: p.' 214J
Much to the chagrin of the Air Force, the Polaris system was too important to
U.S. deterrence strategy to consider cutting. The principle debate in Congress was not
over whether Polaris was a good system, but how fast, how many and how soon they
could be built.
The second Soviet space launch, Sputnik II, confirmed Russian prowess and sent
shivers down the spines of U.S. political leaders. The fear was not that the Russians
were technological astute (which they undoubtedly were) but that they had a system
that threatened to bring international war where it had not been before--the heartland
of America. One of the primary congressional requirements for warmaking-that it
remain far from American shores-had been violated. War with the Soviet Union was
no longer a viable alternative in congressional thinking. It had to be deterred rather
than fought. Polaris seemed to be the ideal instrument of deterrence. It was
invulnerable, it was powerful, and it was a technological marvel—a combination that
established for the fleet ballistic missile force (FBM) a permanent and undisputable
position in national defense. The Air Force was totally impotent in its efforts to
impede Polaris's deployment.
After overcoming technological obstacles that were reminiscent of the Manhattan
effort, Raborn deployed his first FBM, the George Washington in the fall of 1960,
followed shortly by the Patrick Henry. Although Arleigh Burke had cautioned against
placing unrealistic expectations on Polaris, the U.S. leadership continued to look for a
quick fix to national security problems. As the Soviet nuclear threat became more
intense, Polaris seemed a method of reestablishing U.S. superiority in nuclear warfare.
While the Navy fully appreciated the capability that Polaris represented, it was in
certain respects a dramatic departure from traditional naval thinking on warfare.
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Polaris served no purpose in conventional, limited or general nuclear warfighting. 19
However, Polaris was a deterrent force the nation wanted and it operated in the naval
environment. Therefore, even though Polaris violated the general naval attitude
toward warfighting. the Navy cautiously embraced it. Unhappy to be paying for the
construction of what it considered a "national rather than Navy program," the Navy
resented having to cut surface shipbuilding projects to fund Polaris [Ref. 54: p. 152].
The Air Force was partially justified in its legitimate concern over the
implications of the additional nuclear firepower presented by Polaris. The history of
strategic targeting by U.S. nuclear forces was replete with instances of duplication in
the assignment of targets to separate nuclear forces. The Air Forces wanted to prevent
the waste of assigning the same target to two different weapon systems, i.e. assigning
both an ICBM and a Polaris to target a single enemy industrial complex.
In the 1950's each individual specified or unified commander who was assigned
nuclear-capable forces was free to develop his own targeting annex or list of targets.
This inevitably led to duplication by adjoining commanders who both controlled
nuclear-capable forces within range of the same target. [Ref. 55: p. 8]
The modest size of the Navy's nuclear capability in comparison to that of the Air
Force and the Navy's emphasis on conventional warfare in the 1950's created only
moderate concern over the lack of a unified doctrine for nuclear targeting. In fact, the
Navy was generaly free to deploy its nuclear forces to suit itself with little interference
from outside the Navy. The carriers had received their targeting assignments from the
Air Force but there was little further coordination.
However, the advent of Polaris and its significant contribution to the overall
nuclear capability of the nation's strategic arsenal was greeted much more seriously by
the Air Force. Led by the SAC commander, General Thomas S. Power, in 1958, the
Air Force made its abortive attempt to incorporate Polaris into a unified strategic
command under a SAC commander.
Although this effort failed, as described above, the Secretary of Defense, Thomas
Gates, also recognized the legitimacy of Air Force concerns and in August 1960
directed the formation of the Joint Strategic Targeting Planning Staff (JSTPS). The
JSTPS has continued until today at its location at SAC headquarters at Omaha,
Polaris was not accurate enough to destrov counter-force targets like ICBM
silos nor was it "prompt" enough to be tacticallv useful. It was a retaliatorv weapon
that was most effective against area targets, e.'g., population centers and 'industrial
complexes. Therefore its use in warfighting was negligible.
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Nebraska. The JSTPS, headed by a SAC commander with a Navy flag officer as
deputy, was tasked with developing and maintaining the National Strategic Targeting
List (NSTL) of all strategic targets, and with developing and maintaining the Single
Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) which coordinates the assignment of targets from
the NSTL to all strategic nuclear weapon systems-including Polaris. [Ref. 55: p. 9]
The Navy, therefore, retained full control of Polaris yet joined in a legitimate effort to
coordinate the capability of Polaris with other national strategic nuclear assets.
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VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
A. THE CHARACTER AND EVOLUTION OF NAVAL STRATEGIC
THINKING
The geographical characteristics of the United States allowed the country the
privilege of pursuing an isolationist foreign policy throughout most of its history. The
vast oceans that separated America from European and Asian hostilities were a
fundamental ingredient in the formula that determined the growth of American foreign
policy. Even when the United States did venture forth to exert its increasing power in
the world, it was able to do so with a selectivity that was denied traditional nation-
states. For example, the United States was generally able to ignore political
developments in Europe during the 1800's and concentrate on interests in the Pacific
Ocean. Even when forced to confront a European power--Spain--the U.S. did so in the
Pacific and Caribbean not in Europe. Neither England, France, Japan, Germany or
Russia could feel safe from the threat posed by the close proximity of hostile forces.
Throughout the entire course of the early development of the United States as a world
power, it alone could claim that privilege.
The consequences for the Navy of such a geographical position were two-fold.
On the one hand, the oceans that surrounded the United States called for control by a
strong navy, and on the other, the protection afforded by the isolation seemed to make
the expense of a navy extravagant and unnecessary. As a result, in times of war, the
Navy was belatedly expanded and glorified. In times of peace it was retired and
denigrated.
Repeatedly, students of U.S. naval history have faulted the Navy for not
sounding its own trumpet and thereby contributing to its own legacy of "feast or
famine." The Army, stationed at posts around the country and in Washington,
constantly reinforced its position as vital to the defense of the nation in the minds of
the public. From the blatant orchestrations of Billy Mitchell in the I920's to the four-
part series of articles written for The Reader's Digest in Decemberl947-April 1948, the
Air Force lost not a single opportunity to impress the public with the essential
character of its role in national defense. However, the Navy, at sea on ships, remained
the "silent service," out of sight and out of mind, reluctant to involve itself in political
lobbying despite the inevitable reductions that awaited it after every cycle of conflict
and settlement.
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Brief interludes of genius did interrupt the historical course of the U.S. Navy's
development. First, Captain Alfred T. Mahan defined, not only for the U.S. Navy but
for the rest of world, the direction of 19th century naval warfare. Secondly, James
Forrestal redirected the Navy to address its newly developed strategic as well as tactical
capability. Generally, however, the U.S. Navy was content to follow a slow, steady
course in the execution of its mission as defined by the foreign policy and national
strategy determined by the U.S. political leadership. The Navy had historically been
very faithful in pursuing the foreign policy direction provided by the executive branch
even during times when that policy was so slow in formulation that the Navy begged
for guidance [Ref. 7: p. 147].
In its development of a strategy to perform its mission, the Navy originally
followed the European pattern of guerre de course, or coastal defense and commercial
raiding. The doctrines of Mahan altered that strategy to conform with the more
decisive role of engaging the enemy fleet on the high seas or blockading his ports. The
development of the battleship as the preeminent naval weapon climaxed the strategy of
"sea control." The rise of the aircraft carrier and naval aviation brought with it the
ability to conduct "power projection" or warfare beyond the range of naval guns as a
complement to "sea control." With naval aviation, the Navy created the foundation of
a strategic role in warfare.
The struggles with the Air Force actually stimulated the rise of naval aviation to
its dominant position in the Navy. By having to justify its possession of an air force,
the Navy was forced to explore aviation's actual worth in naval warfare. Despite this,
the Navy was still slow to recognize naval aviation for what it was. Even after the
devastating air attack, by naval aircraft upon Pearl Harbor, there was a call to rebuild a
battleship fleet [Ref. 7: pp. 82-83]. The ironically fortuitous sinking of the battleships
forced the Navy to meet the enemy with the correct weapon—the aircraft—and thereby
established naval aviation as the preeminent weapon of naval warfare.
The relatively inconsequential strategy of commerce and coastal raiding practiced
by the American fleet prior to Mahan was rejected in favor of his more efficient
doctrine of sea control. Control of the seas allowed the unhindered transportation of
troops as well as 19th century7 colonial expansionism. Forrestal completed the
evolution of naval strategy by expanding the tactical missions of naval forces to include
strategic functions-interdicting enemy forces and warmaking capabilities not directly
involved in tactical combat.
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The exploitation of naval aviation adopted to a strategic role directly challenged
the role that the Air Force had reserved for itself thereby amplifying the conflict
between the services. Nevertheless, the consequences of the controversy between the
two would have been even worse for the Navy had it not had a strategic capability.
Because of the budget limitations that fueled their conflict, had the Navy not been able
to justify itself with a strategic contribution of its own. the Navy might very likely have
been reduced to a patrol boat fleet as was feared by Arleigh Burke. Such a reduction
would have provided additional funds for the Air Force to increase its strategic
bombing capability.
The introduction of the atomic bomb into U.S. naval strategy presented the
Navy with the opportunity to claim the complete usurpation of the Air Force's raison
d'etre. In fact, one school of thought held the more radical view that the nuclear
warhead mated to a missile had invalidated both the Air Force and naval aviation.
Their reasoning was that the manned airplane was merely an extension of artillery.
The airplane was able to extend the range of army and navy bombardment. However,
once the missile was introduced, the necessity for manned aircraft for bombing was
lost. The missile, once sufficiently refined, could deliver ordinance on the target
without the failures of human intervention or fear for the pilot's life. Consequently,
there was no longer any need for the Air Force or naval aviation whose jobs could
more readily be performed by missiles with nuclear or conventional warheads. The
separately organized Air Force, under this thesis, would be dissolved and its
responsibilities returned to the land and naval forces from which they were taken.
[Ref. 7: p. 59]
Despite the development of a strategic bomber, the Navy was too committed to a
balanced force to advocate assuming strategic bombing as its primary mission. The
traditional naval approach amplified by the diversity of naval operations-above, on
and below the sea—relegated strategic bombing to a position parallel to other naval
tactics. It was undoubtedly important, and it was a tactic the Navy wanted to exploit.
However, it did not invalidate any other proven tactic or strategy of warfare.
In pursuit of adopting strategic bombing into naval strategy, the Navy supported
the Doolittle Raid over Japan. Naval bombers were active throughout the war,
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attacking the enemy's warmaking potential far behind the lines of combat. Adopting
nuclear strategic bombing was accomplished by the development of the AJ-1 Savage
and its more capable follow-on. the A-3D Skywarrior. 20
However, the Navy was perfectly willing to permit the Air Force the dominant
role in strategic bombing. Two factors were important. First, while strategic bombing
was a legitimate role, it was of dubious worth in actually meeting the threat. The
tactical use of nuclear weapons seemed much more efficient at addressing those forces
that threatened naval operations. Such targets included submarine bases, licet
concentrations and enemy air fields, all of which were tactical targets. Subsequently,
the Navy concentrated on the tactical employment of nuclear weapons. Secondly, the
use of nuclear strategic bombing, while having little legitimate warfighting value, served
better as a counter-value weapon threatening enemy civilian population centers. As
was proven by the Strategic Bombing Survey, such a role had minimal impact on the
actual warfighting capability of an enemy. Therefore, strategic nuclear bombing's most
efficient role was as a deterrent to aggression and not as a warfighting instrument. The
Navy was willing to allow the Air Force to dominate the American deterrent
responsibility. It was such a single-minded responsibility that the Navy rejected it in
favor of a more well-rounded capability.
The Navy argued that with the stalemate brought on by the mutual acquisition
of nuclear weapons by both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., further conflicts between the
two would involve small-scale limited confrontations either directly or through proxies.
The Korean War proved to be a prime example of the Navy's position. After the
cessation of hostilities, the Navy continued to press its position-that the nation's
defense should rest upon a well-balanced defense capable of meeting the entire
spectrum of conflict.
The evolution of the Navy's warfighting strategy, both tactical and strategic,
nuclear and conventional, was colored by the recurring debate with the Air Service; Air
Corp,' Air Force. Throughout the history of the debate over roles and mission, the Air
Force was clearly the antagonist. Initially, the Air Force attacked the Navy in order to
enhance its demand for independence. Then, the Air Force attacked the Navy over the
fabricated threat to strategic bombing. Underlying the entire conflict was the struggle
In March 1949 Douglas Aircraft Companv was awarded a contract to build a
two-engine jet aircraft to function as a carrier-borne strategic nuclear bomber. 1 he
Skywarrior was delivered to the Fleet in December 1954. "It was (and still is) the
heaviest operational carrier-borne aircraft although it has long since lost its role as a
nuclear bomber.
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for funding and the constraints of the defense budget. Despite the futile attempts of
the leadership to quell the conflict through legislation, conferences and boards, the only
effective relief came from the loosening of the budgetary purse strings brought on by
first. World War II, and secondly, the Korean War. The acrimonious debate that took
place in the halls of Congress after World War II was stopped swiftly and surely by the
unprecedented growth in defense spending between 1950 and 1952-from SI 3.1 billion
to S44.0 billion in two years! Of course, there continued occasional eruptions in
interservice rivalry throughout the 1950s. However, it never threatened the
proportions that were reached during the parsimonious administration of Harry
Truman.
Throughout the administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Navy was
resolutely pursuing its limited war strategy regardless of the President's avowed reliance
upon retaliation with nuclear weapons. Convinced that the pattern set by Korea was
bound to continue regardless of the threat of massive retaliation, the Navy pressed for
the construction of aircraft carriers, cruisers, and destroyers to meet the needs of
limited warfare.
Just when the Navy had given up on its attempt to establish a legitimate
contribution to strategic warfighting and defense, the Polaris submarine became a
possibility. The Polaris missile coupled to a nuclear submarine, gave the Navy an
undisputed role in the nation's deterrent posture. Ironically, the Polaris submarine did
not fit into the mainstream of Naval strategic thinking. It necessitated the
endorsement of the utility of strategic nuclear bombing--an idea the Navy had
previously abandoned. However, the Navy had accepted the essential nature of the
"balance of terror" that existed between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The Polaris
submarine contributed to that balance which made nuclear war an illogical expression
of national policy. With that definition, the Navy accepted Polaris. 21 Consequently,
the Navy did not endorse the utility of strategic nuclear bombing as a warfighting
strategy, but did accept it as a means to deter to general war. However, while
deterring general war, in the Navy's mind, the nuclear stalemate, complemented by
7 1
However, despite the integration of Polaris into the Navy, even todav there
exists a wide gap between the traditional forces of naval warfare and the ballistic
missile submarine force. Both forces operate independently, rarelv meet or discuss the
operations of the other, and act as if they are practically different services.
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Polaris, failed to stop Soviet aggression manifested through limited conflicts and for
which, the Navy continued to need aircraft carriers, cruisers and destroyers.
The Navy entered the 1960's with a fairly coherent strategic nuclear policy. It
was particularly suited for the new national strategic doctrine of John Kennedy-
Flexible Response. The Navy had both a potent conventional as well as nuclear
capability and a tactical as well as strategic role. It was prepared to meet a
conventional limited conflict with aircraft carriers and naval aviation as well as escalate
to a limited nuclear engagement with tactical nuclear bombs. [Ref. 40: p. 79] The
undisputable advantages of Polaris as a strategic nuclear weapon system protected the
Navy from any legitimate attack by the Air Force on the Navy's contribution to
national defense. After a significant struggle, the Navy successfully adopted nuclear
weapons into its naval forces in such a manner as to preserve for itself an undisputable
role in the nation's defense.
After examining the depth and dimension of interservice rivalry' in the aftermath
of World War II, one might be tempted to make the observation that the guiding
principle behind the development of naval strategy during that period was the
competition with the other services for funds. While it undoubtedly did have an
impact, it would be a mistake to make such a generalization. From its inception the
Navy has waged a constant battle against the popular notion that a peacetime navy
serves no purpose. Throughout its existence the Navy has struggled with the Army
over limited defense dollars. Naturally, when the Air Force also joined in the
competition, the struggled intensified. Flowever, the most significant developments in
naval warfare have occurred outside the context of interservice rivalry.
Captain Mahan formulated his "sea control" doctrine without regard for
interservice rivalry. It was formulated to meet the threat posed by the inevitable
conflicts that he felt would result from the competition between capitalist countries
over world markets. [Ref. 7: pp. 107-1 OS]
The rise of the battleship as an instrument of war occurred as a manifestation of
Mahan's theory and response to international events and competition. The adoption of
naval aviation as the preeminent striking force of the Navy occurred as a result of the
Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor which sank the battleships--not to spite the Air
Corp. The strategic reorientation of U.S. naval forces ordered by James Forrestal
developed from his perception of Soviet worldwide aggression. Only secondarily were
these developments converted to become the useful bargaining tools of interservice
rivalry.
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Just as with these examples, the adoption of a nuclear role in the Navy, first as a
deployed atomic bomber, and then as a Polaris submarine, was a response to a
legitimate threat to the national interest and naval operations. The primary role
adopted for nuclear bombers was that of attacking submarine facilities, operating bases
and other tactical targets. Secondarily the bombers were assigned strategic roles, under
the assumption that overseas bases for Air Force strategic bombers would very likely
be unavailable. Likewise, the Polaris was developed as a deterrent to the employment
of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles that threatened the land-based deterrent of
ICBM's and manned bombers--not to usurp the role of the Air Force.
Undoubtedly, interservice rivalry played a role. However, that role was a
secondary one that could only respond with what the Navy had developed to meet the
foreign threat. To overemphasize that role would be in error.
A more legitimate criticism of the development of naval strategic policy after
World War II (and one that could apply equally well to the development of the
national strategy during the same time period) was the assumptions upon which that
strategic policy was founded. While naval strategy was developed as a response to an
external threat, there was little discussion or understanding of what the threat actually
was, what it was capable of doing, or what its intentions were. In debating the
development of a nuclear strategic policy, both the Navy and the Air Force based their
respective arguments upon the nature of the bomb and its purported destructive
capability. Neither the attitude of the Soviet Union toward the bomb nor its strategy
for employment of the bomb appears have been considered by the Air Force or Navy
in deciding their own strategy.
Historically, in 19th Century balance of power politics, such a disregard for the
enemy or his strategy might have been forgivable. Flowever, the unique character of
Soviet Communism has shown itself to be dramatically different from that of the status
quo powers of the 19th Century. The ideological underpinnings of communism
supporting Soviet imperialism have no precedent in history. To develop a nuclear
strategy in the 20th Century to address the threat of world communism demands an
exhaustive consideration for the motivations and strategy of that movement. Only
then could a strategy be developed within the constraints of the American political
situation that genuinely addressed the threat. For example, first Truman and then
Eisenhower founded the national strategy upon strategic nuclear bombing. This was
not done with any consideration for the motivations, objectives or strategy of the
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Soviet Union--but, was based upon the domestic economic constraints of the U.S.
political system. Rather than consider whether strategic nuclear bombing would really
keep the Soviet Union from committing acts of aggression, both administrations
assumed that it would because it would deter U.S. action had the circumstances been
reversed. And, it seemed to be the only strategy that could be afTorded.
The strategy of massive retaliation was adopted for three basic reasons. First, it
envisioned a war using few soldiers and in a place far from American shores. Second, it
was a technological solution to the messy business of war and technology was an area
in which the U.S. excelled. And, third, it was appeared economical. Supporting 500
strategic bombers was significantly cheaper that supporting thousands of troops
scattered around the world attempting to stamp out every eruption of Soviet
incrementalism. None of the above considers the impact that such a strategy of
massive retaliation would have upon the Soviet Union or whether it would actually
serve to deter them. There does not seem to have been any significant thought to what
actually deterred Soviet aggression. While the threat of nuclear annihilation would
certainly deter the United States from aggressive action, could the same be said for the
Soviet Union? Such an assumption was an inadequate basis upon which to found a
national strategy-particularly, considering the ideological imperative of the Soviet
Union to establish world hegemony.
Even the experience in Korea seems not to have measurably increased the effort
to address Soviet strategy. Upon taking office, President Eisenhower immediately
established the domestic economy as the determining factor in U.S. strategy--not Soviet
strategy. However, there are notable examples of particular insight into Soviet grand
strategy by some in leadership positions. They were not, unfortunately, accorded the
full attention they deserved. Frequently cited examples include George Kennan's
"Long Telegram," Paul Nitze's seminal eftbrt--NSC-6S, and James Forrestal's concerns
over Soviet expansionism. Despite the attention these examples and others received by
high level policy makers, their substance did not find itself reflected sufficiently clearly
in actual policy and budgeting. Domestic economics and interservice rivalry easily
surpassed their influence as the determining factors of national strategy.
Similarly, the Navy had to resist the inclination to become engrossed in domestic
political squabbling at the expense of developing a coherent strategic policy to deal
with the threat. While there was a general recognition of Soviet aggressive tendencies
by the U.S. naval leadership, initial efforts at postwar planning underestimated the
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potential naval threat that would later develop. Some, particularly those outside the
Navy, dismissed the idea that the Soviet Union would ever be anything more than a
land power. The Air Force used that sentiment to support a call for a reduction in
U.S. naval forces and a transfer of budgeted dollars to its cause of aerial warfare.
The sources of disregard for Soviet strategy and potential naval capability are
many and varied with the greatest contribution coming from persistent tendencies
toward isolationism. Despite the lessons of World War I, World War II and Korea,
the U.S. leadership continued to allow itself the privilege of ignoring the outside world
to pursue policies catering solely to domestic interests and constraints. In all fairness,
however, President Eisenhower was right in his fear that little would be gained in the
cold war with communism if the U.S. were to collapse economically. Nevertheless,
those policies which were implemented could have shown more consideration for Soviet
strategy.
In the Navy's postwar planning, the temptation to revert to isolationism was
prevented by Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal. Nevertheless, the development of
its strategic and tactical nuclear policy did show some disregard for Soviet strategy.
The Navy believed in a balance force that included the use of nuclear weapons. Why?
It was not because a balanced force was determined necessary to stop Soviet forces. It
was because the Navy had always favored balanced forces. The closest the Navy ever
came to saying otherwise was in remarks made by Admiral Nimitz in a report he
submitted upon his retirement from the office of Chief of Naval Operations. In his
report Admiral Nimitz remarked on the cause of the Japanese defeat in World War II
and credited air power, both Army and Navy, with "engendering in the enemy that
hopelessness which precedes submission." [Ref. 56: p. 534] Beyond this remark, the
Navy as a whole firmly believed that balanced forces had defeated the Japanese in the
Pacific. Balanced forces were deemed equally capable of defeating communism in the
Pacific. Unfortunately, the form and substance of Japanese aggression bore no
resemblance to the form and substance of communist aggression. While the Navy
admitted the presence of the threat-Soviet-inspired communist aggression— it failed to
account for the unique nature, motivations and strategy of the threat. Therein, the
Navy shared somewhat in the overall misdirection and disorientation of U.S. strategic
nuclear policy.
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B. A NEW TREND AND THE FUTURE
Even while accepting Forrestal's thinking on its potential contribution to
strategic warfare, the Navy initiated a twist to its strategy on the employment of
nuclear weapons. Initially this was manifested by the promotion of tactical nuclear
combat [Ref. 33: p. 94]. In contrast to the apparent futility of strategic nuclear
bombing, the Navy still credited the limited use of nuclear weapons in a tactical
situation as a legitimate strategy. This idea persisted throughout the 1950's and
seemed to be a well-balanced compromise between the destructiveness of the atomic
bomb and traditional naval strategy. The Navy felt that nuclear weapons could
provide a valuable contribution in the tactical warfare environment. All aircraft
carriers and bomber aircraft were subsequently configured to have a nuclear capability.
Increasingly, however, the Navy was determining for itself that essential nuclear parity
between the the two superpowers was changing the equation that supported the use of
nuclear weapons.
The growth of a nuclear retaliatory capability by both the U.S. and the Soviet
Union and the increasing awareness of the consequences of nuclear war led the Navy
more and more to question any use of nuclear weapons in combat. If the use of
nuclear weapons automatically brought about an escalation of the conflict to general
nuclear war then the use of nuclear weapons became more and more a dubious
strategy for victory. Douglas MacArthur expressed the growing sentiment both within
and outside the Navy that because of the growing stalemate nuclear war was
unwinable. by saying:
War has become a Frankenstein to destrov both sides. . . . If vou lose,
you are annihilated, If you win, you stand only to lose. No longer, does it
possess the chance of a winner of a" duel— it contains rather the germs of double
suicide. [Ref. 33: pp. 107-10SJ
MacArthur was seconded by General Taylor's remarks before congressional
airpower hearings in 1956 where he said the United States needed enough atomic
airpower deterrence to prevent a total atomic war—but not enough to fight and win
that war [Ref. 33: p. 156]. The Chief of Naval Operations, Arleigh Burke, added the
Navy's vote to the non-utility of nuclear weapons on 11 December 1957 by saying:
"Limited" action can destrov us just as surely as nuclear war, unless
appropriate force can be administere'd preciselv and rapidlv to stop or to confine
local disturbances. And in supplying thisTimited" pressure we must be careful
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not to applv too much pressure, for this mav cause a limited action to expand
into one of major proportions. [Ref. 33: p. 170]
Here Burke refers to the dubious capability of keeping a limited nuclear engagement
from becoming a general nuclear war and consequently bringing about the destruction
of both sides.
This growing attitude coupled with the already accepted belief that general
nuclear war was less likely than brush-fire engagements led the Navy to concentrate on
conventional weaponry. A clear distinction was felt to exist between the use of
conventional and nuclear weapons—a distinction that could obtain far longer in a crisis
than the tenuous distinction between limited and general nuclear war.
Finally, in January 195S the Navy issued a summary of Naval Warfare Group
Study Number 5, "National Policy Implications of Atomic Parity" which formally
presented a new trend in the Navy's strategic thinking on the use of nuclear weapons
that was more in line with the popular attitude concerning nuclear warfare. The
document explored the consequences of atomic parity between the U.S. and the Soviet
Union. The loss of the U.S. monopoly on nuclear weapons coupled with the Soviet
advances in nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles (the ballistic missile) was determined
to have altered traditional thinking on victory in warfare. Winning war was no longer
seen as significant as preventing war or stopping it once it had begun. Since
miscalculation and misunderstanding could possibly cause war despite the
destructiveness of atomic weapons, the prevention and deterrence of war became
paramount-much more so than achieving a dubious victory should war develop. For
that reason, U.S. nuclear forces should be oriented toward preventing nuclear war
rather than winning nuclear war. Consequently, forces that would be more effective in
nuclear combat should be replaced by weapons that served retaliatory functions
regardless of their efficacy in combat. [Ref. 33: pp. 171-172]
The logical outgrowth of this study supported the development and deployment
of the quintessential retaliatory force—the Polaris submarine. With its stealth and
invulnerability, the ballistic missile submarine represented the ultimate in retaliatory
force. Parenthetically, in contrast to a build-up of land-based warfighting forces that
would stimulate a spiraling arms race, a sea-based deterrent that served only as a
retaliatory force was believed to reduce arms competition.
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The Navy articulated this logic in a paper, National Policy Implications of Atomic
Power, issued by the Naval Warfare Analysis Group as Navwag US. [Ref. 37: p. 234].
In the paper the Group concluded that promoting the Air Force idea of hardening
missile silos and surrounding them with anti-missile batteries was a faulty concept that
would commit the U.S. "to an eternal, strength-sapping race in which the Soviets had a
head start." Naturally, they concluded that a deployed force of Polaris submarines did
not suffer from the same weaknesses. A mobile and invulnerable submarine deployed
in modest but sufficient numbers (finite deterrence) would deter war yet not promote
an arms race because it could not possibly be destroyed regardless of quantitative
improvements in enemy forces.
The Navy found itself divided in half-one half consisting of a ballistic missile
submarine force designed to barrage nuclear warheads upon the Soviet Union, and one
half made up of regular naval forces eschewing the use of nuclear weapons.
Consequently, the Navy embraced the concept of "finite deterrence" as explained by
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Radford during the airpower
hearings of 1956:
This visible deterrent may be obtained with very small forces. ... I think that
there will be a change [in the years 1957-19601. We are moving with our atomic
weapons capability toward more powerful deterrents with smaller forces. In
other words, a very small force can have a verv effective deterrent power, and I
think we have to explain that to our allies. [Ref. 33: p. 129]
While the Air Force was demanding the buildup of a B-52 bomber force in their
incessant pursuit of strategic bombing, the Navy was admitting the necessity of a
specific and finite strategic retaliatory capability. Once that capability had been
achieved, the Navy recommended emphasis upon a strong conventional capability to
address the more likely conflict—the brush-fire war.
Part and parcel with the strategy of finite deterrence embraced by the Navy was
its corollary-that defense against nuclear attack was less efficient at deterring war than
maintaining a well-hidden, effective and sure retaliatory capability. In a no-win game,
there is little incentive to play. If the Navy were to maintain a guaranteed nuclear
retaliatory capability, the initiation of general nuclear war by the Soviet Union would
be a remote possibility. Defensive measures by themselves, not directly threatening the
destruction of the enemy, by definition do nothing to stop him from the attempt to
attack and overcome them. However, retaliatory forces, which threaten his existence
should he fail, serve to deter him from the very attempt. [Ref. 33: p. 132]
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While the proponents of airpower continued their tirade through the halls of
Congress in the mid and late 1950's, massive retaliation and strategic bombing was
slowly giving way to the strategy of "Flexible Response." Eisenhower had already
abandoned massive retaliation as a consequence of Dienbienphu [Ref. 33: p. 51]. The
Navy was joined in its refutation of nuclear warfighting by the Army who actually bore
the brunt of the Air Force's machinations in the 50's through manning reductions and
budget cuts. Nevertheless, the deaths of massive retaliation and nuclear warfighting
were slow. The generation of the "bomber gap" and "missile gap" were latent
manifestations of the air atomic blitz philosophy that lingered on throughout the
period. Eventually, the nation's strategy shifted toward responding to Soviet
aggression with commensurate force--the strategy of "Flexible Response."
Likewise, the Navy entered a period of virtual abandonment of a nuclear
warfighting strategy. The dubious capability of preventing the escalation of a limited
nuclear exchange into a general nuclear war seemed to many prominent naval officers
as proof of the necessity not to initiate the use of nuclear weapons under any
circumstances.
However, as the strength of Soviet military forces has increased, the tactical
necessity of a U.S. reliance upon nuclear weapons in naval warfare has moderately
gained new life. The seemingly impossible task of defending naval forces or
accomplishing naval missions with conventional weapons alone against the increasing
strength of the Soviet military has forced the new application of nuclear weapons to
naval combat. Consequently, the Navy has continued to enhance both its nuclear
deterrent capability-the FBM with Poseidon and then Trident submarines, as well as
its tactical nuclear force-now complemented by nuclear-armed Tomahawk missiles.
Even the battleship has been resurrected to support a tactical nuclear conflict.
The Navy weathered the innumerable obstacles throughout its recent history with
some precarious moments. However, actual world events--the Korean War,
Dienbienphu, and later Viet Nam--continually vindicated the Navy's position on
warfare as well as demonstrated the value of its necessary contribution to national
defense.
00
""The consequence of the shift in national strategv was, of course, the Viet. Nam
War. One has to question the difference a continued reliance upon massive retaliation
would have had on U.S. involvement there.
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In conclusion, the Navy, despite the tortuous evolutions of its struggle for
viability from its inception to 1960. adhered to the strategy of a well-balanced fleet
consisting of all means of conducting naval warfare. The Navy incorporated nuclear
weapons into its strategy in a fashion to complement the entire thrust of its combined
forces. It refused to accept the "absolute" nature of the atomic bomb as the single
force capable of preventing and stopping communist aggression, but insisted that both
nuclear and conventional forces were necessary in the atomic age.
Although the Navy developed its nuclear strategic policy as a consequence oi"
recognizing the Soviet-communist threat to world peace, it was distracted by domestic
factors-budget constraints, interservice rivalry, and national strategy—from actually
considering the specific nature, motivations and strategy of communism. Therefore, the
Navy shared in the overall lack, of a coherent and effective national strategy to meet
the communist threat.
Before fully recognizing the consequences of nuclear war, the Navy tried to
incorporate the atomic bomb into a strategic attack role—principally, as an adjunct to
the Air Force's primary role of strategic bombing. Finding itself frustrated by the
cancellation of the super carrier, and disillusioned with the consequences of strategic
nuclear war, the Navy settled upon a tactical role for nuclear weapons. With the
deployment of Polaris, the Navy found itself possessing a strategic deterrent capability,
a tactical nuclear capability, as well as a traditional conventional capability. The Navy
entered the 1960's believing that the nuclear stalemate had lessened the chances of
general nuclear war, while doing little to prevent brush-fire conflicts fermented by
communist aggression.
The aircraft carrier and naval aviation were the centerpieces of postwar naval
strategy. Aviation was a vital instrument for justifying the Navy's continued viability
as a military service. Had the Navy been relegated to ships and submarines there can
be little doubt but that the Navy would have been reduced almost to the point of
virtual extinction-a fate promoted by air power enthusiasts. Fortunately, common
sense prevailed and the Navy was permitted to retain an extensive aviation capability
although the Navy as a whole was severely handicapped by budget constraints and
interservice rivalry.
Naval aviation provided the medium for integrating nuclear weapons into the
Navy's roles and missions. However, despite the adoption of a nuclear delivery
capability, the Navy shared the national ambivalence over a nuclear employment
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strategy. Not only was there a lack of consensus within the Navy over the proper use
of nuclear weapons, but advocates themselves fluctuated on their opinions, changing
from one strategy to the next.
However, prior to the deployment of Polaris, it can generally be said that
whatever the strategy in vogue, the Navy intended to use nuclear weapons as an
adjunct to the employment of traditional forces. Whether attacking a strategic or
tactical target, the atomic bomb was meant to complement and support the traditional
missions o[ the Navy—sea control and power projection. As has been repeatedly
emphasized, the Navy rejected the atomic bomb as the "absolute" weapon.
The development of a strategic deterrent capability. Polaris, was an ironic
maneuver that seemed to guarantee the rest of the Navy continued utility. By serving
as the "ultimate" deterrent Polaris removed nuclear war from the list of logical
warmaking options of state foreign policy thereby promoting conventional war as the
only alternative. Conventional war necessarily required naval forces. In that regard,
Polaris, by forcing a reliance on conventional war, promoted the employment of
traditional naval forces. 24
The question that remained for the Navy was the role that nuclear weapons
might play in limited warfare. Could nuclear weapons be used at sea in a limited
fashion without inevitable escalation to general nuclear war? Could the mass of Soviet
forces specifically directed at U.S. naval forces be defeated conventionally, or would the
use of nuclear weapons be necessary regardless of the consequences? Should the fleet
merely reject the first use of nuclear weapons and abdicate the final decision to the
enemy? These questions remain valid even while they remain essentially unanswered.
From the vantage point of the present era, it is clear that the Navy has achieved a
significant nuclear capability. What remains unclear is whether the Navy, after four
-Polaris was practicallv an aberration. If it performed its function as the
"ultimate deterrent" successfully, it would never be used. Consequentlv, it did not fit
into the requirement to complement traditional naval forces. Had it been developed as
an actual warfishting instrument, then undoubtedlv it would have been integrated
somehow into a niissTon that supported other naval 'forces. One has to wonder about
the possible implications of this on the Trident D5 missile. If the missile is accurate
enouch to eive it a warfuzhting capabilitv. will a move begin to incorporate its
capabilities into supporting other naval forces?
"4The Air Force, who in 1945 vowed the next war would be a nuclear war, by
preparing for it, actuallv ensured the next war would not be a nuclear war, but in fact a
conventional war-Kore'a.
-"The extent to which these questions have recentlv been answered by the
Maritime Strategy is beyond the scope of this study.
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decades of debate, has settled on a coherent and enduring nuclear strategy for the
employment of that capability.
In confirming the validity of the thesis of this study, one must conclude that the
actual development and deployment of a nuclear capability for the Navy was a
peripheral issue. It was prompted and carried out by relatively junior officers. The
more difficult process and the one that threatened the organizational dismemberment
of the Navy was deciding upon a strategy to support and integrate that capability into
naval warfare while remaining in harmony with the greater national strategy on nuclear
warfare. The process of developing the naval strategy that culminated with the
deployment of Polaris was tortuous and frustrating. It plunged the Navy into a
lengthy and acrimonious debate with the Air Force over roles and missions, an
abortive attempt to change national strategy, and, finally, a close encounter with the
prospects of virtual emasculation. In the end, world events—the rise of Soviet
imperialism, the Korean War and the demands of nuclear deterrence-brought




DESIGNATION OF COMMANDER OF JOINT TASK FORCE ONE
Directions given bv the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the designation letter to Admiral Bundv
assigning him as Commander of Joint Task Force One. r
1
'c
1. Bv direction of the President, you are designated commander of a task force under
the Joint Chiefs of Stall for the purpose of conducting tests for the determination of
the effects of atomic explosives against naval vessels in order to appraise the strategic
implications of atomic bombs including the results on naval design and tactics. You
will organize a joint staff with adequate representation of land, "sea. and air forces.
You will include civilian scientists in your organization.
2. The general requirements of the test will be to determine the effects of atomic
explosives against ships selected to give good representation of construction of modern
naval and merchant vessels suitabtv disposed to give a graduation of damage from
maximum to minimum. It is desired to include in the tests both air detonation and
underwater detonation if the latter is considered feasible. Tests should be so arranged
as to take advantage of opportunities to obtain the effects of atomic explosives against
ground and air targets and to acquire scientific data of general value if this is
practicable.
3. Your are authorized to deal directly with agencies of the War and Naw Department
in all matters relating to the preparation for the conduct of these tests: including direct
access to the Manhattan District, Usual service lines will be available for
administrative and logistical support of forces assigned. . . .
4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will appoint as a separate agency, directly responsible to
them, an evaluation board (committee) for the express purpose of evaluating the results
of the test. This board will be available to you for advice during the preparation of the
tests. Appropriate sections of your organization will collaborate with this board as
necessary, ana you will provide it with all necessary facilities it may require to fulfill its
iunctions.
5. You will prepare plans for the test including selection of a suitable site which will
permit, accomplishment of the test with acceptable risk and minimum hazard. Your
plans for the operation and final report will oe submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
for their approval.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:





NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
An excerpt from the Act outlining the Navy's roles and missions
Sec. 206 (a) The term "Department of the Navy" as used in this Act shall be construed
to mean the Department of the Navy at the 'seat of government: the headquarters.
Lnited States Marine Corps: the entire operating forces of the Lnited States Navy,
including naval aviation, and of the Lnited States" Marine Corps, including the reserve
components of such forces: all field activities, headquarters, forces, bases. Installations,
activities, and functions under the control or supervision of the Department of the
Navy; and the Lnited States Coast Guard when operating as a part of the naw
pursuant to law.
(b) In general the United States Navy, within the Department of the Navy, shall
include naval combat and services forces and such aviation as may be organic therein.
It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat
incident to operations at sea. It shall oe responsible' for the preparation of naval forces
necessarv for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned, and, in
accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime
components of the Navy to meet the needs of war.
All naval aviation shall be integrated with the naval service as part thereof within the
Department of the Navv. Naval aviation shall consist o[ combat and service and
training forces, and shall' include land-based naval aviation, air transport essential for
naval operations, all air weapons and air techniques involved in the operations and
activities of the United Stated Navy, and the entire remainder of the aeronautical
organization of the United States Navy, together with the personnel necessary therefor.
The Navy shall be generally responsible for naval reconnaissance, anti-submarine
warfare, and protection of shipping.
The Navy shall develop aircraft, weapons, tactics, technique, organization and
equipment of naval combat and service elements; matters of joint concern as to these
functions shall be coordinated between the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy.
(c) The Lnited States Marine Corps, within the Department of the Naw, shall include
land combat and service forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. The
Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to'provide'lleet marine forces
of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet
in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land
operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. It shall be the
dutv of the Marine Corps to develop, in coordination with the ARmy and the Air
Force, those phases of amphibious operations which pertain to the tactics, technique,
and equipment employed by landing forces, In addition, the Marine Corps shall
provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the navv, shall
provide securitv detachments' for the protection of naval property at naval stations and
bases, and shall perform such other duties as the President mav direct: Provided, that
such additional duties shall not detract from or interfere with the operations for which
the Marine Corps is primarily organized. The Marine Corps shall be responsible, in
accordance with integrated join mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime
components of the Marine Corp to meet the needs of war.




Excerpt defining the functions of the Navy.
The United States Navy includes naval combat and service forces, naval aviation, and
the Lnited States Marine Corps. It is organized, trained and equipped primarily lor
prompt and sustained combat at sea. The" Navy is responsible for the preparation of
naval forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war. and in accordance with
integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of
the Navy to meet the needs of war.
The specific functions of the United States Navy are: 1. To organize, train and equip
naval forces for:
a. Operations at sea, including joint operations.
b. The control of vital sea areas, the protection of vital sea lanes, and the
suppresssion of enemy sea commerce.
c. The support of occupation forces as required.
d. The seizure of minor enemv shore positions capable of reduction by such
landing forces as may be comprised within the fleet organization.
e. Naval reconnaissance, anti-submarine warfare, and protection of shipping.
The air aspects of those functions shall be coordinated with the Air Force,
including the development and procurement of aircraft, and air
installations located on shore, ana use shall be made of Air Force
personnel, equipment and facilities in all cases where economy and
effectiveness win therebv be increased. Subject to the above provision,
the Navy will not be restricted as to types of aircraft maintained and
operated" for these purposes.
f. The air transport necessarv for essential internal and for air transport over
routes of sole interest to "naval forces where the requirements cannot be
met by normal air transport facilities.
2. To develop weapons, tactics, technique, organization and equipment of naval
combat and service elements, coordinating with the Army and the Air Force in
all aspects of joint concern, including "those which pertain to amphibious
operations.
3. To provide, as directed bv proper authority, such missions and detachments for
service in foreign countries as may be required to support the national policies
and interests ofthe United States.
4. To maintain the U.S. Marine Corps whose specific functions are:
a. To provide Marine Forces together with supporting air components, for
service with the Fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases
and for the conduct of limited land operations in connection therewith.
b. To develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force those
phases of amphibious operations which pertain to the tactics, technique
and equipment employed by landing forces.
c. To provide detachments and organization for service on armed vessels of
the Navy.
d. To provide security detachments for protection of naval property at naval
stations and bases.
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e. To provide, as directed bv proper authority, such missions and
detachments for service in foreign countries as may be required to support
the national policies and inaterests of the United States.
To assist the Army and the Air Force in the accomplishment of their missions,
including the provision of common services and supplies as determined Im-
proper authority.
Cited in Rosenberg, David A. and Kennedv, Floyd D., History of the Strategic
Arms Competition, 1945-1972, Supporting Study/ U.S. Aircraft Carriers in the
Strategic Role, Part I—Naval Strategy in a Period of Change: Interservice Rivalry,
Strategic Interaction, and the Development of a Nuclear Attack Capability,
1945-1951. Falls Church. Virginia: Lulejian and Associates. Inc.. Contract
N00014-75-C-0327 for DeputvXhief of Naval Operations (Plans and Policv).
Department of the Navy, October 1975, pp. 92-93.
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